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ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores the evolution of China’s foreign investment policies and laws between 1978-
2016.  The main goal of this study is to provide an objective narrative about the past and 
present development of Chinese foreign investment from a legal perspective. The study includes 
discussions about the creation, development, and reforms of these policies and laws. In 
addition, this project considers problems and opportunities of Chinese foreign investment 
regulatory regime. The first chapter is the introduction, which offers detailed explanations for 
the main focus, issues, and structure of the thesis, the methodology of the study and the reason 
for conducting this study, an executive summary for each chapter is provided at the end. 
Second, the third, and the fourth chapter will respectively focus on China’s foreign investment 
regulatory framework during 1978-1991, 1992-2005, 2006-2016. A short summary is provided at 
the end of chapter four to conclude this study. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The main focus of this study is the evolution of the FDI policy and law in China 
from 1978-2016. This study considers two important issues: first, what is the FDI 
regulatory framework and how has it developed and been reformed. It considers and 
analyzes the effectiveness and impact of such framework from a legal perspective. 
Second, what is the implication of China’s FDI regulatory framework for China’s 
investment environment within the context of the rule of law? It considers and analyzes 
the dynamic relationship between the regulator and market within the context of the 
FDI regulatory framework.  
 
1. Concept definition  
“Law” and “Policy.” 
“Law” and “Policy” in this study refer to a general view shared by academics and 
public and internal views among those working within the system.1 In this sense, “law” 
refers to a structure of norms, regulations, and rules made by the authority for the 
purpose of social governance with specific enforceable details. The modern 
constitutional theory within the Chinese paradigm would strictly define law as rules 
made by the National People’s Congress and applied by the court. Government 
Ordinances, Decrees, or Regulations are rules made by the People’s Government with 
                                               
1 Peerenboom, Randall, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002): 567.  
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power authorized by the Constitution.2 “Policy” refers to a structure of guidance with 
abstract principles produced by governing entities. It is quite common that “law” would 
adopt recommendations or goals established by “policy.”  
 
A discussion about China’s foreign investment policy and law during the 1980s 
would be a challenge to the modern definition on “law” and “policy.” It is important to 
note that rules and “recommendations” made by the government were prevalent in 
China’s foreign investment regulatory framework, especially during the 1980s when 
China did not have a functioning commercial legal system. Also as one problem in 
China’s rule of law system, policies sometimes function as government rules, and 
government rule operates as the law. Thus, this study adopts a broader meaning of law 
and policy: the law and policy both refer to structures that guide people in a given area. 
Unless otherwise emphasized, Law could refer to rules made either by the National 
People’s Congress and government agencies.  
 
FDI 
Western scholars identified that Chinese adopt a broader definition of FDI, which 
considered all usage of foreign funds for commercial activities, such as equity joint 
venture (EJV), Wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOE), and cooperative ventures, 
cooperative development of oil resources, compensation trade and even processing and 
                                               
2 Larry Catá Backer, Wang  Keren, “The Emerging Structures of Socialist Constitutionalism with 
Chinese Characteristics: Extra-Judicial Detention and the Chinese Constitutional Order,” Rim L. & 
Pol'y J 23 no.2, (2014): 20. Accessed July 31, 2017, http://hdl.handle.net/1773.1/1365. 
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assembly arrangements. For example, the 1982 Foreign Investment Commission listed 
six forms of foreign investment: 
1. Foreign loans 
2. Foreign investment in joint ventures 
3. Compensatory trade and cooperative management  
4. Joint exploration and exploitation of offshore oil 
5. Foreign investment in SEZ 
6. Investment through China International Trust and Investment Corporation CITIC3 
 
A declassified 1984 CIA study on Chinese economic policy found that, “both 
forms of joint ventures, as well as joint oil exploration agreements and wholly owned 
foreign subsidiaries, would be considered as foreign direct investment.” The CIA study 
further pointed that the “Chinese would include other forms of business arrangements, 
such as licensing, processing, and compensation trade agreements, even though no 
foreign claims on real assets located in China exist as foreign investment. The Chinese 
sometimes use the term foreign investment loosely to refer to all forms of foreign 
participation, even including foreign loans to Chinese enterprises.” 4 It is noted that 
“compensation trade” was later removed from “FDI” under government statistics in the 
90s.   
                                               
3 CIA, “Directorate of Intelligence,” 20 Nov, 20, 1984, accessed July 31, 2017,   
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00287R001001060001-5.pdf  
4 Ibid.  
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2. Structure of the thesis  
This study is organized in four chapters in chronological order. The first chapter 
is the introduction, which explains the purpose, intent, and methodology of the study. It 
provides an executive summary of each chapter to illustrate the purpose, main content, 
and structure of these chapters. The second chapter focuses on the FDI framework 
between 1978-1991. The third chapter concentrates on the FDI framework between 
1992-2005. The fourth chapter concentrates on the FDI framework between 2006-2016. 
In the end, it will provide a short summary to conclude the study. In addition, the thesis 
follows a simple structure for each chapter. Each chapter starts with a section of the 
introduction, which explains the focus and main issue of the chapter.  Then it is followed 
by a section of the ideological and constitutional framework, which examines the 
constitutional and political context of the FDI legal framework during the time. The next 
section will concentrate on the legal framework for foreign investment. In order to help 
readers identify arguments and discussions in these two sections, each section would 
start with a mini introduction explaining the main focus and findings. Each chapter will 
end up with a short conclusion.  
 
Why discuss the ideological and constitutional framework in each chapter  
First, Chinese foreign investment policy and the law is an expression that is 
embedded within the overall political, ideological and social institutional framework: it 
reflects an agenda to revitalize national prosperity and to restore decent living and self-
13 
 
respect, goals are also shared by individual private citizens. Many studies considered 
that Chinese culture is one important element in explaining China’s business practice, 
and the lack of the rule of law. But this study argues that Chinese culture does not have 
significant explanatory power for the creation and quality of China’s FDI framework. 
Chinese culture may explain a certain aspect of the policy tendency, but this study 
considers the ideological and constitutional framework to provide a theoretical and 
conceptual foundation for the creation and enforcement of laws and policies. These 
laws and policies are also common extensions of China’s ideological and constitutional 
framework.  
 
Second, by outlining and discussing the political principles proposed by Chinese 
Communist Party, and how these principles and reform agenda are textualized by the 
Constitution of People’s Republic of China, the ideological and constitutional framework 
section can provide a necessary context to illuminate the form and substance of the law 
and policy, and the pattern of the development. Thus, each chapter provides a short 
section about China’s ideological and constitutional framework before the discussion of 
the legal framework for a better understanding of the subject.  
 
Why exclude pre-1978 period from this study  
1978 marked the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution 
is one of the most important events in China’s history. It provided rich and meaningful 
implications that reshaped the politics, ideology and cultural system. The significance of 
14 
 
the Cultural Revolution is undeniable. However, this study will not include discussion of 
this topic mainly because it would distract from the main theme of the study.  
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to provide an objective account of China’s 
foreign investment policy and law from the legal perspective. It is noted that politics and 
ideologies are an important part that shapes the view of the society and the substance 
of the law, which is why each chapter will include a section that discusses the ideological 
and constitutional framework. However, in the process of research and study, this study 
found the origins and development of the Cultural Revolution to be interesting and 
complex. The historical background is rich: the progress of domestic law and policy was 
largely influenced by the entanglement of China’s domestic political and economic 
agenda and international geopolitics during the Cold-war era. In addition, there was no 
meaningful FDI and no functioning legal framework during the Cultural Revolution.  
 
Although the Cultural Revolution provides a rich and interesting insight into 
political leaders’ interpretation of China’s socialist system, an objective discussion on 
the subject would require extensive debates that may distract from the main theme of 
the study: a study of China’s foreign investment law and policy through a legal 
perspective. For this reason, the thesis would start the discussion right after the end of 
the Cultural Revolution in the late 70s.  
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3. Data and method  
The information and data supporting this thesis come from two sources. One 
includes published journals, books, and newspapers. A significant amount of the 
published materials were collected electronically through online databases, university 
library services and other commercial databases such as Jstor. The second source of 
information comes from Chinese news media, databases, and official government 
websites. Unless cited otherwise, the majority of the Chinese law and policies cited in 
this study were collected from the Westlaw China database. Unless otherwise noted, 
the English translation of the laws and policies are provided by Westlaw China. For the 
convenience of the reference, this study does not change the translation provided by 
Westlaw China; this does not mean the author agrees with the translation.  In addition, 
special thanks to those who work for government agencies who offered their personal 
views and insights on the function and operation of government policy, which provided 
necessary help in understanding certain issues.  
 
4. Rationale for topic choice  
It is in-part a personal reason for the author to choose this subject. I was born at 
the end of the 1980s, almost a decade since the Reform and Open Up policy. In fact, I 
consider myself as a beneficiary of this policy. I witnessed the transformation of China’s 
landscape, physically and metaphorically. I remembered the time when the grown-ups 
talked about life under the Planned Economy, and I was amazed by those stories. The 
evolution of FDI for the past decade and the change of China is the story that I live and 
breathe every day. It intimately affects everyone but still seems mysterious. Such 
16 
 
mystery facilitates a channel for exploration: to explore the meaning of myself and the 
other various academic interests.  
 
I still vividly remember the first time when I dined at the first McDonalds in my 
city when I was 7 years old. Like the younger generation standing in line waiting for the 
first iPhone, my parents, along with many other thousands of people on that opening 
day in 1993, took me to this American restaurant to experience the taste of U.S.A.  A 
piece of yellow square thing in the Big Mac was the first cheese I ever had in my life. “It 
tastes interesting, but what is that?” I still remember it. As one of the members of the 
post-cultural revolution generation, we have the luxury to consume, discuss, engage and 
be influenced by the West, or a certain form of the West created by certain views and 
imageries from the movies, magazines, music, and English textbooks. We do not have 
the historical burden with the West as my previous generation does. I still remember 
the security guard at my elementary school joking about “imperialist capitalist 
American” when he saw the letter of “U.S.A” on my friend's jacket. I also understand 
that the reality is always way more complex than what the surface shows us. As many 
Chinese students first come to the U.S., they are shocked that America is not the 
concrete jungle depicted by Hollywood but with different regional cultures and 
personalities. On the contrary, China has been trying to transform its urban landscape 
with more and more skyscrapers. I was also shocked and later understood there are 
more stories behind the separation of power; there are more shades under freedom of 
speech, and also there are more stories about my country and history.  
17 
 
The stories and meaning behind that Big Mac are way larger than what I can 
imagine when I first had it. Indeed, my personal experience is a representative slice of 
the experience of the larger post-Cultural Revolution generation. This generation of 
Chinese can be seen as beneficiaries or product of a society that was formed and shaped 
by many characters, teachers, politicians, academics, entrepreneurs, and most 
importantly, foreigners. Under globalization, foreigners in China bring in fresh new 
views, cultures, and perspectives. The Big Mac I had, the computer I typed on, and 
movie I watched are the creations of those foreign investors, Chinese partners, Chinese 
regulators, global treaties, and global banking infrastructure. 
Today, a Chinese can sit in his or her apartment in Beijing and order a bottle of 
French wine from a French vineyard from the cell phone and have it delivered in a week. 
Decades ago, investors needed to work years of preparation and administration process 
to provide the same product to Chinese customers. “We, humans, crave myth, first 
because they are good stories, but second because they nurture our desire for meaning. 
We see struggle transformed into a righteous cause and from that, we draw purpose of 
applying in our own lives. The purpose is the catalyst for our actions. The purpose, 
therefore, sparks where we want to go (vision), what we want to accomplish (mission) 
and what we believe (values).” 5 I consider the evolution of FDI policy and law in China 
to be a great story with many interesting twists. It is a story of my generation. More 
importantly, it helps me understand my country, my culture, and my people.  
                                               
5 John Baldoni, “Dunkirk: When Valor Becomes Myth,” Forbes, August 3, 2017, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbaldoni/2017/08/03/dunkirk-when-valor-becomes-
myth/#fcfe1a969d79.  
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5. Limitation of the study 
FDI policy and law is a huge subject with various interests and focuses. It is impossible to 
cover all aspects of the FDI policy and framework in one essay. This study acknowledges 
the limits of the research and study due to such limitations. In order to illustrate the 
object of this study, it selects and highlights some areas of the FDI framework, including 
the registration and verification rules, the foreign exchange control framework in China, 
and the corporate governance under Chinese company law. Also, it considers the issue 
of corruption in relation to Chinese FDI regulatory framework. However, this study did 
not provide a comprehensive overview of China’s tax policy and law.  
 
 
6. Executive summary of each chapter  
Chapter 2 FDI Policy and Law 1978-1991 
The main focus of this chapter is the FDI framework during 1978- 1991. The main 
theme of this period was the introduction of foreign investment under Chinese reform 
and Open Up program. The main issues are, first what was the basic framework of 
foreign investment in China at the beginning of the reform, and second, how it worked 
under Chinese centralized planning economic system. The main findings are, first, the 
Reform and Open Up reshaped China’s history with foreign investment. The foreign 
investment introduced new elements to Chinese centralized command system, which 
19 
 
facilitated economic, political and constitutional reform. Second, the basic legal 
framework of FDI contained many features of the centralized economic system, which 
caused massive criticisms from the investment community and criticisms from 
conservative politicians for being not centralized enough.  
 
Chapter 3 FDI Policy and Law 1992-2005 
The main focus of this chapter is the FDI Policy and Law in 1992-2005. The main 
theme during this period was the establishment of the socialist market economy with 
“Chinese characteristics,” which protected the private interest and promoted market 
competition. The main issues are, first, how FDI framework developed in this new 
period, and second, how foreign investment worked under these new developments. 
The main findings are, first, China developed a dualist commercial legal system, one 
exclusively for domestic firms and another designed for foreign investors. This system 
not only insulated SOE sector from competition but also created unfair treatments for 
foreign investors and domestic investors. Second, the FDI framework retained many 
central planning elements. In addition, these central planning elements raised the 
concern of corruption and problems for the rule of law.  
 
Chapter 4 FDI Policy and Law 2006-2016 
The main focus of this chapter is FDI Policy and Law 2006-2016. The main theme 
during this period was the new challenges and opportunities for Chinese FDI framework. 
The main issues are (1), Chinese traditional “dualist commercial” system proved to be 
20 
 
insufficient in further serving China’s new conditions. The traditional export-oriented 
FDI policy first cannot attract high-quality FDI, and secondly, the benefits of the policy 
reached its limits, causing China’s imbalanced trade relationship. (2) The dualist 
commercial system discriminated and alienated private sectors from the Chinese 
market, which caused capital outflow with possibly more restrictions to deter such 
outflow.  The main findings are that, first, Chinese authorities acknowledged the issue 
with traditional FDI policy and dualist commercial system. The Shanghai Free Trade Zone 
experiment was designed to offer unified and fair market access for both domestic and 
foreign investors. In addition, China has been working in close collaboration with the 
international legal framework by promoting a new “public disclosure” scheme to create 
a robust regulatory framework. In addition, the development of China’s Wechat 
economy structure introduced an alternative regulatory approach to Chinese FDI 
framework, which empowers the individual consumer to enforce values and orders 
promoted by a central authority.  
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Chapter 2 THE FDI POLICY AND LAW BETWEEN 1978-1991 
 
Changes occurred at the end of the 1970s that led to Chinese reform and Open 
Up. Externally, China returned to the world stage. For example, in 1971, China admitted 
to the UN. Nixon visited China in 1972 and started negotiation for establishing 
diplomatic relations. 6  In 1979, China and US signed the Economic Cooperation 
Agreement, which awarded China Most Favored National (MFN) status.7 China joined 
the IMF and World Bank in 1980. During the late 1970s, the Chinese government 
launched many overseas economic delegations participated in by Chinese industrialists; 
bank, finance, and trade officials; and economists. These state-sponsored high-level 
economic delegations normally took weeks or even months touring a specific region of 
the world with a particular agenda: to learn firsthand information on modernization and 
                                               
6 Shanghai Communiqué laid out the foundation for the normalization of Sino-U.S. relationship, 
which removed many political obstacles for later rapprochement with the West. “Shanghai 
Communiqué, which laid the basis for future cooperation between the two countries even while 
acknowledging continuing disagreements on the subject of Taiwan…” See “China Policy,” 
Department of the State, Office of the Historian, accessed July 31, 2017,  
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy.  
7 “China was first awarded MFN in 1979, during the Jimmy Carter Administration. Two-way trade 
between the two countries more than doubled in a year, to $4.9 billion in 1980 from $2.4 billion 
the year before. By 1990, China enjoyed a $10.4-billion annual surplus in its trade with the 
United States, with exports totaling $15.2 billion and imports of U.S. goods worth $4.8 billion. 
U.S. officials have predicted that China's surplus will be even larger this year. Chinese officials 
have said that over the long term, they seek balanced trade. But meanwhile, this surplus places 
China in a stronger position to service foreign loans and to finance future imports.” See, David 
Holley, “Briefing Paper : Most Favored Nation: What It Means for the Chinese,” LA Times, last 
modified June 4, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-04/news/wr-114_1_favored-nation-
trading-status, (accessed August 10, 2011) 
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economic reform. 8 These missions respectively produced great information as a 
resource for policy makers, which later contributed to the creation of Reform and Open 
Up policy with the goal of introducing foreign investment. 
 
Internally, China started political, ideological and economic reform in 
preparation for the new economic and investment development. For example, the 1976 
“Gang of Four” was purged and then arrested for trial. New political line “Four 
Modernizations” was proposed to develop the national economy. With constant policy 
debates and arguments, the reformers concluded that China’s central command 
economy lacked flexibility, which deterred productivity and competition. The “Reform 
and Open Up” policy was established through the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee of CPC, which started China’s experiment with foreign investment 
and economic reform.  
 
This chapter focuses on the FDI policy and law between 1978-1991. The main 
purpose is to understand the genesis of the FDI regulatory framework during this period 
of the time. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part gives a comprehensive 
                                               
8 The destination of these delegations including:  Asian (including places such as Japan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong), West Europe (including countries such as France, Belgium, Denmark, 
Switzerland, and West Germany), East Europe (including Romania and Yugoslavia) and United 
States in North America.    “In 1978, Gu Mu, then vice premier of the State Council, led an 
economic delegation to visit five Western European countries. It was the first time the Chinese 
government had ever officially dispatched representatives to Western countries since the 
founding of New China in 1949. See, Zhao linyun, Zhongguo guongchandang jingji gongzuo shi 
[CPC Economic Work History 1921-2011] (Beijing, Zhongguo Caijing jingji Press, 2011), 100. 
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overview of the historical events of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Congress of CPC in 
the introduction, which led to the promulgation and development of Chinese reform 
and Open Up policy. In addition, it outlines the ideological and constitutional framework 
to support China’s foreign investment experiment in the next section. It provides a 
political and constitutional perspective to explore the third part of this chapter, the legal 
framework of FDI regulation during 1978-1991. This part would first identify the basis of 
FDI regulatory framework by introducing EJV Law and its implementing regulations. 
Then it gives special attention to China’s foreign exchange regulation and labor 
regulation to showcase China’s unique FDI regulation under China’s command economy. 
 
 The central issue of the FDI policy and law development during the 1978-1991 
was the dynamic between the central authority’s traditional command economy setting 
and the development of the new foreign investment regime. The study of the 
ideological and constitutional framework and foreign investment legal framework 
during this time suggests a contentious relationship between the conventional 
understanding of socialism and the meaning of modernization, exemplified, 
implemented and introduced by foreign investors. The most obvious evidence would be 
foreign investors’ expectation for a large domestic consumer market and low labor cost 
played against China’s policymakers’ expectation for foreign capital and technology 
without an open domestic market. These issues had not been settled until the 14th 
Party Congress in 1992, a historical event that will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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1. Introduction  
After rehabilitated from the political prosecution during the cultural revolution 
and restored to his political power within the Chinese Communist Party , Deng Xiaoping 
and his followers gradually re-established a pragmatic political line for the Party : to 
improve the living standard of Chinese people under the leadership of the Party through 
the program of Four Modernizations, which was originally proposed by the late prime 
minister Zhou Enlai, but was suspended due to the interference of the far-left faction 
and Zhou’s illness. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with multiple state official visits to 
major western countries, and numerous of close collaborations with specialists from 
international organizations (such as World Bank), Deng Xiaoping and his followers 
gradually formulated a notion that China cannot improve economic performance and 
productivity without the world market. Specifically, Deng believed a meaningful and 
successful modernization cannot be achieved without foreign capital, technology, 
managerial skills, market, and investment. 9Most importantly, modernization cannot 
achieve without the law to govern and protect people and society. 10  
                                               
9 A West German coal mining company produces 50 million tons of coals with two thousand 
employees while the same output requires 80 thousands employees. for the same amount of 
output, a Switzerland Hydroelectric power plant only require 12 staff while China requires 
almost three hundred. see Gu mu, “Guanyu Fangwen Ouzhou Wuguo de Qingkuang Baogao,” 
[Report on Visitation of Five Western European States],  1978, July, 22 reprinted in Dangde 
Wenxian 1 (2009), http://www.hprc.org.cn/pdf/DANG200901007.pdf.  (accessed July 31, 2017) 
10 Deng Xiaoping returned to power on a platform that emphasized the    "two hands policy" and 
the "four modernizations." The two hands policy meant that on the one hand, the economy 
must be developed while on the other hand, the legal system must be strengthened. The four 
modernizations referred to the need to modernize agriculture, industry, national defense, and 
science and technology. See Randall Peerenboom, “Globalization, Path Dependency and the 
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Deng’s visions were crystallized at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central 
CPC Congress, when China declared the Reform and Open-Up policy, which symbolized 
a new era for China’s relationship with socialism, with world economy, and with foreign 
investors. The new economic policy was supported by the revelation of two crucial and 
intertwined factors: first, the power of global commerce and foreign investment in 
improving the economy performance and living standard of the people, which was 
evidenced by the successful transformation of Japan and Singapore in the 1970s11; 
second, a more connected and integrated global economic system indicated by 
increasingly stabilized international relationship between the West and China, which 
was considered as an unprecedented opportunity for China due to its  ideological 
conflict with the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the 60s. 12 
 
“Reform” in the context of the Reform and Open- Up meant to transform China’s 
ideology thinking, and to restructure the institution of the Party and State apparatus. 
“Open-Up” meant to reconnect with the West and the rest of world through trade and 
foreign investment. From late 1970s to early 1990s, there had been insufficient political, 
                                               
Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China,” 
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 19 (2001): 161-163. 
11 Gu mu, “Guanyu Fangwen Ouzhou Wuguo de Qingkuang Baogao,” [Report on Visitation of 
Five Western European States],  1978, July, 22 reprinted in Dangde Wenxian 1 (2009), 
http://www.hprc.org.cn/pdf/DANG200901007.pdf.  (accessed July 31, 2017) 
12 John W. Garver, China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of 
China, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) 358-361.   
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legal, and social infrastructure to implement the Reform and Open Up policy. But this 
did not stop the central authority to give it a try. It was a period of reconstruction 
between 1978-1993: political and ideological debates and institutional overhaul 
established new political and constitutional principles, which served as the foundation 
and guidance for the reform. During this period, massive amount of new legislation and 
regulations enabled and facilitated the inflow of foreign investment and trade. 
 
The introduction of foreign investment under the Reform and Open Up policy  
has truly liberated the economy. According to the study by Shen jiaming, “since 1979, 
more than 2100 joint ventures, cooperative enterprises and business wholly owned by 
foreign firms have been established in China.” 13 There was no western business 
presence in China before 1978 and the rapid growth was unprecedented. “By the end of 
1984, total paid-in foreign investment in these enterprises had grown to $3.7 billion, 
almost 60 percent higher than the year-end figure for 1983.”14 The communication 
between China and the West also experienced rapidly increased since the 
implementation of the Reform and Open Up policy. “By September 1988, there were 
already 1,047 foreign representative offices in Beijing... P.R.C.'s exports in 1987 total 
                                               
13 Shen Jiaming, “Investment in the People’s Republic of China: The Basic Legal Framework,” 
U.Pa.J.Int' lBus.L. 10(1988): 409,  
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume10/issue3/Shen10U.Pa.J.Int'lBus.L.409(
1988).pdf, (accessed July 31, 2017) 
14 Ibid.  
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34.6 billion dollars, 256% higher than that in 1978. Similarly, its imports in 1987 total 
33.4 billion dollars, 210% greater than that in 1978.” 15  
 
A significant amount of foreign investment contracts was signed between 1979 
to 1986. According to the study by Garry Dernelle, it was estimated that about “7,500 
foreign investment contracts were signed with a value of approximately 19.1 billion U.S. 
dollars.”16 Economic data illustrated the initial enthusiasm of the foreign investors. 
However, this excitement soon fizzled when foreign investors encounter the reality of 
Chinese central planning economy. For example, the CIA reported that FDI rose about 
“10 percent to more than $2 billion in 1986, but the level of new foreign investment 
pledged fell nearly 50 percent.”17 Western observers noted that “disappointment 
toward new FDI regulation” and uncertainty derived from political debate over the 
“pace and direction of economic reform” were the causes of the change of the 
numbers.18  
 
With the enactment of the Contractual Joint Venture (CJV) Law and Wholly 
Foreign Owned Enterprise (WFOE) Law, some foreign investors organized their business 
                                               
15 Ibid.     
16 Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s 
Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 (1993):345. Also see Zhang Lixing, “The Statutory 
Framework for Direct Foreign Investment in China,” FLORIDA INT'L LJ.  4 (1989): 289-290.   
17CIA Office of East Asia Analysis, “Directorate of Intelligence: Foreign Investment in China in 
1986, and Prospects for 1987,” CIA , March 31 1987, accessed July 29, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90T00114R000200110001-4.pdf.   
18 Ibid.   
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in the form of CJV or WFOE. The CIA report found that “[a]mong 1500 approved SFJV 
contracts in 1986, there were 870 EJV and 560 CJV and 18 WFOE.”19 During 1978-1992, 
FDI inflows increased steadily and rapidly. However, the distribution was uneven. Most 
of the inflows concentrated in coastal China. For example, Guangdong Province. “FDI 
has played a major role in Chinese economy, for instance by stimulating trade growth 
and promoting productivity improvements in the domestic economy. Hong Kong 
remains the largest source of FDI. Measured by the size of its population and other 
objective factors, China’s potential for attracting more FDI from OECD countries remains 
underexploited.”20 
 
Despite the rapid growth of the FDI, the central authority did not have consensus 
as to the extent and the political implication of the foreign investment. The central 
authority was divided into two factions: a moderate faction supporting foreign investors 
and market reform, and a traditionalist faction supporting central command economy.21  
                                               
19 Ibid.   
20 See OECD, The Role of FDI In China's Economic Development, OECD Publishing, 2003, accessed 
July 31, 2017, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-investment-policy-
revie 
ws-china-2003/the-role-of-fdi-in-china-s-economic-development_9789264101975-4-en.    
21 China’s observers in the 1970s observed and labeled two groups of policies advocators. One 
was moderate and another was radicals. The “Moderator view China as a weak, vulnerable, 
underdeveloped country which must be transformed as rapidly as possible into a modern 
industrial state. They believe, among other things, that modernization requires scientific 
exchanges with and imports of technologically advanced investment goods from the West.” 
However, the radicals hold a different view, they “believe that large-scale imports of foreign 
goods undermine faith of the people in the success of the revolution and makes China 
vulnerable to economic ‘blackmail’. The Radicals believe that reliance on foreigners rekindles 
the sense of inferiority caused by a century of humiliation at the hands of the West and that 
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The traditionalists were struggling with the ideological debate on whether to accept 
foreign investors and their market economy practice on a longer term and larger scale. 
Traditionalist faction envisioned a curated command economy that private sector and 
the market alone are not trusted to be sufficient to generate long-term stable economic 
growth. 22 The objection of traditionalists for foreign investment was ideological: foreign 
investment and relevant reforms represented capitalism economy, which is 
incompatible with the socialist economy.  
 
Deng Xiaoping and his followers had a clear vision of the relationship between 
Socialism and market economy for the purpose of reform. In Deng Xiaoping’s mind, 
foreign investment and export-oriented industries were great policy tools to resolve 
China’s modernization problem. The export-oriented and foreign joint venture industry 
could serve as a means to pay importation of advanced machinery. In addition, with the 
possibility of the joint venture, China can finance the industry upgrade through foreign 
investments. Furthermore, foreign invested enterprises would establish examples to 
promote modernized corporate governance.23 This approach was supported by other 
                                               
exposure to capitalists, capitalist-made products, and capitalist business procedures erodes the 
revolutionary will of the masses, leading to revisionism.” See, Randall Peerenboom, 
“Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of 
Law in the People's Republic of China,” BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 19 (2001): 161-163.  
 
23 For example:“In early 1979, Chinese arranged commercial credit lines amounting to nearly 10 
billion, mostly with Japanese banks. China also made major capital purchases, during mid-1979, 
over 17 billion worth of pledges for officially supported export credits from France 7, UK 5, and 
Japan 1.8, Canada 1.7 and Italy 1. China’s balance of payments position improved dramatically 
over the next year as a result of excellent export growth.”see:  Central Intelligence Agency 
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senior leaders of the Party. For example, the vice prime minister Li Xiannian proposed 
that the state shall reduce the fiscal pressure of direct purchasing foreign technology by 
relying on compensatory trade and foreign investments.24In order to convince the party 
cadres, Deng Xiaoping’s made public remarks that Mao Zedong supported economic 
cooperation with the West in the form of trade and joint ventures, as Deng stated that:  
“While Comrade Mao was still living we thought about expanding economic and 
technical exchanges with other countries. We wanted to develop economic and 
trade relations with certain capitalist countries and even to absorb foreign 
capital and undertake joint ventures.”25  
 
However, not everyone believed it. Deng argued that one cannot convince the 
masses to follow socialism if the administration failed to maintain sustainable 
development. With a sense of relentless pragmatism, he emphatically refuted that a 
market economy only lives in capitalism.26 For example, in order to relax the tension 
                                               
National Foreign Assessment Center, Memorandum China’s International Economic Relations, 
Oct 28, 1981, Page 1, accessed july 28, 2017,   
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00551R000200050011-1.pdf.  
24 Wen Tiejun, Dong Xiaodan, “Xue Cui, Gaige kaifang yilai zhongguo duiwai kaifang lishi de 
yanbian jiqi neizai luoji,” [Evolution of Chinese reform and Open Up Policy and Logic behind it] 
, in Zhongguo Jingjishi Yanjiu 2 (2012): 148.  
25 Deng Xiaoping,  “Hold High the Banner of Mao Zedong Thought and Adhere to the Principle of 
Seeking Truth From Facts,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, digital version please see: 
https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/hold-high-the-banner-of-mao-zedong-
thought-and-adhere-to-the-principle-of-seeking-truth-from-facts/    
26 For example, when Deng Xiaoping talked to Guinea first president Ahmed Sékou Touré, he 
argued that “the first thing about socialism is the development of productivity...the right or 
wrong of a socialist economic policy shall be determined by its effect on the development of 
productivity and people’s income. This is the overriding standard.” See “Zhongguo Gaige Kaifang 
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with the far-left in the Party, he skillfully packaged his reform agenda in a Maoist 
expression by stating that “modernization is a new Great Revolution.”27 Deng 
highlighted the main theme of the reform is to relax centralized planning.28     
 
Although reform and decentralization were inevitable, foreign investment 
experiment faced many political obstructions. Traditionalists, such as Chen Yun and his 
followers repeatedly emphasized the supremacy of the central planning and 
unapologetically pointed out the inherited defects of the market, such as opportunism, 
would cause the collapse of those fiscally irresponsible reform policies. As a major 
critique of the Reform, Chen opposed the expansion of the Special Economic Zone 
experiment and considered these experiments should be contained within the approved 
regions. Ironically, this idea was resonant by others after Deng Xiaoping’s retirement in 
the early 1990s. Chen Yun theorized his idea as the “bird-cage economy,” in which the 
                                               
Da Shiji,” [Reform and Open Up Chronical 1977-2008] 
http://www.reformdata.org/book/200805/34.html.   
27 Here is another example showing Deng Xiaoping explaining the meaninig of the 
Modernization. “Modernization is a new Great Revolution. The object of our revolution is to 
liberate and develop productivity. It is certainly wrong to conclude that market economy only 
live in a capitalist society. Why socialist society cannot engage market economy. Our economy, 
or socialist market economy is a combination of market economy and plan economy, which plan 
economy is dominant.” Deng Xiaoping’s conversation with Paul T. K. Lin, director of East Asian 
Study Institution of McGill University, Dec. 26, 1979. Ibid.   
28 For example: State Council, Economic System Reform Working Group issued Preliminary 
Opinion Concerning the Reform of Economic Administration System, which provided that 
economic mechanism shall be the primary means for government administration of the 
economy, and state shall expand autonomous operation by the enterprises. Also see, the 
MOFERT Report on Reforming Foreign Trade System provided that the main focus of the reform 
is to separate government agency and enterprise operation, decentralization of approving 
process and make trade company financially independent from the central planning.  
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cage represents central planning under Party leadership and the bird represents the 
market. “A bird can fly freely in the cage when the size of the cage is appropriate for the 
comfort of the bird,” as Chen explained. It is important to point out that Chen Yun did 
not principally oppose reform or improvements in productivity. Although many 
traditionalists had ideological reasons to object foreign investment, there were also 
other concerns. For example, Chen concerned a free market would threaten the 
effectiveness of central planning in maintaining economic balance and protect people’s 
economic rights.   
 
A central command economy system is a self-proclaimed rule system that 
requires all transactions following the central government. The integrity of the central 
command economy system depends on the restrictions on the freedom of contract. The 
rationale was that the private sector could not achieve optimization of economic 
outcome. A centralized authority can produce an optimized outcome through central 
planning. One risk for Chinese reform and Open Up was the issue of opportunism and 
rent-seeking during the transition from central command economy to a more relaxed 
economy system. The condition went worse when there was no effective commercial 
law system during the 1980s. The launch of Reform and Open UP since the end of the 
1970s entailed unprecedented waves of inflation, smuggling goods, corruption, which in 
return gave platforms for the critics from conservative members of the Party and 
massive protests by students. Deng realized the rise of official corruption and illegal 
activities at an alarming rate, which could jeopardize the central authority’s legitimacy 
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and capacity in implementing the reform.  For example, state and Party officials had 
unchecked access to obtain finance, natural resource, commodity, and information for 
business opportunities under the planning system. These officials and their family 
members and friends obtained unfair advantages over business transactions.  
 
Many foreign investment laws and regulations during the 1980s reflected the 
struggles that the traditionalists experienced. The conflicts between the command 
economy and the notion of competition and profit were the main theme of the 
contradiction of the reform during the 1980s and early 90s. The contradiction was not 
truly settled until the beginning of the 1990s when the Party decided to build the 
“socialist market economy.” The terminology “socialist market economy” expressed a 
concession of political rhetoric against market and profit, which was extraordinary given 
the fact that a decade ago, China was vigorously condemning the market and profit.29 
 
Unfortunately, the Reform and Open Up ended up with a series of setbacks and 
conflicts in the late 1980s, politically and economically. China still lacked a basic civil and 
commercial legal system at the end of the 80s. Inflation, corruption, an opportunism for 
short-term profit by state officials and enterprise managers, and other elements seeded 
and fomented a sense of conflicts and discontent between the reformers and 
                                               
29 For detailed function of a planned economy in China and how such function affect China’s 
productivity, see Anna M. Han, “China’s Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In a Transitional 
Economy,” Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 5 (1995):457, accesed July 27, 2017,  
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1488&context=facpubs.  
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conservatives. There were also massive protests by students that led to strong reactions 
from political conservatives.30 Uncertainty shadowed China’s future at the beginning of 
the 1990s with the visible decline of foreign trade, and with foreign investment and 
public condemnation from the western societies. In 1991, the public narrative turned to 
a harsher tone on the reform with an ideological attack on the supporters of the reform. 
For example, an editorial in People’s Daily suggested that China cannot sustain a market 
economy. Another editorial openly revived Maoist expression of bourgeois 
liberalization, which openly attacked the new reform policies as the host of such right-
wing tendency. The Premier openly stated that the development of the economy should 
slow down.  
 
However, the story of foreign investment and reforms during the 1980s did not 
end this way. Deng Xiaoping was fully aware of the mood and narrative calling for 
retreating from further reform. He orchestrated a semi-private trip to the Special 
Economic Zone during the Chinese New Year of 1992.31 During the trip, his open 
remarks on Chinese administration revealed his frustration and concern for the 
                                               
30 For example, the new year editorial of People’s Daily in 1987 proposed to uphold Four 
Cardinal Principle and against Bourgeois liberalization (Zi chan jie ji zi you hua 资产阶级自由化
思潮)  
31 Between Jan 18 and Feb 21 of 1992, Deng Xiaoping scheduled a southern tour through train to 
visit Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai. He made public speech openly criticized the slowdown of 
reform process. He called for further liberal market reform. Initially, the southern tour was not 
publicized by the official press until later of the year. About the organization and subsequent 
implication of the trip, see Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, 
(Cambridge, MA, and London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011): 876. 
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slowdown of the reform. He unapologetically proclaimed that the debate of central 
planning and market economy is not a defining element of socialist ideology, which was 
a position he repeatedly argued throughout the 1980s.32 To him, a much more 
appropriate benchmark or the predominant defining element for socialism would be the 
performance of the economy and living standard of the people.33 Deng’s public remark 
later resonated with his followers in the Party. The mood of uncertainty disappeared by 
the end of 1992. It is interesting, from a retrospective, to reconsider Deng’s reaction and 
remarks. It is clear that conservatives’ concern over reform derived from the classic 
problem of “opportunism” under market economy system without a strong protection 
from the rule of law. Although Deng himself mentioned the administration should 
concentrate on reforming and relaxing central planning and regulation on the one hand, 
on the other hand, he warned the administration the need to use law and legal system 
to punish illegal activities such as corruption and smuggling. The 1992 Deng Xiaoping’s 
Southern Tour ended the uncertainty of Chinese reform and entailed a new era of 
China’s development of the FDI legislation. In addition, an economy performance 
benchmark, such as GDP, GNP and or other economic data had started to be a critical 
evaluation standard to determine the policy of the state and career path of state 
                                               
32 Deng Xiaoping told future premier Zhu Rongji during his Shanghai visit in 1991 that it is 
impossible to have economic development without open up. In addition, China cannot stop the 
reform because there were different opinions in the party. Ibid.  
33  For example, “Fundamentally, the reason we cannot step forward on the path of reform 
linked to our fear for capitalism and capitalism path. The benchmark for socialism or capitalism 
debate should be whether the policy could improve socialist productivity, whether it could 
improve national power and the living standard of the people.” Ibid.  
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officials.      
 
2. Ideological and Constitutional Framework  
a. Ideological Framework  
 
Acceptance is the first step of invitation for foreign investors. Before China 
opened the gate for foreign investment, the political rhetoric against market and private 
ownership had gradually declined but not disappeared throughout the 1980s. During 
the 1970s, the 11th Party Congress asserted that “defend socialist economy, against 
attacks from urban and rural capitalism.34” At the end of the 1970s, although the official 
position on the privately owned or operated economy was less supportive, it turned a 
neutral and less combative tone. It considered such acts as the “supplement and 
addition” to a socialist economy. In 1981, the 6th Plenary Session of 11th Central CPC 
showed more supports, which affirmed that such economic activity is “necessary 
supplement.”  The 12th Party Congress further relaxed the taboo by claiming private 
owned, or the operated economy is “necessary and beneficial.” The authority approved 
three economy forms during the early 1980s: State owned enterprises (SOE), Collective 
Ownership and Individual owned or operated economy. The term for individual owned 
                                               
34 “Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyici quanguo daibiao dahui jianjie 中国共产党第十一次全国
代表大会简介” [Brief Introduction on the 11th National Party Congress], last modified 
November 1, 2002, 
http://www.cas.cn/zt/jzt/djzt/sldzt/lcddh/200211/t20021101_2669504.shtml. (accessed July 
31, 2017) 
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or the operating economy in Chinese is “Geti jingji,” literally meaning individual 
economy of urban and rural working people, which de-emphasize the issue of 
ownership due to political sensitivity. In 1988, the political rhetoric dismissed the 
traditional taboo on the market and private ownership; it proposed a new term “Siying 
jingji” (private sector of the economy) in Chinese, which means a form of an economy 
managed and operated by private sector. This new policy also approved by 1988 
Constitution. The 1988 Constitution amendment added a new paragraph to article 11, 
which stated that: 
 
“The State permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop within 
limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the economy is a complement to 
the socialist public economy. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of 
the private sector of the economy and exercises guidance, supervision, and 
control over the private sector of the economy.35” 
 
The pre-amendment article provided that:  
“The individual economy of urban and rural working people, operating within 
limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the socialist public economy. The 
State protects the lawful rights and interests of the individual economy. The 
                                               
351988 Const Amendment.   
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State guides assists and supervises the individual economy by administrative 
control.36 
This section focuses on the ideological and constitutional framework between 
1978-1991 that contribute to the development of China’s foreign investment policy and 
law. It will provide a brief overview over the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central CPC 
and the promulgation of the 1982 Constitution, which offers a necessary historical 
context in understanding the FDI legal framework in the next section.  
 
Various events occurred prior to the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central 
Committee of CPC in 1978 suggested a gowning consensus that questioning the 
legitimacy of the old thinking and structure on what defines as socialism. For example, 
left extremists and Mao’s followers’ political line was publicly debated and questioned. 
The supports for the reform grown stronger. The idea of rewarding one’s labor based on 
performance and contribution was no longer considered as capitalism practice.37 A new 
economic system “rural responsibility” was introduced and implemented, to allow 
peasants sell any products that exceed their assigned portion.38 The People’s 
Procuratorate was restored as a part of Chinese legal system rebuild after the Cultural 
                                               
36 Art.11 PRC Const.  
37‘ During the cultural revolution, the principle that “To each according to his contribution” 
（Anlao Fenpei 按劳分配） was denounced as capitalism.  Zhongguo gaige kaifang dashiji 
bianxiezu, [Reform and Open Up Chronical Committee] Chronical of Chinese reform and Open 
Up 1977-2008 , ( Beijing: Zhongguo caijing Press, 2008) 
http://www.reformdata.org/content/20080509/1272.html.  
38  Ibid.  
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Revolution. In multiple occasions, Deng revealed that “fundamental feature showing the 
superiority of the socialist system is to be able to have an unprecedented development 
of productivity than the old society [pre-1949 Republic of China time], and to be able 
gradually to satisfy the growing needs of the people.”39 Two days before the meeting, 
on December 16, Beijing and Washington jointly issued  Joint Communiqué on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, which was unimaginable when China acquiesced 
U.S. as imperialists just a few years ago. 40 
 
On December 22, 1978, Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing.41 Historians and Chinese authorities 
later consider this meeting as the beginning of a new era for China: it not only 
denounced left extremism political ideology but also opened a small gate to reconsider 
the role of central planning, which is essential for the decision for the Reform and Open 
Up policy and the policy of accepting foreign investment in China.  
 
On the ideological side, this meeting officially ended the political line of class 
struggle as the main goal of the state, which was just affirmed in 1978 Constitution in 
                                               
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid. 
41 Zhonggong shiyi jie sanzhong quanhui (中共十一届三中全会) [Communique of the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] adopted at the 
Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Dec. 
22, 1978, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-
review/1978/PR1978-52.pdf.   
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less than ten months.42 In assessing the past left extremist political movements, the 
meeting linked the connection between Party’s failure of enforcing democratic 
centralism and the expansion extremist political view. Thus, it called for restoring the 
principle of democratic centralism and collective leadership, and the need for restoring 
the rule of law in protecting people’s Constitutional rights-- a move that not only later 
successfully attacked Mao’s followers in the Party, but also made it possible to 
rehabilitate many Party cadres and intellectuals.43 For example, it emphatically stated 
the importance of law in safeguarding people’s democracy and socialism four 
modernization.44 Law is needed for building and improving the socialist legal system.45   
                                               
42 The People's Republic of China is a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat led by 
the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. PRC Constitution. Art.1  
43 “The plenary session unanimously endorsed the policy decision put forward by Comrade Hua 
Guofeng on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on shifting the emphasis of 
our Party's work and the attention of the people of the whole country to socialist 
modernization.”  
“The session highly evaluated the discussion of whether practice is the sole criterion for testing 
truth, noting that this is of far-reaching historic significance in encouraging comrades of the 
whole Party and the people of the whole country to emancipate their minds and follow the 
correct ideological line.” See, “Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central 
Committee,” Beijing Review.com October 10, 2008, 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/special/third_plenum_17thcpc/txt/2008-
10/10/content_156226_5.htm.  
44 Since for a period in the past democratic centralism was not carried out in the true sense, 
centralism being divorced from democracy and there being too little democracy, it is necessary 
to lay particular emphasis on democracy at present, and on the dialectical relationship between 
democracy and centralism, so as to make the mass line the foundation of the Party's centralized 
leadership and the effective direction of the organizations of production. See The Communique. 
45 In order to safeguard people's democracy, it is imperative to strengthen the socialist legal 
system so that democracy is systematized and written into law in such a way as to ensure the 
stability, continuity and full authority of this democratic system and these laws; there must be 
laws for people to follow, these laws must be observed, their enforcement must be strict and 
law breakers must be dealt with. From now on, legislative work should have an important place 
on the agenda of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee. Procuratorial and 
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In addition, it announced to shift the focus from politics and ideology to a more 
moderate and practical goal: economic development and modernization. The meeting’s 
diagnosis on China’s economic performance linked the underperformance of the 
economy with China’s over centralized command economy system. It openly criticized 
that the entanglement between government agencies and enterprises under the 
centralization creating problems for the performance efficiency.46 The cautiously 
drafted language suggested the planning may not be compatible with the law of the 
economics and function of the value in economic activities.47 Thus, the meeting 
proposed for decentralization and liberalization based on its critique of a centralized 
command economy. The Communique proposed new policy designed to separate Party, 
government, and enterprise through introducing a new “responsibility system,” 
                                               
judicial organizations must maintain their independence as is appropriate; they must faithfully 
abide by the laws, rules and regulations, serve the people's interests, keep to the facts; 
guarantee the equality of all people before the people's laws and deny anyone the privilege of 
being above the law. See, “Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central 
Committee,” Beijing Review.com October 10, 2008, 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/special/third_plenum_17thcpc/txt/2008-
10/10/content_156226_5.htm. 
46 “The session points out that one of the serious shortcomings in the structure of economic 
management in our country is the over-concentration of authority, and it is necessary boldly to 
shift it under guidance from the leadership to lower levels so that the local authorities and 
industrial and agricultural enterprises will have greater power of decision in management under 
the guidance of unified state planning; big efforts should be made to simplify bodies at various 
levels charged with economic administration and transfer most of their functions to such 
enterprises as specialized companies or complexes. Ibid.  
47  “It is necessary to act firmly in line with the law of economics, attach importance to the 
function of the value in economics, consciously combine ideological and political work with 
economic methods and give full play to the enthusiasm of cadres and workers for production.” 
Ibid. 
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performance evaluation and promotion system.48 Translate into plain language this was 
a half supports to private interest, private profits.  
 
It is important to point out that the 1978 Meeting was not the end of the debate 
for the nature of the reform and legitimacy of foreign investment policy under a socialist 
system, on the contrary, the meeting cracked an opening on the supreme status of 
central planning. In fact, as the FDI policy and legislation expressed, China was not fully 
embracing the notion of the market economy during the entire 1980s. Questions and 
debates about the legitimacy of the new reform and the definition of socialism 
throughout the 1980s. For example, less than three months after the Third Plenary 
Session, the head of Plan Commission, Chen Yun published his essay on the issues of 
Central Planning and Market. He argued that socialist economy needs two defining 
feature: 1, centralized planning, which is the foundation; 2, the market as a supplement 
to adjust the central plan.   
 
Although debates about the nature of socialism in the context of introducing 
foreign investment never ends during the 1980s, the central authority made the 
                                               
48 “ It is necessary, under the centralized leadership of the Party, to tackle conscientiously the 
failure to make a distinction between the Party, the government and the enterprise and to put a 
stop to the substitution of Party for government and the substitution of government for 
enterprise administration, to institute a division of responsibilities among different levels, types 
of work and individuals, increase the authority and responsibility of administrative bodies and 
managerial personnel, reduce the number of meetings and amount of paperwork to raise work 
efficiency, and conscientiously adopt the practices of examination, reward and punishment, 
promotion and demotion. Ibid.  
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decision for the Reform and Open Up. In fact, the decision of reform and open up, using 
foreign investment and establishing special economic zone was the result of some 
careful policy studies and debates. The information pool for the policymaker came from 
two sources. First, a massive wave of state-sponsored economic delegation around the 
world to investigate and study economic development in other countries. Second, close 
academic cooperation with an international organization, such as World Bank. 49 
 
b. Constitutional Framework  
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th National Congress of CPC established an 
ideological and conceptual framework for the development of China’s socialist 
modernization. It fundamentally shifted Authority's focus from politics to economic 
development by redefining China’s socialism. After the Third Plenary Session of 11th 
Central Committee of CPC, the Party  openly denounced the Cultural Revolution and 
announced a new political line of focusing modernization and economic development. 
                                               
49 “The World Bank’s first official mission to China to discuss Beijing’s request was led by its 
president, Robert McNamara in April 1980. The mission was received by Deng Xiaoping who told 
the mission: “We are very poor. We have lost touch with the world. We need the World Bank to 
catch up. We can do it without you, but we can do it quicker and better with you.” The change in 
China’s representation in the World Bank was arranged with amazing speed; in May1980 the 
Board approved Beijing’s request. The first mission was led by “thirty two Bank staff 
(economists, agronomists, engineers, health experts, education experts and other sector 
specialists) participated at various times, from October through December … The Chinese 
organized a counterpart team which included Zhu Rongji (China’s PM from 1998 – 
2003)…Mission findings were reflected in a 1,000-page multi-volume report entitled ‘China: 
Socialist Economic Development’ which was submitted to the Bank’s Board before the first 
project loan was presented for approval in June 1981.” see Pieter Bottelier, “China and the 
World Bank: How a Partnership Was Built,” Working Paper No. 277, accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/84e3/99cb8a4029d3bba20d34a754ce98da230dd8.pdf.  
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Since then, the central authority started the process of drafting constitution 
amendment, to restore and rebuild China’s legal infrastructure. According to Peng 
Zhen’s report to the National People’s Congress (NPC), the NPC started this process by 
establishing a Constitution Amendment Committee to charge the draft in 1980.50 This 
Constitution amendment later has become the basis of China’s current constitutional 
framework. The report particularly highlighted that: 
Our country follows the policy of opening to the outside world while adhering to 
the principle of independence and will continue to do so in the days to come. 
China will continue to expand economic, technological and cultural exchanges 
with other countries on the principle of equality and mutual benefit. The draft 
stipulates that foreign economic organizations and individuals foreign may invest 
in China and enter into economic cooperation with Chinese economic 
organizations. Of course, all foreign economic organizations in China must abide 
by the laws of the People’s Republic of China, and their lawful rights and 
interests will be protected by the law of the People’s Republic of China.51 
 
                                               
50 Peng zhen, “Report on the Draft of the Revised Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” 
delivered at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on November 26, 1982, 
accessed, July 27, 2017 http://www.e-chaupak.net/database/chicon/1982/1982e.report.pdf.   
51 Zhonggong shiyi jie sanzhong quanhui (中共十一届三中全会) [Communique of the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] adopted at the 
Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Dec. 
22, 1978, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-
review/1978/PR1978-52.pdf.   
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The 1982 Constitution is one landmark legislation that affirmed the principles of 
the 3rd plenary session, which established the constitutional basis for Chinese reform 
and Open Up. It provides a legal basis for China’s new economic reform and foreign 
investment. Although it has limits, it is a necessary tool for the later development. The 
Preamble provided that:  
 
“The future of China is closely linked with that of the whole world. China adheres 
to an independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles of mutual 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, 
noninterference in each other’s' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and 
cultural exchanges with other countries.”52 
 
The article 6 of the Constitution defined China’s economic system; it provided that: 
 
The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is 
socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the 
whole people and collective ownership by the working people. The system of 
socialist public ownership supersedes the system of exploitation of man by man; 
                                               
52 Preamble, PRC Constitution.  
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it applies the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to 
his work.53 
 
As later discussion indicated, between 1978-1991, China’s foreign investment legal 
framework operated within a centralized planning economy. The government 
functioned as the central planner with unchecked power, and China’s legal system was 
underdeveloped.  Other articles in the Constitution can also highlight this central 
planning economy. For example, article 11 defined the relationship between private 
sector and public sector:  
The individual economy of urban and rural working people, operating within 
limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the socialist public economy. The 
State protects the lawful rights and interests of the individual economy. The 
State guides assists and supervises the individual economy by administrative 
control.54 
The statutory language clearly stated the words “control,” which indicated that the 
supports to the private sector were minimum. Article 12 further emphasized 
that: “Socialist public property is inviolable. The State protects socialist public 
property.”55 However, no similar treatment was awarded to “private sector,” which 
                                               
53 PRC. Const art. 6. 
54 PRC. Const art. 11. 
55 PRC. Const art.12. 
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affirmed a clear and differentiated treatment by the Constitution. 56Article 18 stipulated 
basic principle of the foreign investment. It provided that: 
 
The People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, other foreign 
economic organizations, and individual foreigners to invest in China and to enter 
into various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese enterprises and other 
Chinese economic organizations in accordance with the provisions of the laws of 
the People's Republic of China. All foreign enterprises, other foreign economic 
organizations as well as Chinese-foreign joint ventures within Chinese territory 
shall abide by the laws of the People's Republic of China. Their lawful rights and 
interests are protected by the laws of the People's Republic of China.57 
 
The restrictive tone over China’s private-sector under the Constitution create a shocking 
contrast with the article 18. As the discussions in next section suggested, the 
development of FDI framework between 1978-1991 displayed a dualist regulation 
system. China’s private sector was oppressed by the central planning system. The 
foreign investments were treated as tools for creating foreign exchange and technology 
for China’s economic development.  
 
 
                                               
56 This changed in 2004 Constitution amendment. See next chapter discussion.  
57 PRC. Const art.18. 
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3. FDI Legal Framework 1978-1991  
 
On July 1st of 1979, the second session of The Fifth National People’s Congress 
adopted Sino- Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (hereinafter EJV Law).58 This was the 
first foreign invested enterprise (hereinafter FIE) related legislation since the 3rd Plenary 
Session of the 11th National Congress of CPC proclaiming the decision of Reform and 
Open Up. The 1979 EJV Law was an “enabling act” for containing only 15 short articles. 
Supplementary legislation such as Implementing EJV Regulations was adopted to 
provide necessary guidance for the investor and regulator. The 1979 EJV Law and its 
implementing rules formed the foundation for China’s foreign investment framework.  
 
The first generation of the foreign investment legal framework demonstrated 
various features of the centralized command economy system. For example, (1) the 
Sino-foreign joint venture (JVs) adopt the principle of “equal share, equal rights,” which 
negated the rights of majority shareholder by requiring a unanimous decision. (2) The 
chairman of the board of director in a foreign invested enterprise (FIE) must be served 
by a Chinese. (3) FIE must submit detailed production and operation plan to China’s 
planning authority for inspection and review before, during and after production. (4) 
The FIE cannot sell its products to China’s domestic market without obtaining 
                                               
58 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture (promulgated July. 
1, 1979 by the Second Session of The Fifth National People’s Congress) [hereinafter EJV Law]. 
Many studies and publications during the 80s also translated the title of this law as Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment.  
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administrative permission. Even with permission, the products must be sold to a 
government agency that in charge of the distribution because there was no private 
distribution network and market. (5) The employee of the FIE must be appointed or 
recommended by local labor authority. Any disciplinary punishment or discharge must 
be approved by such authority. In addition, due to a shortage of foreign exchange, strict 
foreign exchange rule was placed on FIE. (6) Employees can only remit 50% of their 
salary outside China. Initial enthusiasm from investment community soon declined due 
to market restrictions, the lack of a meaningful and clear legal guidance, and strict rules 
on foreign exchange.  
 
The central authority was not unaware of these unpopular restrictions and 
regulations. The State Council issued 1986 Encouragement Provision, which designed to 
relax some unpopular restrictions. With this new measure, FIE can hire or discipline 
employee at their will. The restriction on Chinese chairman was also removed. In 1986 
the NPC adopted WFOE Law, in 1990 State Council adopted WFOE Implementing Rules.  
These two laws allowed foreign investors to establish a wholly owned business in China. 
The Contractual Joint Venture Law (hereinafter CJV Law) was enacted in 1988. The EJV, 
WFOE (Wholly foreign owned enterprises), and CJV referred to different forms of 
investment structure for foreign investors. The Contractual Joint Venture is a special 
form of a business venture based on contract. The venture itself would not be an 
independent legal entity. Each investor would be held responsible in accordance with 
their shares of contribution. Legally, this form of investment remembered to the 
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structure of a partnership. The EJV Law, WFOE Law, and CJV Law and their implementing 
rules formed the basis of China’s FDI regulatory framework. Under this foreign 
investment legal framework, China later adopted relevant tax regulations, labor 
regulations, foreign exchange regulations and contract regulations. In addition, as many 
ignored, China adopted special investment measures for investors from Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan with less restrictive rules. Throughout the 1980s, China had signed 
series bilateral treaties of investment protection with different countries around the 
world to gain MFN status.59 These treaties became the foundation for China’s future 
investment regime.  
It is important to point out that there was no formal commercial legal 
infrastructure during the 1980s. Thus most of the FIE related legislation were fulfilled by 
administrative rules and decrees created by State Council or relevant departments. In 
addition, foreign investment laws promoted arbitration as dispute resolution when 
China’s litigation system was not ready to adjudicate disputes involved foreign investors.  
                                               
59 See Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Belgian-
Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
accessed July 31, 2017, http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/h/au/201001/20100106725192.html.   
Art. 3.1: Direct or indirect investment made by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party shall enjoy equitable treatment.  
art. 3.3 The treatment and protection provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not be 
less favorable than that enjoyed by investors of a third State.  
Art. 11: Investors of one Contracting Party shall enjoy the most favored nation treatment in the 
territory in the of the other Contracting Party in respect of all the matters subject to this 
Agreement. Or see: Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's 
Republic of China on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments: Neither 
Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities associated with such investments by 
the investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favorable than that accorded to 
the investments and associated activities by the investors of any third State. 
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The FDI framework during the 1980s subject to various criticisms from the investment 
community. The most prominent one was a lack of coherency and clarity. Corruption 
and rent-seeking issues were also quite serious throughout the 1980s. However, as 
Deng famously stated: it is better to have some law than not, and we can improve it 
later. Massive legislation during the 1990s started China’s judicial system 
modernization, which focuses on the quality of the legislation and the professionalism 
of judicial system.  
 
This section exclusively focuses on the legal framework of FDI between 1978- 
1991. The purpose is to illustrate how the foreign investment policies and laws were 
created and developed through analysis of the laws and regulations. This section will 
first discuss the EJV Law and supplementing regulations. In this part, it will provide an 
article by article analysis of the first EJV Law. Then it will provide a shorter analysis on 
WFOE Law and CJV Law because these laws are sharing similar regulations with the EJV 
Law. In addition, this section will also discuss the foreign exchange regulations and labor 
regulations. The purpose of this section is to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
basic framework of foreign investment regulation. At the end of this section, a short 
summary will be provided to highlight issues and complaints of China’s FDI framework 
between 1978-1991.  
 
a. EJV Law Framework  
On July 1st of 1979, the second session of The Fifth National People’s Congress 
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adopted Sino- Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (hereinafter EJV Law).60 This EJV Law 
was later amended in 1990 and 2001. The current 2016 EJV Law is based on 2001 
version with one minor change. There were only fifteen articles for the 1979 EJV Law. As 
one scholar concluded that the law was “too vague and too skeleton.”61 Thus, 
supplementary legislation was created during the 1980s to form an EJV regulatory 
framework.  
 
The main purpose of the EJV Law, as the article one stated, was to “expanding 
international economic cooperation and technological exchange.”62 Interestingly, the 
phrase “international economic cooperation and technological exchange,” widely used 
in diplomatic context played down the economic implication of foreign investors 
                                               
60 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture (promulgated July. 
1, 1979 by the Second Session of The Fifth National People’s Congress)中华人民共和国中外合
资经营企业法. Many studies and publications during the 80s also translated the title of this law 
as Law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign 
Investment.  
61 Barbara Campbell Potter, “China's equity joint venture law: a standing invitation to the West 
for foreign investment?” Univ. Penn. J. Int. Law  12, no.1 (1993) :362 Accessed July 31, 2017,  
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume14/issue1/Potter14U.Pa.J.Int%27lBus.L.
1(1993).pdf.   
62 Art.1, EJV Law. “With a view to expanding international economic cooperation and 
technological exchange, the People's Republic of China shall permit foreign companies, 
enterprises, other economic organizations or individuals (hereinafter referred to as "foreign 
joint venturers") to establish equity joint ventures together with Chinese companies, enterprises 
or other economic organizations (hereinafter referred to as "Chinese joint venturers") within the 
territory of the People's Republic of China, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit and 
subject to approval by the Chinese Government. ” 
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because capitalism was still a sensitive issue. 63 Foe example, one of the issues at the 
planning stage of establishing SEZ was how to name the special experiment. The term 
“trade zone,” “export zone” or even “industrial park” were refused because they were 
considered as the too bourgeoisie. 
 
With only fifteen articles, the signature 1979 EJV Law covered very basic aspect 
of foreign investment without any supports from a functioning domestic legal system 
due to lack of contract law, civil code or other essential commercial law.64 Thus, the 
1979 EJV Law was more of a political statement than a meaningful legal guidance, which 
affirmed the will of enforcing the open up policy. As Deng himself admitted “an 
imperfect law is better than nothing,” because it could be the first step for later 
improvement.65 In addition, the 1979 EJV Law did serve some practice interests. First, as 
                                               
63 The 1978 Constitution and political rhetoric at late 1970s remained hostile to foreign 
elements. See 1978 Constitution preamble. See P.R.C. Const. Preamble, “We must persevere in 
the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and in the struggle for the socialist road 
against the capitalist road. We must oppose revisionism and prevent the restoration and 
aggression against our country by social-imperialism and imperialism.” accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:People%27s_Republic_of_China_1978_Constitu
tion.pdf&page=3/.   
64 China do not have any form of contract law until the promulgation of Economic Contract Law 
in 1981. The first Civil law in China was 1986 General Principle of Civil Law. China do not have 
company law until 1993.  
65 “There is a lot of legislative work to do, and we don't have enough trained people. Therefore, 
legal provisions will have to be less than perfect to start with, then be gradually improved upon. 
Some laws and statutes can be tried out in particular localities and later enacted nationally after 
the experience has been evaluated and improvements have been made. Individual legal 
provisions can be revised or supplemented one at a time, as necessary; there is no need to wait 
for a comprehensive revision of an entire body of law. In short, it is better to have some laws 
than none, and better to have them sooner than later. Moreover, we should intensify our study 
of international law.” See, Deng Xiaoping, “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts, and 
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Deng insightfully pointed out, it established a legal foundation for future improvement. 
Second, it officially proclaimed China’s commitment to Reform and Open Up through 
the expression of legislation by NPC. This announcement not only dismissed the protest 
against foreign investment in China’s politics circle but also assured foreign investors 
China’s plan for Reform and Open Up.  
 
Article one and two outlined the purpose of FDI and the eligibility of investors. 
As previously indicated, the purpose of FDI was to “expand international economic 
cooperation and technological exchange.”66 Foreign companies, enterprises, individuals 
and other economic organizations are permitted to establish EJV with only Chinese 
business entity (excluding Chinese individual).67 It is important to point out that the 
“foreigner” presumed anyone outside mainland China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan 
even China claiming sovereignty over these regimes at the time). But China would adopt 
the term “Overseas Chinese” to categorize this special group.  
 
Article 3 governed the basic principle of establishing FIE, which provided that a 
                                               
Unite as One in Looking to the Future,” accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://en.people.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1260.html.  
66 Art.1, EJV Law.  
67 Art. 1, and art. 2 of EJV Law. see “The Chinese Government shall protect, in accordance with 
the law, the investment of foreign joint ventures, the profits due them and their other lawful 
rights and interests in an equity joint venture, pursuant to the agreement, contract and articles 
of association approved by the Chinese Government. All activities of an equity joint venture 
shall comply with the provisions of the laws, decrees and pertinent regulations of the People's 
Republic of China.” 
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FIE applicant must obtain administrative approval from a designated agency prior to the 
process of applying for a business registration. This practice did not change  until a 
recent adjustment in 2016 after the success of Shanghai Free Trade Zone, which allowed 
certain investors exempt from foreign investment verification.68 Such agency will 
develop a set of rules, directives, and regulations concerning the qualification and 
required conditions for the investors and investment project. Article 3 required prior 
obtaining a business license through State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC), the signed joint venture agreements, contracts and article of association must be 
approved and permitted by PRC Foreign Investment Commission.69  
 
Article four specified the corporate form of the joint venture and minimal 
contribution standard. It required foreign investor must contribute no less than 25 
percent of its registered capital. The established joint venture would be a limited liability 
company that investors would share the profit and risk in accordance with their 
contribution.70 Article five concerned the forms of contribution. It specified that foreign 
                                               
68 See last chapter on Shanghai Free Trade Zone.  
69 Art. 3, EJV Law “ 
“Article 3The equity joint venture agreement, contract and articles of association signed 
by the parties to the venture shall be submitted to the Foreign Investment Commission 
of the People's Rpublic of China, which shall then decide to approve or disapprove the 
venture within three months. When approved, the equity joint venture shall register 
with the General Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People's Republic of 
China, acquire a business licence and start operations.” 
70 Art.4 EJV Law  
“An equity joint venture shall take the form of a limited liability company.  The 
proportion of the foreign joint venture's investment in an equity joint venture shall be, 
in general, not less than 25 percent of its registered capital. 
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investor could contribute cash, in kind or industrial property. It strongly emphasized that 
the foreign investor could subject to compensation request from China when such 
contribution was made by outdated technology and equipment. The Foreign investor 
must also pay for land use rights when land use rights were not part of the contribution 
to the joint venture.71  
 
Perhaps one of the most controversial regulations of the EJV Law was the article 
six, which governed the board of the directors. This article required the chairman of the 
board of the director must be served by a Chinese person appointed by the Chinese 
partner in the JV. Without specifying the decision-making process in EJV board, article 
six only vaguely stated that both parties should make a decision under  the principle of 
equal and mutual benefits.72 Clearly, this meant China negate “majority share control” 
                                               
The parties to the venture shall share the profits, risks and losses in proportion to their 
contributions to the registered capital. If any of the joint venturers wishes to assign its 
registered capital, it must obtain the consent of the other parties to the venture.” 
71 Art. 5, EJV Law,  
“The parties to an equity joint venture may make their investment in cash, in kind or in 
industrial property rights, etc. The technology and equipment contributed by a foreign 
joint venturer as its investment in kind must be advanced technology and equipment 
that really suit China's needs.  In case of losses caused by a foreign joint venturer 
practicing deception through the intentional provision of outdated technology and 
equipment, it shall compensate for the losses.A Chinese joint venturer's investment may 
include the right to the use of a site provided for the equity joint venture during the 
period of its operation.   If the right to the use of the site is not taken as a part of the 
Chinese joint venturer's investment, the equity joint venture shall pay the Chinese 
Government for its use.The above-mentioned investments shall be specified in the 
contract and articles of association of the equity joint venture, and their value 
(excluding that of the site) shall be assessed by all parties to the venture.” 
72 Art. 6 EJV Law   
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in corporate governance. However, the chairman of the board was also vested other 
important authorities: such as signature JV contract. This meant foreign managers in JV 
might need Chinese chairman’s support to greenlight an important business dealing.  
 
Distribution of profits and taxation was set forth in article seven. Under article 
seven, the after-tax profit would be distributed in accordance with the proportion of 
their investment in joint venture. This means investors cannot privately determine the 
share of profit. Article seven also provided a less clear tax incentive: an equity joint 
venture equipped with world advanced technology can enjoy income tax reduction or 
exemption for the first two to three profit-making years.73 Clearly, the definition of 
                                               
An equity joint venture shall have a board of directors, the size and composition of 
which shall be stipulated in the contract and articles of association, after consultation 
between the parties to the venture; the directors shall be appointed and replaced by 
the relevant parties.  The board of directors shall have a chairman, whose office shall be 
assumed by the Chinese side, one or two vice-chairmen, whose office(s) shall be 
assumed by the foreign joint venturer(s). In handling important problems, the board of 
directors shall make decisions through consultation by the parties to the venture on the 
principle of equality and mutual benefit. 
The functions and powers of the board of directors are, as stipulated in the articles of 
association of the equity joint venture,  to discuss and decide all major issues concerning 
the venture, namely, the venture's development plans, proposals for production and 
business operations, the budget for revenues and expenditures, the distribution of 
profits, the plans concerning manpower and wages, the termination of business, and 
the appointment or employment of the general manager, the vice-general manager(s), 
the chief engineer, the treasurer and the auditors, as well as the determination of their 
functions,  powers and terms of employment, etc. 
The offices of general manager and vice-general manager(s) (or factory manager and 
deputy manager(s)) shall be assumed by the respective parties to the venture. 
The employment and discharge of the workers and staff members of an equity joint 
venture shall be stipulated in accordance with the  law in the agreement and contract 
concluded by the parties to the venture.” 
73 See Art. 7 EJV Law    
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“world advanced technology” required further explanation by the authority.   
 
There were other restrictions related to capitals. For example, FIEs must deposit 
their profit and money at Bank of China [hereinafter BOC] or any other bank approved 
by BOC.74 In order to save foreign exchange reserve, EJV Law further specified a 
preference of domestic supplier over the foreign supplier for manufacturing purchasing. 
75 Because China did not allow FIEs to pay domestic supplier with foreign exchange, FIEs 
                                               
“The net profit of an equity joint venture shall be distributed among the parties to the 
venture in proportion to their respective contributions to the registered capital, after  
payment out of its gross profit of the equity joint venture  income  tax, pursuant to the 
provisions of  the tax laws of the People's Republic of China, and after deductions from 
the gross profit of  a reserve fund, a bonus and welfare fund for  workers and staff 
members and a venture expansion fund, as stipulated in the venture's articles of 
association. An equity joint venture equipped with advanced technology by world 
standards may apply for a reduction of or exemption from income tax for the first two 
to three profit-making years. A foreign joint venturer that reinvests its share of the net 
profit within Chinese territory may apply for a partial refund of the income tax already 
paid.” 
74 Art. 8, EJV Law  
“An equity joint venture shall open an account with the Bank of China or a bank 
approved by the Bank of China. An equity joint venture shall handle its foreign exchange 
transactions in accordance with the regulations on foreign exchange control of the 
People's Republic of China. An equity joint venture may, in its business operations, 
directly raise funds from foreign banks. The various kinds of insurance coverage of an 
equity joint venture shall be furnished by Chinese insurance companies.” 
75 Art. 9 EJV Law  
“The production and business operating plans of an equity joint venture shall be 
submitted to the competent authorities for the record and shall be implemented 
through economic contracts. In its purchase of required raw and semi-processed 
materials, fuels, auxiliary equipment, etc., an equity joint venture should give first 
priority to purchases in China.  It may also make such purchases directly on the world 
market with   foreign exchange raised by itself. An equity joint venture shall be 
encouraged to market its products outside China.  It may sell its export products on 
foreign markets directly or through associated agencies or China's foreign trade 
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must sell foreign exchange to BOC to obtain Chinese currency. Moreover, additional 
restrictions could be found in Article 10 and 11 specified that profit or wage earned in 
China by a foreign investor or an employee could only be remitted abroad through the 
Bank of China under a less desired official exchange rate.76  
 
The EJV Law also sent some uncertain signals about China’s commitment to the 
future of JV program when it placed a mandatory time limits on the existence of EJV. 
Under article 12, the equity joint venture only lasted to a period of time agreed by the 
investors, although investors can apply for an extension through the Foreign Investment 
Commission.77 There was a strong presumption that supporting a limited and restricted 
                                               
agencies. Its products may also be sold on the Chinese market. When necessary, an 
equity joint venture may set up branches and subbranches outside China.” 
76 See art. 10  
“The net profit which a foreign joint venture receives as its share after performing its 
obligations under the laws, the agreements and the contract, the funds it receives upon 
the expiration of the venture's term of operation or its early termination, and its other 
funds may be remitted abroad through the Bank of China in accordance with the foreign 
exchange regulations and in the currency or currencies specified in the contract 
concerning the equity joint venture. 
A foreign joint venture shall be encouraged to deposit  in the Bank of China  the foreign 
exchange which it is entitled to remit abroad.” 
Art.11     
“The wages, salaries or other legitimate income earned by a foreign worker or staff 
member of an equity joint venture, after payment of the individual income tax under 
the tax laws of the People's Republic of China, may be remitted abroad through the 
Bank of China in accordance with foreign exchange regulations.” 
77 Art. 12 EJV Law     
“The contract period of an equity joint venture may be decided through consultation by 
the parties to the venture according to its particular line of business and circumstances. 
Upon its expiration, the joint venture contract period may be extended if the parties 
have reached an agreement and obtained the approval of the Foreign Investment 
Commission of the People's Republic of China. An application for such extension shall be 
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foreign presence for the purpose of facilitating domestic companies obtain modern 
business operation skills and technology. Article 13 set forth reasons for ending an 
equity joint venture, which includes: several losses, fail to perform obligations under 
joint venture agreement, force majeure, etc.78 Article 14 concerned dispute resolution, 
which provided that investors can settle their disputes through mediation or arbitration 
in China or other agency agreed by investors.  
 
The 1979 EJV Law was revolutionary, it directly confronted with value and faith 
vested within the 1978 Constitution by permitting the representatives of “bourgeois and 
imperialist,” which tested Chinese policy makers and reformers’ understanding of 
modernization and beneficiary of the socialism.79 The legislation of EJV Law was led by 
Peng Zhen, who started China’s legislative work after rehabilitation from the Cultural 
Revolution. The first wave of legislation after Cultural Revolution included Election Law, 
                                               
made six months before expiration of the contract.” 
78 Art.13 EJV Law     
“If, prior to the expiration of the contract period of an equity joint venture, there occur 
heavy losses, failure of a party to perform its obligations under the contract and the 
articles of association or force majeure, etc., the contract may be terminated before the 
expiration date through consultation and agreement by the parties, and subject to 
approval  by the Foreign Investment Commission of the People's Republic of China and 
to registration with the General Administration for Industry and Commerce.  In cases of 
losses caused by a breach of contract, the financial responsibility shall be borne by the 
party that has breached the contract.” 
79 See P.R.C. Const. Preamble, “We must persevere in the struggle of the proletariat against the 
bourgeoisie and in the struggle for the socialist road against the capitalist road. We must oppose 
revisionism and prevent the restoration and aggression against our country by social-
imperialism and imperialism.” accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:People%27s_Republic_of_China_1978_Constitu
tion.pdf&page=3/.   
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Organization Law for People’s Congress and People’s Government,  Organization Law for 
People’s Court, Organization Law for People's Procuratorate, PRC Criminal Code, PRC 
Criminal Procedural Law, and EJV Law. He proclaimed that “the development of socialist 
democracy requires future improve and complete socialist rule by law…”80 During the 
draft of the EJV Law, there was an intensive discussion on whether the law should place 
a restriction on the percentage of foreign investors’ share. The original draft restricted 
foreign investor share shall not exceed 49%, and major business decision required ⅔ of 
the investor approval. After consultation with experts and investors, Deng Xiaoping and 
Peng Zhen believed such restriction would be detrimental to the foreign investors, 
which might not be what policymaker wanted.81 Although China did not adopt any share 
restrictions, it negates majority shareholder principle by asserting all major corporate 
affairs must be determined unanimously.  
 
Although 1979 EJV Law was considered as an “enabling legislation,” it jumped 
started China’s foreign investment policy. Few months after the promulgation of 1979 
EJV Law, the first SFJV Beijing Air Catering was established in April 1980.82 On April 1990, 
                                               
80 Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi (中共中央党史研究室) [CPC Party Hisotry Research 
Office], “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo da shiji 1949-2009” (中华人民共和国大事记) [Chronical 
of People’s Republic of China 1949-2009],  accessed July 27, 2017, 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/234123/16184862.html.     
81 Jingrongjie, “Zhongguo shoujia zhongwai hezi qiye” (中国首家中外合资企业：北京航空食品
有限公司) [The First Sino-Foreign Joint Venture: Beijing Airline Food Catering Inc], accessed July 
27, 2017, http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2009/09/0414435979906.shtml.  
82 For example, see the administrative approval from PRC Foreign Investment Administrative 
Committee Notice: On April 4th of 1980, Foreign Investment Administrative Committee 
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Seventh National People's Congress adopted a new amendment to the EJV Law.83 This 
was the only amendment to EJV Law between 1978-1991, it was later amended again in 
2001 and 2016. The 1990 amendment covered about 9 articles, focused on sections 
with strong criticisms and complaints from the foreign investment community.84 For 
example. The EJV Law emphatically stated that the state would not nationalize FIE 
unless for the purpose of public interest with “proportional compensation.”85 As one 
could expect, the vague wording “proportional” could not satisfy investors’ concern. The 
1990 amendment further removed one extremely unpopular rule about the board of 
director. Under article 6 of the amended EJV Law, the authority no longer required the 
chairman of the board to be a Chinese appointed by a Chinese investor. However, the 
rule for unanimous voting remained, which meant it continues refusing the interest of 
the majority. The amendment rewrote tax incentive part by removing strict conditions 
                                               
convened meeting to review following documents: the contract between CAAC Civil Aviation 
Administration of China (CAAC)  Beijing branch and Hong Kong CNAC Air Catering Ltd. for 
establishing Beijing Air Catering Ltd., Beijing Air Catering Article of Incorporation, and the 
memorandum Certain Issue regarding the Company, we approved all these documents for 
implementation.”  This administrative notice affirmed the joint venture between CAAC and 
Hong Kong investor. Ibid.  
83 Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui guanyu xiugai zhonghua renmin gongheguo hezi jingying qiye 
fa de jueding(全国人民代表大会关于修改《中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法》的决定) 
[Decision of the National People's Congress Regarding the Revision of the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures]  adopted at the Third Session of the 
Seventh National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on April 4, 1990, 
[hereinafter 1990 amendment].  
84 Zhang Yuqing, James S. McLean, “China's Foreign Economic Contract Law: Its Significance and 
Analysis ,” Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus 8, no.1 (1987):120-143, accessed July 27, 2017, 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1222&context=njil
b. 
85 Art.2 1990 EJV Law  
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that preserving tax benefits only to FIEs with advanced technology. The amendment 
also allowed FIEs open bank account at any institution approved by SAFE. The 
amendment took a more flexible attitude toward the term of operation, which allowed 
investors to decide if they want to put a time limit on JV contract.  
 
On July 26, 1980, State Council promulgated Measures on Administration of 
Sino-Foreign EJV Registration [hereinafter Registration Measure]. 86 The Registration 
Measure was a piece of administrative legislation centered on the procedure and 
implementing rules regarding equity joint venture’s application for a business license 
through SAIC in pursuant to the article 3 of EJV Law. The Registration Measure clearly 
defined the time limit, the required files, and items for business license registration. 
According to article 2, the registration must occur within 1 months after FIE obtain 
permission from Foreign Investment Administration Committee (FIAC).87  Three types of 
files must be provided during registration in accordance with article 3: 
1. Approval from FIAC,  
2. EJV agreement, Contract, Article of Association (both English and Chinese with 3 
copies),  
3. Copies of business license or other licenses issued by a foreign government.88   
                                               
86  Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Dengji Guanli Banfa (中外合资经营企业登记管理办法) [State 
Council, Measures on Administration of Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Registration] (adopted 
July. 26, 1980 by State Council) [hereinafter EJV Registration Measure].   
87 Art. 2 Registration Measure.  
88 Art. 3 Registration Measure.  
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Article 4 detailed listed information must be provided for business license registration: 
1. Name, location, address, scope of operation and method of operation of the EJV 
2. The registered capitals and shares of each investor,  
3. Board of directors, and chairman of the board, senior manager, and vice 
manager,  
4. Number of the employee (Chinese and foreigners),  
5. File number of the relevant approval documents.89  
As some FIEs later complaint, Chinese authority was restrictive over the items listed on 
the registration. For example, the registration demand investors to register their 
contract with SAIC. However, it was quite difficult for such investors to amend the 
contract without permission from SAIC later.  
 
In addition, the authority followed a strict interpretation of the “scope of 
operation,” changes from one category into another proved to be difficult. Article 8 
requiring investors to pay the registration fee, which was detailed by 1982 Interim 
Measures on EJV Registration Fee. 90 
                                               
89 Art. 4 Registration Measure.  
90 Guanyu Zhongwaihezi jingying qiye jiaona dengjifei biaozhun de guiding（关于中外合资经营
企业交纳登记费标准的暂行规定）[Interim Measures on EJV Registration Fee] adopted by 
SAIC February 2 1982. Table 2-1. Registration fee  
Registered capital  Registration fee  
10 million RMB and below  1%% of registered capitals 
Above 10 million RMB 0.5%% of the registered capital  
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Four years after the promulgation of the EJV Law in 1979, in response to 
criticisms of vagueness and lack of guidance from the business community and western 
academics, the State Council promulgated the Regulations for the Implementation of 
the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture on 
September 20 of 1983.91 Based on the 1979 EJV Law, this was a piece of administrative 
legislation designed to provide comprehensive guidance on issues concerning the 
establishment, operation, and management of a joint venture through sixteen chapters 
and one hundred and eighteen articles.92 The title “Implementing Regulation” signified 
                                               
Chinese overseas, Hong Kong, Marco Investors 50% discount on registration fee  
Registration amendment  Registration fee  
● Relocate JV  
● Change production  
● Increase or transfer registered capital  
● Change of Board of Director or senior 
manager 
● Extension of JV contract  
100 RMB 
 
91 Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-
Foreign Equity Joint Venture (promulgated Sept. 20, 1983 by the State Council) [hereinafter EJV 
Law Implementation Regulations] 
This law also referred as “Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment,” accessed, July 29, 
2017, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100064563.shtml  
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rftiotlotprocojvucafi1228/.   
92 The EJV Law in 1979 only had 15 articles. There are sixteen chapters of this legislation. To 
make a comparison, I list chapters in below:  
Chapter 1 General Principle 
Chapter 2 Establishment and Registration 
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the supplementary nature of the legislation, to compensate the deficiency of the EJV 
law. It was an important part of China’s FDI regulatory framework when there was no 
domestic legal infrastructure, such as Company Law, Bankruptcy Law, labor laws, 
Intellectual Property Laws, and other business-related legislation. Many rules under EJV 
Law Implementing Regulation reaffirmed rules or measures adopted by the regulatory 
agencies throughout the years since the initial promulgation of 1979 EJV Law. Under EJV 
Law Implementing Regulation, MOFERT is the designated agency in charge of the 
application and enforcement of the EJV registration related the laws and rule. 93 In 
addition, it specifically excluded Special Economic Zone from the application of this 
regulation unless NPC or State Council stated otherwise.94 
 
Structurally, the Implementing Regulation provided a better and clearer 
                                               
Chapter 3 Structure and Registered Capital  
Chapter 4 Contribution 
Chapter 5 Board of Director and Management  
Chapter 6 Importation of Technology  
Chapter 7 Land use Rights and Fees 
Chapter 8 Sales and Purchases  
Chapter 9 Taxation  
Chapter 10 Foreign Exchange Control 
Chapter 11 Finance and Accounting  
Chapter 12 Employee 
Chapter 13 Labor Union  
Chapter 14 Period of Operation, Dissolution and Liquidation  
Chapter 15 Dispute Resolution  
Chapter 16 Miscellaneous  
EJV Law Implementing Regulation.   
93 Art. 117, EJV Law Implementing Regulation.   
94  Art. 116, EJV Law Implementing Regulation.  
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guidance for the investors. Chapter one General Principle laid out principles for the 
eligibility of a foreign investment project. For example, article 3 and 4 respectively 
defined the industry sector allowed for FIE, and basic conditions must meet for such 
investment.95  Article 5 provided conditions deny a FIE application.96 The problem with 
this article was the ambiguity of the criteria listed in the statutory language. For 
                                               
95 Art. 3, Joint ventures established within China's territory shall be able to promote the 
development of Chinese economy  and the raising of scientific and technological levels for the 
benefit of socialist modernization.  Joint ventures permitted are mainly in the following 
industries: 
(1) Energy development, the building material, chemical and metallurgical industries; 
(2) Machine manufacturing, instrument and meter industries and offshore oil exploitation 
equipment manufacturing; 
(3) Electronics and computer industries, and communication equipment manufacturing; 
(4) Light, textile, foodstuffs, medicine, medical apparatus and packing industries; 
(5) Agriculture, animal husbandry and fish breeding; 
(6) Tourism and service trades. 
Art.4, “ Applicants to establish joint ventures shall lay stress on economic results and shall 
comply with one or several of the following requirements: 
(1) They shall adopt advanced technical equipment and scientific management which enable the 
increase of the variety of products, the raising of quality and output and the saving of energy 
and materials; 
(2) They shall provide benefits in terms of technical renovation of enterprises and result in less 
investment, quicker returns and bigger profits; 
(3) They shall enable the expanded production of products for export and result in increasing 
income in foreign currency; 
(4) They shall enable the training of technical and managerial personnel.” See, Art.4, EJV Law 
Implementing Regulation. 
96 Article 5, “Applicants to establish joint ventures shall not be granted approval if the project 
involves any of the following conditions: 
(1) Detriment to China's sovereignty; 
(2) Violation of Chinese law; 
(3) Nonconformity with the requirements of the development of China's national economy; 
(4) Environmental pollution; 
(5) Obvious inequity in the agreements, contracts and articles of association signed, impairing 
the rights and interests of one party.” See Art. 5. EJV Law Implementing Regulation.  
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example, the project “incompatible with China’s national economic development” or 
the project “violate China’s sovereignty” would not be granted permission.97  These 
three articles formed a conceptual framework indicating the conditions for accepting or 
denying a FIE application. These rules became the prototype of the Catalogue of 
Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment developed during the 1990s.98 Read it 
together, the EJV Implementing Regulation stated a clear preference for industry 
involving high technology, such as energy development, electronics and computer 
industries, and communication equipment manufacturing,  medical apparatus; and 
industry provided fast return on investment, such as textile, food staff, and packing 
industries; and industry generate foreign exchange, such as tourism and service 
trades.99  
 
It further defined the legal nature of JV as “Fa ren” (Legal person), which 
protected by Chinese law under Chinese jurisdiction.100  “Legal person” is a legal concept 
originated from German Law as “juristische Person,” it refers to a non-human entity that 
                                               
97 Article 5, “Applicants to establish joint ventures shall not be granted approval if the project 
involves any of the following conditions: 
(1) Detriment to China's sovereignty; 
(2) Violation of Chinese law; 
(3) Nonconformity with the requirements of the development of China's national economy; 
(4) Environmental pollution; 
(5) Obvious inequity in the agreements, contracts and articles of association signed, impairing 
the rights and interests of one party.” See Art. 5. EJV Law Implementing Regulation.  
98 Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment, see next chapter.  
99 Art. 3 Implementing Regulation.  
100 Normally it can be an incorporated forprofit organization or not-for-profit organization. Art. 
2, EJV Law Implementing Regulation, Ibid.  
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recognized by the legal system through legislation or registration. Moreover, in order to 
assure the independent operation rights of the investor, article 7 emphasized that joint 
venture “has the right to do business independently within the scope of the provisions 
of Chinese laws, decrees, and the agreement, contract and articles of association” and 
the relevant government agencies shall provide support and assistant.101        
 
Chapter two concerned issues related to the administrative examination and 
approval for establishing a FIE project. Article 8 designated MOFERT as the agency in 
charge the FIE permission.102 Certain projects can be reviewed and approved by a lower 
level authority when certain criteria are met. Article 9 detailed outlined the required 
documents for application, which is:  
1. application form,  
2. project feasibility study jointly conducted by Chinese and foreign 
investors,  
3. the signed article of association, joint venture agreement and contract,  
4. candidate list for Chairman, vice-chairman, and board of directors.  
5. Local government and Chinese partner’s supervising authority’s opinion 
and recommendations.  
Under article 10, the MOFERT or other authority has three months to review and make a 
decision. When joint venture project obtained permission from the MOFERT, the 
                                               
101 See Art. 7. EJV Law Implementing Regulation. 
102 See Art. 8, and 9(1). EJV Law Implementing Regulation. 
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applicant must apply for a business license with the provincial administrative bureau for 
industry and commerce within a month since the grant of permission.103 The joint 
venture would be officially established since the date of issuing business licenses. The 
                                               
103 Article 9 The following procedures shall be followed for the establishment of a joint venture: 
 (1) The Chinese participant in a joint venture shall submit to its department in charge a 
project proposal and a preliminary feasibility study report of the joint venture to be established 
with foreign participants.  The proposal and the preliminary feasibility study report, upon 
examination and consent by the department in charge, shall be submitted to the examination 
and approval authority for final approval.  The parties to the venture shall then conduct work 
relevant to the feasibility study, and based on this, negotiate and sign joint venture agreements, 
contracts and articles of association. 
 (2) When applying for the establishment of a joint venture, the Chinese participant is 
responsible for the submission of the following documents to the examination and approval 
authority; 
  (a) Application for the establishment of a joint venture; 
  (b) The feasibility study report jointly prepared by the parties to the venture; 
  (c) Joint venture agreement, contract and articles of association signed by 
representatives authorized by the parties to the venture; 
  (d) List of candidates for chairman, vice-chairman and directors appointed by 
the parties to the venture; 
  (e) Written opinions of the department in charge and the people's government 
of the province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the central government 
where the joint venture is located with regard to the establishment of the joint venture. 
The aforesaid documents shall be written in Chinese.  Documents (b), (c) and (d) may be written 
simultaneously in a foreign language agreed upon by the parties to the joint venture.  Both 
versions are equally authentic. 
Article 10 Upon receipt of the documents stipulated in Article 9 (2), the examination and 
approval authority shall, within three months, decide whether to approve or disapprove them.  
Should anything inappropriate be found in any of the aforementioned documents, the 
examination and approval authority shall demand an amendment to it within a limited time.  
Without such amendment no approval shall be granted. 
Article 11 The applicant shall, within one month after receipt of the certificate of approval, 
register with the administrative bureau for industry and commerce of the province, autonomous 
region or municipality directly under the central government in accordance with the provisions 
of the Procedures of the People's Republic of China for the Registration and Administration of 
Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures (hereinafter referred to as registration and administration 
office).  The date on which it is issued its business license is regarded as the date of formal 
establishment of a joint venture. 
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joint venture will continue operating until the expiration of the term listed on the JV 
contract. Joint ventures are normally granted for 10-30 years. Certain project can last 
more than 30 years with permission from state council. Liquidation and dissolution 
started after the expiration of the term.104    
 
Article 13, 14 defined two legal concepts: Joint Venture Agreements [合营企业
协议 Heying Qiye Xieyi] and Joint Venture Contracts [合营企业合同 Heying Qiye 
Hetong]. In pursuant to the definition provided by article 13, the “Agreement” would be 
something similar to the “letter of intent.105” The distinction seems irrelevant to the 
enforceability of the agreement. The need for such distinction may relate to the content 
of the agreement. Sometimes, a foreign investor found it was quite difficult to amend a 
signed or approved contract even private contract provide conditions for renegotiation. 
Thus, the Implementing Regulation allowed investors to sign “agreement” with less 
                                               
104 Article 102. EJV Law Implementing Regulation.  
105 Article 13 The "joint venture agreement" mentioned in this chapter refers to a document 
agreed upon by the parties to the joint venture on some main points and principles governing 
the establishment of a joint venture.  
"Joint venture contract" refers to a document agreed upon and concluded by the parties to the 
joint venture on their rights and obligations. 
"Article of association" refers to a document agreed upon by the parties to the joint venture 
indicating the purpose, organizational principles and method of management of a joint venture 
in compliance with the principles of the joint venture contract. 
If the joint venture agreement conflicts with the contract, the contract shall prevail. 
If the parties to the joint venture agree to sign only a contract and articles of association, the 
agreement can be omitted. 
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detailed terms.  Article 14 stipulated items must be included in the contract.106  
Article 15 might be the most controversial one, which excluded the choice of law 
for Joint Venture Contract. It stated that “The formation of a joint venture contract, its 
validity, interpretation, execution and the settlement of disputes under it shall be 
governed by the Chinese law.107” This restriction contradicted to common practice 
among many market economies. It was unfair to foreign investors when China’s legal 
infrastructure was limited. Article 16 outlined the items must be included in the article 
                                               
106 Article 14 The joint venture contract shall include the following main items: 
 (1) The names, the countries of registration, the legal address of parties to the joint 
venture, and the names, professions and nationalities of the legal representatives thereof; 
 (2) Name of the joint venture, its legal address, purpose and the scope and scale of 
business; 
 (3) Total amount of investment and registered capital of the joint venture, investment 
contributed by the parties to the joint venture, each party's investment proportion, forms of 
investment, the time limit for contributing investment, stipulations concerning incomplete 
contributions, and assignment of investment; 
 (4) The ratio of profit distribution and losses to be borne by each party; 
 (5) The composition of the board of directors, the distribution of the number of 
directors, and the responsibilities, powers and means of employment of the general manager, 
deputy general manager and high-ranking management personnel; 
 (6) The main production equipment and technology to be adopted and their source of 
supply; 
 (7) The ways and means of purchasing raw materials and selling finished products, and 
the ratio of products sold within Chinese territory and outside China; 
 (8) Arrangements for income and expenditure of foreign currency; 
 (9) Principles governing the handling of finance, accounting and auditing; 
 (10) Stipulations concerning labor management, wages, welfare, and labor insurance; 
 (11) The duration of the joint venture, its dissolution and the procedure for liquidation; 
 (12) The liabilities for breach of contract; 
 (13) Ways and Procedures for settling disputes between the parties to the joint venture; 
 (14) The language used for the contract and the conditions for putting the contract into 
force. 
The annex to the contract of a joint venture shall be equally authentic with the contract itself. 
107 Article 15. EJV Law Implementing Regulation.  
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of association, which provided a clear guidance for establishing joint ventures108 Article 
17 stipulated that joint venture agreement, contract, and article of association only 
come to effect after obtaining approval from the regulatory authority.109     
 
Chapter three and chapter four governed the business structure of the joint 
venture and contributions. Under article 19, joint ventures could be formed as limited 
liability company. Shareholders of the company bore the risk in proportionate to their 
contribution, or as the Implementing Regulation referred to as “liable to the joint 
venture within the limits of the capital subscribed.110” Although Article 19 adopted the 
common practice of limited liability, this might not be a true limited liability as many 
                                               
108 Article 16 Articles of association shall include the following main items: 
 (1) The name of the joint venture and its legal address; 
 (2) The purpose, business scope and duration of the joint venture; 
 (3) The names, countries of registration and legal addresses of parties to the joint 
venture, and the names, professions and nationalities of the legal representatives thereof; 
 (4) The total amount of investment, registered capital of the joint venture, each party's 
investment proportion, stipulations concerning the assignment of investment, the ratio of profit 
distribution and losses to be borne by parties to the joint venture; 
 (5) The composition of the board of directors, its responsibilities, powers and rules of 
procedure, the term of office of the directors, and the responsibilities of its chairman and vice-
chairman; 
 (6) The setting up of management organizations, rules for handling routine affairs, the 
responsibilities of the general manager, deputy general manager and other high-ranking 
management personnel, and the method of their appointment and dismissal; 
 (7) Principles governing finance, accounting and auditing; 
 (8) Dissolution and liquidation; 
 (9) Procedures for amendment of the articles of association. 
109 Art. 17,EJV Law Implementing Regulation. 
110 Article 19: A joint venture is a limited liability company. 
Each party to the joint venture is liable to the joint venture within the limit of the capital 
subscribed by it. 
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investors soon discovered that majority contribution would not automatically translate 
into controlling right in business management. Article 36 of chapter 5 specifically listed 
four categories in business management that must be decided through a unanimous 
decision by board members. These four areas are: 
(1) Amendment of the articles of association of the joint venture; 
(2) Termination and dissolution of the joint venture; 
(3) Increase or assignment of the registered capital of the joint venture; 
(4) The merger of the joint venture with other economic organizations.111 
 
The article 106 also allowed investors to distribute remaining assets of the joint venture 
in proportion to their investment or any other ways agreed under joint venture 
agreement, contract or article of association in case of liquidation.112 Other restrictions 
included the joint venture could not reduce the registered capital during the term of the 
joint venture. In addition, one could not transfer his or her shares or increase the 
registered capital  without approval from regulatory agency first.113 Although EJV Law 
Implementing Regulation allowed non-cash contribution, it placed strict requirements. 
These restrictions caused many complaints.114 For example, article 27 stipulated that 
contribution in the form of machinery equipment and other materials must meet three 
conditions:  
                                               
111 Art. 36, EJV Law Implementing Regulation.  
112 Art. 106, EJV Law Implementing Regulation. 
113 See Article 23, Article 24. EJV Implementing Regulation.  
114 Zhang Lixing, “The statutory Framework for Direct Investment in China,” FLA. IT’L.J. 
4(1989):289-290.   
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(1) They are indispensable to the production of the joint venture; 
(2) China is unable to manufacture them or manufactures them only at too high 
a price, or their technical performance and time of availability cannot meet the 
demand; 
(3) The price fixed shall not be higher than the current international market price 
for similar equipment or materials.115 
In effect, this was an extremely narrowed definition for a qualified non-cash 
contribution.  
 
Chapter five of the law concerned issues related to the board of director. As the 
above analysis pointed out, the limited liability principle was not truly reflected in the 
Implementing Rules because majority share will not translate into control of the joint 
venture. Article 32 even stipulated that the chairman of the board of director would be 
held by a person appointed by a Chinese investor. Under article 37, the chairman would 
be the legal representative of the joint venture. A  limited liability company is an entity 
created by law (as a natural person is created naturally), legal representative. The legal 
representative of the legal person represented the affairs of such entity. His or her 
signature would have legal effect on any contract or agreement that involve a legal 
person.   
  
Chapter six of the Implementing Regulation produced many unpopular 
                                               
115 Art. 27, EJV Law Implementing Regulation.  
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protective measures restricted the rights of intellectual property holder in the business 
of joint venture. First, the Implementing Regulation asserted that technology must 
be“appropriate, advanced with the great and obvious return on investment and 
competitiveness in the global market.” 116Second, the technology transfer agreement 
must be reviewed and approved by Chinese authority prior to effective date. The 
Foreign investor must provide information about such technology as a reference.117 
These requirements remained as a fixture of China’s FIE regulatory framework and thus 
subject to strong criticisms by the foreigners. Third, the law outlined other restrictions 
as review conditions for the agreement. For example, Article 46 laid out a laundry list of 
rules restraining the rights of the intellectual property holders. For example, the 
intellectual property right holder “shall not put any restrictions on the quantity, price, or 
region of the sale of the products that are to be exported.”118The term of technology 
transfer could not exceed ten years, but the licensee could still have the right keep using 
the technology.119 In addition, no restriction was allowed on the part of the licensee for 
purchasing any parts or raw material needed in the process of utilizing such 
technology.120Moreover, there was one catch-all clause that prohibits any restrictive 
terms deemed unreasonable by Chinese laws and decrees. This was problematic 
because the statute did not provide any guidance on what consider as “unreasonable.”  
 
                                               
116 Art. 44. EJV Implementing Regulation.  
117 Art. 45. EJV Implementing Regulation.  
118 Art. 46 (2) EJV Implementing Regulation.  
119 Art. 46(3),(4) EJV Implementing Regulation.  
120 Art. 46 (6) EJV Implementing Regulation.  
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Chapter 7 and 8 respectively focused on site using rights and purchase and sale 
of the FIE. Regulation regarding the purchase and sale was the most representative 
feature of China’s command economy. Under a command economy, everything was 
allocated in accordance with the central plan, which was why there was no modern 
price market. Since the introduction of FIE, the legislator must provide means and 
mechanism to accommodate this new reality. Under the EJV framework, FIE was 
required to produce an annual plan for operation, production or construction. The FIE 
would send their plan to the “department in charge,” an administrative agency in charge 
of JV’s Chinese partner.121 This department would coordinate with other government 
agencies in charge of the resources, to ensure supply of these resources. Even China’s 
command economy system provided undesired domestic material supply. The EJV 
Implementing Regulation specifically asked FIE to purchase supplies from domestic 
vendors “given the same conditions.”122 In addition, contrary to many investors’ 
expectation of taking advantage of China’s large consumer market, the EJV Regulation 
restricted FIE’s capacity of selling to domestic consumers. Only products “urgently 
needed by Chinese market” was allowed to be sold in China under article 61.123 Even 
when one can qualify to sell the product in China, the seller must go through a special 
government department. Because the lack of free market, the government would 
purchase the goods then redistribute to another buyer in accordance with the central 
plan.         
                                               
121  Art. 54, 55, 56 EJV Implementing Regulation.  
122  Art. 57  EJV Implementing Regulation.  
123 Art. 61  EJV Implementing Regulation. 
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Although the 1983 EJV Implementing Regulation provided more detailed rules 
related to FIE affairs, the law itself revealed its central planning economy nature 
through multiple restrictions. For example, (1) a FIE investment project would not be 
granted if the consumption of the resource by FIE would affect the enforcement of the 
central or regional plan. (2) Share transfer by a foreign investor was not allowed unless 
reviewed by the relevant authority. (3) Although the board of director was the highest 
authority of the company, the chairman must be served by a Chinese appointed by the 
Chinese investor. (4) In addition, the board voting followed the rule of unanimous, 
which excluded majority voting right rule. (5) The intellectual property right holder 
could not sign contract exceed certain years, and the law can strike down any restrictive 
terms it deemed as “unreasonable.”  
 
The implementing Regulation had been amended twice during the 1980s. the 
1986 amendment extended maximum operation time for JV. It allowed state council to 
grant 50 years of JV contract for any project with huge investment or involved advanced 
technology. The 1987 amendment concerns specific accounting rules, which is not the 
focus of this study.  The EJV Law and Implementing Regulation established two 
important legal concepts for China when there was no developed commercial legal 
system. The first important legal concept was “legal person.’’124 Under the central 
                                               
124 1986 Article 41 of General Principle of Civil Law adopt the concept of legal person, it provided 
that:“Sino-foreign equity joint venture enterprises, Sino-foreign contractual joint venture 
enterprises and wholly foreign owned enterprises established in the territory of the PRC that 
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planning, firms were viewed as the apparatus of the administration. Thus, they were not 
endowed with a separate legal identity.125 The second important legal principle is the 
“alienability of ownership and the associated benefit right from owning the assets.”126 
The transferable interest and the adoption of the board of director in corporate 
governance were revolutionary considering China’s socialist system. The shareholders’ 
benefit and alienation rights for the SOE sector were not recognized until the early 
1990s. The promulgation of Company Law in 1994 formalized and enshrined the limited 
liability reform experiments into the national legislation.127 The legislative recognition of 
the decision right came much earlier to FIEs than to SOEs. Probably the most important 
control right was the right to appoint managers when FIEs could not hire employee 
independently at the beginning of the 1980s. However, The recognition of legal 
independence may not automatically translate into a political autonomous. The legal 
independence only  referred to civil or criminal liability. Politically, the business entity is 
considered as an extension of the political program of socialism.   
 
On October 11, 1986, State Council adopted Provisions for Encouragement of 
                                               
meet the requirements for legal persons acquire the status of Chinese legal persons upon 
approval and registration in accordance with law by the administrative agencies for industry and 
commerce.”   
125 Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 195),300. 
126 Ibid.  
127 Huang yasheng, “An Institutional and Policy Approach to the Demand for Foreign Direct 
Investment in China,” in China Review 2000  (Hong Kong, Chinese University Press, 2000): 269. 
Also see: Huang Yasheng, “One country, two systems: Foreign-invested enterprises and 
domestic firms in China,” China Economic Review 14, no. 4 (2003): 409.  
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Foreign Investment (hereinafter Encouragement Provision), also known as Article 22.128 
The main purpose of this administrative legislation was to resolve two issues. First, it 
provided legislative solutions for many problems and criticisms asked by foreign 
investment communities and western academics.129 Second, it provided new tax 
incentives to counter the sharp drop in FIEs investment during the preceding years since 
the beginning of the 1980s. 130  The main subject of the Encouragement Provision, as it 
stated clearly at the very beginning, was to promote two types of FIEs, “Products Export 
Enterprises” and “Technologically Advanced Enterprises,” with various specific policies 
and incentives related to site using fee, financing, profit remittance, tax, staff and labor 
management, government service and support, and etc.131 These policies and incentives 
can be deconstructed into following categories:  
1. Tax related incentives  
2. Government service  
3. Foreign exchange  
                                               
128 Guowuyuan guanyu guli waishang touzi de guiding (国务院关于鼓励外商投资的规定) 
[Provisions of the State Council for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment] [hereinafter 
Encouragement Provision] adopted by State Council on October 11, 1986, accessed July 26, 
2017, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100053822.html.   
129 Anna M. Han, “China’s Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In a Transitional Economy,” Pac. 
Rim L. & Pol'y J. 5 (1995):457, accesed July 27, 2017,  
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1488&context=facpubs. 
130 FDI rose about “10 percent to more than $2 billion in 1986, but the level of new foreign 
investment pledged fell nearly 50 percent. See CIA Office of East Asia Analysis, “Directorate of 
Intelligence: Foreign Investment in China in 1986, and Prospects for 1987,” CIA , March 31 1987, 
accessed July 29, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP90T00114R000200110001-4.pdf.   
131 Art.2, Encouragement Provision.  
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4. Labor management    
There were two main functions of these new policies and incentives. Tax incentive 
designed to attract more investors with economic benefits. Government service and 
supports designed to improve investment environment with clear and standardized 
regulations and rules.  In order to attract foreign investment, the Encouragement 
Provision outlined additional tax incentives in the form of tax deduction and tax holiday 
extension. Article 7, 8 ,9, 10, and 11 concerned tax incentives. Under the new provision, 
Product-for-export FIEs and technologically advanced FIEs enjoy zero tax when they 
remit abroad the profit.132 Product-for-export FIEs enjoy additional 50% off tax 
reduction if FIE export 70% or more of the output value.133 If such FIEs located in SEZ, it 
will enjoy 10% income tax rate. Technologically advanced FIEs will enjoy an extended tax 
holiday of three more years.134 In pursuant to the article 10, the provision provides tax 
return for a portion of profit used for reinvestment by qualified FIEs. 135   
 
The Encouragement Provision clarified and standardized three types of 
                                               
132 art. 7 Encouragement Provision. 
133 art. 8 Encouragement Provision. 
134 art. 9 Encouragement Provision.  
135 “Foreign investors who reinvest their shares of profits from their enterprises in order to 
establish or expand product-for-export enterprises or technologically advanced enterprises for a 
period of operation of not less than five years, after application to and approval by the tax 
authorities, shall be refunded the total amount of enterprise income tax already paid on the 
reinvested portion. If the investment is withdrawn before the period of operation reaches five 
years, the amount of enterprise income tax refunded shall be repaid.” See Art. 10, 
Encouragement Provision.  
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administrative practice. Firstly, it lifted mandatory export agent service requirement.136 
Secondly, it standardized the site using fee. Thirdly, it placed a maximum time limit on 
administrative reviewing process. In addition, it emphasized the principle of respecting 
FIEs’ labor management without undue interference by local labor authority. Article 12 
and 13 concerned the export and import license. Under this provision, FIEs can apply the 
export license to export product without using the service of an agent.137 In addition, 
FIEs can apply for such license every 6 months.138 Any semi-products, raw materials 
utilized for the manufacturing of the products can be exempt from the requirement of 
the importation license unless they are later resold to domestic customers.139 In 
response to complaints from investors that local authority or Chinese partners abuse 
site using fee to obtain rents from foreign investors, article 4 specifically defined the 
standard of the site using fee, as it provided that: 
(1) five to twenty RMB yuan per square meter per year in areas where the 
development fee and the site use fee are computed and charged together; 
(2) not more than three RMB yuan per square meter per year in site areas where 
the development fee is computed and charged on a one-time basis or areas 
                                               
136 art. 12 Encouragement Provision. “Enterprises with foreign investment may arrange the 
export of their products directly or may also export by consignment to agents in accordance 
with state provisions. For products that require an export license, in accordance with an annual 
export plan of the enterprises, an application for export licenses shall be made every six 
months.” 
137 art. 12 Encouragement Provision. 
138 Ibid.   
139  art. 13 Encouragement Provision.  
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which are developed by the above-mentioned enterprises themselves.140  
It further allowed local government to exempt site using fee on a case by case basis.141 
Under the EJV Law and supplementing regulations, FIE could not independently hire an 
employee. All hire decision must be made by a local labor authority. The labor authority 
would send labors for the job, and the employer could not fire or discipline the 
employee without approval from the authority. Foreign investors were frustrated by 
these regulations when the local authority could not provide qualified labors. Article 15 
specifically asked the local authority to respect FIEs staff management and wage system. 
It stipulated that FIEs have rights to freely hire or fire any staff without prior approval by 
the labor authority.142 One of the highlights under Encouragement Provision was to 
place a maximin 3 months time limit for all FIEs related administrative approving 
process. As the article 17 stated: 
 
Article 17 The people's governments at various levels and relevant departments 
in charge shall strengthen the coordination of their work, improve efficiency in 
handling matters and shall promptly examine and approve matters reported by 
enterprises with foreign investment that require a response and resolution. For 
the agreements, contracts and articles of association of enterprises with foreign 
                                               
140 art. 4 Encouragement Provision.  
141 “Exemptions for specified periods of time from the fees provided in the foregoing provision 
may be granted at the discretion of the local people's governments.” see art. 4 Encouragement 
Provision , accessed July 26, 2017, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100053822.html.  
142 See art. 15 Encouragement Provision.  
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investment to be examined and approved by the departments in charge under 
the State Council, the relevant examination and approval authorities must, 
within three months from the date of receipt of all documents, decide whether 
to approve or not to approve the documents. 
 
Although the Encouragement Provision provided multiple benefits to FIEs, there 
were many issues that might deter the function of those benefits. The main issues were 
ambiguity and the lack of an effective and meaningful mechanism to prevent local 
government authority from interfering with the rights of the foreign investors. Two 
most representative examples, one concerning the scope of FIEs receive benefits, 
another concerning type of remedies to the injury from arbitrary administrative charges 
and fees. Article 2, article 18, and 19 defined the scope of the benefited FIEs, which 
were:  
 
Article 2:(1) Production-type enterprises whose products are mainly export, 
which have a foreign exchange surplus after deducting from their total annual 
foreign exchange revenues the annual foreign expenditures incurred in 
production and operation and the foreign exchange needed for the remittance 
abroad of the profits earned by foreign investors (hereinafter referred to as" 
Products Export Enterprises") 
(2) Production-type enterprises possessing advanced technology supplied by 
foreign investors which are engaged in developing new products, and upgrading 
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and replacing products in order to increase foreign exchange generated by 
exports or for import substitution (hereinafter referred to as "Technologically 
Advanced Enterprises").143 
 
Production Enterprises (生产型企业) normally refers to business entity involves export-
oriented manufacturing or processing and assembling sectors, which would exclude 
service sector. Article 2 basically established two types of FIEs with preferred 
treatments. One is Products Export Enterprises with products mainly for exportation, 
and another is technologically advanced enterprises. Unfortunately, definition under 
article 2 was ambiguous and confusing. For example, there is no clear statutory 
language to describe what constitutes as “product mainly for export.” One may 
conclude 90% product could qualify as “mainly.” What about 60% or 65%? Also, the 
statutory language “mainly” failed to specify whether it referred to the value of the 
products or the quantity of the products.  In addition, under the article 2 (2) 
“technologically advanced enterprises” was defined as an entity with three qualifying 
conditions: first, FIEs needed to be an entity engage in developing new products, 
second, such products had to be a kind that could upgrade and replace any product,  
which could increase foreign exchange through exportation or to save foreign exchange 
through import substitution. This definition was ambiguous and confusing because it 
failed to clarify whether the products needed to be “new” for the domestic market or 
                                               
143 Art.2 Encouragement Provision. 
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international market. A Certain type of products or technology can be quite common in 
a market economy but fairly new in China, would such products fall into the definition of 
the article 2 (2)? In order to further clarify which FIE met these conditions, article 18 
delegated the power of evaluation to the local MOFERT authority. As it stated: 
 
Product-for-export enterprises and technologically advanced enterprises 
mentioned in these Provisions shall be confirmed by the foreign economic 
relations and trade departments where such enterprises are located in 
conjunction with the other relevant departments in accordance with the 
enterprise contract, and certificates of confirmation shall be accordingly issued. 
If the actual results of the annual exports of a product-for-export enterprise are 
unable to reach the target of a surplus in the foreign exchange balance as set in 
the enterprise contract, the taxes and fees which have already been reduced or 
exempted in the previous year shall be paid in the following year.144 
 
Clearly, this arrangement provided great discretionary power to the local 
authority, which may increase the risk of rent-seeking. Article 19 further provided that 
Products Export Enterprises must pay all deducted taxes in the following year if FIE 
failed to meet target foreign exchange surplus.145 This additional restriction created 
                                               
144 Art.18 Encouragement Provision. 
 
145 “These Provisions shall be applicable to those enterprises with foreign investment that 
obtained approval for establishment prior to the date of these Provisions became effective and 
that conform to the preferential terms of these Provisions.” see art. 19 Encouragement 
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great uncertainties for foreign investors because the global market could not ensure a 
stable product price and provide stable foreign exchange surplus.   
 
Arbitrary administrative charges and fees had been a systematic issue plagued 
the development of Chinese foreign investment and domestic economy.146 During the 
1980s, due to the lack of fiscal supporters from the central government, effective 
intergovernmental regulations and judicial oversight and an adequate tax revenue 
system, a local government would finance its operation through various arbitrary, illegal 
charges and fees from the FIEs and domestic firms. Although central authority had 
repetitively issued multiple directives requiring local officials stop such behavior, those 
directives did not propose any sanctions or punishments. Thus, the Encouragement 
Provisions provided two statutory solutions. 
 
The first solution was to aske a provincial government to restrain lower 
government agencies by making local rules. The second solution was to allow FIEs either 
refused the payment demands by the local authority or filed a written complaint to a 
local MOFERT authority. For example, article 16 emphasized that a provincial 
Government must adopt detailed implementation measures for “State Council 
                                               
Provision , accessed July 26, 2017, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100053822.html.  
146 World Bank, The social sectors: population, health, nutrition, and education, (Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank, 1983), 429, accessed July 25, 2017, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/279491468743727018/The-social-sectors-
population-health-nutrition-and-education.  
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Concerning Firmly Curbing the Indiscriminate Levy of Charges on Enterprises.”147 It was 
questionable that these measures could resolve the problem of arbitrary charges. If the 
central authority wished to end local authority’s illegal administrative charges, she could 
simply announce nationwide sanctions with clear rules. However, the central authority 
delegated sanction power to lower provincial governments with self-discipline. In 
addition, although FIEs would have a statutory right for refusing payment demands from 
the local authority, there was no legal infrastructure to support FIEs claim. The foreign 
investors bore great risk for not paying demands from a local authority.  
 
The only recourse seems to be filing a complaint at local MOFERT authority.148  
However, there is another problem for FIEs, what consider as “unreasonable fee”? Since 
the Encouragement Provision designed local MOFERT to process complaints concerning 
“unreasonable fee,” such authority would obtain interpretive power through this article. 
Unfortunately, local MOFERT authority’s interpretive power may not be helpful to the 
foreign investor in theory and in practice. For example, a local MOFERT is part of the 
                                               
147 See Guo wuyuan guanyu jianjue zhizhi xiang qiye luantanpai de tongzhi(国务院关于坚决制
止向企业乱摊派的通知)  [State Council Notice on Prohibiting arbitrary Administrative Charges], 
adopted by State Council on April 23, 1986, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-10/20/content_5122298.htm.  
148 “Article 16, Encouragement Provision “All regions and departments must implement the 
Circular of the State Council Concerning Firmly Curbing the Indiscriminate Levy of Charges on 
Enterprises. The people's governments at the provincial level shall formulate specific measures 
and strengthen supervision and administration in this regard. Enterprises with foreign 
investment may refuse to pay indiscriminately apportioned charges if such cases occur, and may 
also appeal to the local economic committees up to the State Economic Commission.”  
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local people’s government. When a local People’s Congress adopted an ordinance 
requiring all FIEs within its jurisdiction to pay construction fee for a local theater, which 
may be unreasonable, the local MOFERT would not have the constitutional power to 
struck down such ordinance, even on a case by case basis. Thus, the mechanism 
provided by this Provision cannot resolve illegal administrative charge issues.   
 
The Encouragement Provision, also known as Article 22, outlined a set of policies 
and incentives designed to resolve some of the issues related to the FIEs operation and 
application. One of the greatest policies would be the maximum 3 months’ time limit on 
MOFERT's reviewing process. Additional tax incentives were provided to attract export-
oriented enterprises and technologically advanced enterprises. The problems with the 
Provision, as above discussion and analysis indicated, mainly concentrated on the 
ambiguity of the statutory language and the lack of a mechanism to interpret, enforce 
and remedy injured party.  
 
The EJV Law and its implementing regulations; the registration regulations, and 
the Encouragement Provision were the basis of China’s EJV legal framework. in addition, 
the implementing regulations for EJV law formed the basis for other foreign investment 
regulations, such as WFOE and CJV laws. The EJV Law and its implementing regulations 
demonstrated many features of China’s central commanding economy. First, the central 
authority refused to give foreign investors controlling rights. China’s EJV structure 
negated “majority shareholder rules.” Under the principle, “equal share, equal rights,” 
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major corporate affairs must be determined unanimously. Second, the central authority 
transplanted central command system into FIE corporate governance. Any amendment 
of JV contract or change of registered capitals required permission from the government 
authorities. In addition, foreign investors were not allowed to freely negotiate “choice 
of law” clause under the contract because all JV contract must be interpreted by 
Chinese law. However, China did not have a functioning commercial legal system and 
private legal service market. The EJV Law specifically instruct investors to take 
arbitration when a dispute arose.  
 
b. WFOE Law framework  
On April 12, 1986, 6th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National 
People's Congress of the People's Republic of China adopted the Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China (WFOE Law).149 This was the first 
legislation concerning WFOE, and it was not amended until 2000. The last amendment 
was 2016.  
 
Like the EJV law, the 1986 WFOE Law was a short legislation with only 24 articles. 
Article 2 defined WFOE as enterprises established exclusively by foreign investors’ own 
                                               
149 Zhonghua remin gongheguo waizi qiyefa(中华人民共和国外资企业法) [Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China]promulgated by 6th National People’s 
Congress on April 12, 1986.  
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capital.150 It excluded branches of a FIE.151Article 3 laid out basic principle for a WFOE, 
which required the FIE must be the kind “benefit Chinese economy with advanced 
technology and machinery or a majority of the products for exportation.”152 It 
designated State Council to implement detailed rules for conditions disqualify a WFOE 
project. The establishment of WFOE shared the similar registration process with EJV 
except for verification period. Applicant must first obtain permission from MOFERT 
before applying for business registration.153 The verification and reviewing period was 
90 days, which was longer than EJV.154 In addition, WFOE shared same punishment 
(revocation of the license) if the investor failed to invest within a certain period of 
time.155 Like EJV Law, WFOE Law also installed statutory language stating a preference 
of domestic vendor as the supplier for the FIE.156 Under article 18, FIE must maintain 
payment of balance.157  
 
                                               
150 Art. 2, WFOE Law, “As mentioned in this Law, ‘enterprises with foreign capital’ refers to those 
enterprises established in China by foreign investors, exclusively with their own capital, in 
accordance with relevant Chinese laws. The term does not include branches set up in China by 
foreign enterprises and other foreign economic organizations.” 
151 Ibid.   
152 Art. 3, WFOE Law.  
153 Art. 6, WFOE Law.  
154 Art. 6, WFOE Law.  
155 Art. 9, WFOE Law. “An enterprise with foreign capital shall make investments in China within 
the period approved by the authorities in charge of examination and approval. If it fails to do so, 
the industry and commerce administration authorities may cancel its business licence. The 
industry and commerce administration authorities shall inspect and supervise the investment 
situation of an enterprise with foreign capital.”  
156 Art. 15, WFOE Law.  
157 Art. 18, WFOE Law. 
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The EJV Law and Implementing Regulation formed the basis for EJV framework. 
On December 12, 1990, State Council adopted Implementing Regulation on Wholly 
Foreign-Owned Enterprises [hereinafter WFOE Implementing Rules], which formed the 
basis of WFOE regulatory framework.158 The WFOE Implementing Rule formed a similar 
structure as the EJV Implementing Rule. The first chapter General Principle defined the 
conditions for establishing WFOE, and conditions disqualifying the WFOE project. Under 
the Implementing Rule, there were three categories: conditions, restrictive sector, 
prohibited sector. Under article 4, the prohibited sectors included: 
1. the press, publication, broadcasting, television, and movies; 
2. domestic commerce, foreign trade, and insurance; 
3. post and telecommunications; and 
4. other trades in which the establishment of foreign-capital enterprises is 
forbidden by the Chinese government.159 
 
The restrictive sectors included: 
1. public utilities; 
2. communication and transportation; 
3. real estate; 
                                               
158 Waizi qiye fa shishi xize(外资企业法实施细则) [Implementing Rules of the Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises] adopted by State Council on 
December 12, 1990.  
159 Art.4 Implementing Rules of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-Capital 
Enterprises 
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4. trust investment; and 
5. leasing.160 
These projects must be verified and approved by MOFERT. Article 3 also laid out general 
conditions for a WFOE project, which must be advanced technology or export-oriented. 
Unlike the EJV Law had ambiguous statutory language requiring the “majority of the 
products” for export. Article 3 clearly stated that WFOE project must meet the general 
condition of more than 50% value of the whole production would be exportation.161 The 
WFOE Implementing Rule laid out clear registration process: applicant would directly 
apply for permission from provincial authority when the total investment below a 
threshold setup by the State Council. The local authority would file a record of the 
permission to MOFERT within 15 days.162 In order to ensure the supply of water, 
electricity or another social service, the WFOE demand investor to file a project plan to 
the local authority. The authority must provide a reply within 30 days to the investor.163 
                                               
160 Ibid.  
161 Art. 3, WFOE Implementing Rule. “the annual output value of its exported products accounts 
for more than 50% of the annual output value of all products, thereby resulting in a balance 
between revenue and expenditure in foreign exchange or a surplus.” 
162 Art. 8 WFOE Implementing Rule. 
163 Art. 10 WFOE Implementing Rule.  
“A foreign investor shall, prior to the filing of an application for the establishment of a 
foreign-capital enterprise, submit a report to the local people's government at or above 
the county level at the place where the proposed enterprise is to be established. The 
report shall include: the aim of the establishment of the proposed enterprise; the scope 
and scale of business operation; the products to be produced; the technology and 
equipment to be adopted and used; the proportion of the sales of products between 
the domestic market and the foreign market; the area of land to be used and the related 
requirements: the condition and quantities of water, electricity, coal, coal gas and other 
forms of energy resources required; and the public facilities” 
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WFOE can be organized either as an LLC or other forms under the Implementing Rule, 
although it failed to clarify what were the other forms.   164 Unlike the legislation in the 
1990s, in 1986, the rule still prohibited FIE to reduce registered capital.165 The Rule laid 
out similar regulations regarding contribution in the form of machinery and intellectual 
property. For example, article 28 demonstrated that authority dislikes that intellectual 
property is valued more than 20% of the registered capital. In addition, detailed 
information regarding the intellectual property must be provided to the authority for 
verification.  
 
The Implementing Rule also installed sanctions on the promptness of the 
contribution. For example, payment of contribution by the foreign investor can be made 
in several different times. However, the last payment must be made within 3 years of 
obtaining business licenses. Otherwise, the license would be revoked.166   
 
c. CJV Law framework  
In order to promote and encourage overseas Chinese investors, especially 
investors from Hong Kong and Macau, the State Council adopted Provisions of the State 
Council Concerning the Encouragement of Investments by Overseas Chinese and 
Compatriots From Hong Kong and Macao[hereinafter Encouragement for overseas 
                                               
164 Art. 19 WFOE Implementing Rule.  
165 Art. 22 WFOE Implementing Rule.  
166 Art. 30,  WFOE Implementing Rule.  
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Chinese investor].167 This legislation designed to provide special treatment for investors 
from Hong Kong, Macau or Chinese overseas. However, this decree had been 
overlooked by many studies. Special treatments under this Provision presented a 
shocking contrast with the other FIE related regulations. For example, The EJV 
framework placed strong restrictions over the appointment of a board of directors. Such 
restrictions were later partially lifted. The Chinese overseas investor provision directly 
provided that the investors can freely negotiate the representation of board member 
based on their contribution or other agreed conditions.168  In addition, it specified that 
overseas Chinese investor could hire their friends or relatives in China as their agent to 
process the FIE issue.169 Interestingly, the Chinese overseas investor Provision 
established one unified verification process time limit. Normally, the EJV project has to 
be verified within 30 days, and WFOE project has to be verified within 90 days, and CJV 
project has to be verified within 45 days. Under this provision, disregard form of the 
investment project, it will all be verified within 45 days.     
 
d. Foreign exchange control framework  
Foreign exchange control was an important aspect that could substantially affect 
the rights and interests of the foreign investor. However, China’s foreign exchange 
                                               
167 Guanyu guli huaqiao hexianggang aomen tongbao touzi deguiding(关于鼓励华侨和香港澳
门同胞投资的规定) [Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Encouragement of 
Investments by Overseas Chinese and Compatriots From Hong Kong and Macao] adopted by 
State Council on August 19, 1990.  
168 Art. 14, Encouragement for overseas Chinese investor.  
169 Art. 18, Encouragement for overseas Chinese investor.  
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system or control was tied up with China’s currency policy. Between 1973 and 1979, 
China adopted a material based currency in order to maintain a stable currency value 
for international trade when the western market economy is suffering from the 
disruptions after the fall of Bretton Woods system. RMB currency remained as non-
convertible due to such arrangement, during the 1980s, the state implements a dual 
exchange rate system. Trade sector following 1:2.8 rate while non-trade sector following 
1:1.5 rate. At the very beginning of the  Reform and Open Up, the central authority 
builds a comprehensive foreign exchange control framework. There were two main 
mechanisms of the control: first is foreign exchange coupon. The coupon system was 
established to accommodate the need for the transaction without affect China’s non-
convertible RMB system. What the enforcement of the foreign exchange control 
requires is not always smooth, especially many FIE facing foreign exchange shortage 
under China’s strict rules. 170    
                                               
170 For example, the chart illustrate foreign exchange framework: 
PR on Foreign Exchange Control Of the P.R.C 
● Detailed Regulations for the Implementation of Exchange Control with Respect to 
Foreign Representative Offices and Their Employees 
● Rules Governing the Carrying of Foreign Exchange, Precious Metals and Payment 
Instruments in Convertible Currency into or out of China 
● Detailed Rules and Regulations on Exchange Control Relating to Individuals, 
○ Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of Applications 
by Individuals for Foreign Exchange 
● Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regulations Relating to 
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Foreign-Capital Enterprises, and Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
● Implementing Rules on Punishment of Violation of Foreign Exchange Control 
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Right after the promulgation of the 1979 EJV Law, the central authority adopted 
a comprehensive foreign exchange regulation. China’s RMB was non-convertible. In 
order to accommodate the need for the tourism industry and foreign investment 
without producing significant impacts on RMB exchange rate, the BOC adopted foreign 
exchange coupon system on March 19, 1980.171 Essentially, foreign exchange coupon 
was a special intermediary currency designed to accommodate the need for a foreigner 
without making RMB available for foreigners.172 The foreign exchange coupon could be 
used in certain domestic vendors, which only accepted foreign exchange coupons. The 
value of the coupon was the same as RMB, and it could be transferred to other 
countries. The foreign exchange coupon system lasted throughout the 1980s until the 
foreign exchange rate reform in 1994. As the state enforced two-track foreign exchange 
rate (one for international trade, and one for domestic buyers), there were various 
illegal transactions took advantage of the different rates. Many foreign invested 
companies involved such profit-seeking behavior. For example, a shop only opened to 
foreigns should accept foreign exchange coupon. However, the shop might list 
discounted price when the buyer paid with foreign exchange, which encouraged the 
circulation of the foreign exchange.  
 
 
                                               
171 Zhongguo yinhang waihui duihuan zanxing guanli banfa (中国银行外汇兑换券暂行管理办
法) [BOC Interim Regulation on Administration of Foreign Exchange Coupon] [hereinafter BOC 
Foreign Exchange Coupon] adopted by BOC on March 19, 1980.  
172 Art.3 BOC Foreign Exchange Coupon.   
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On December 18, 1980, the State Council adopted People’s Republic of China 
Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control [hereinafter 1980 Interim 
Regulation].173 This was the first administrative legislation concerning the foreign 
exchange since the Reform and Open Up and it never been updated until later in 1996, 
it was then amended in 1997 and 2008. Between 1978-1992, China’s foreign exchange 
regulation framework was compiled by sets of supplementary rules and guidelines 
created by SAFE and State Council. Other important agencies were involved in creating 
related rules: BOC was responsible for rules related to foreign exchange loans and 
transactions, SAFE enforced and interpreted the Interim Regulations. Different 
individual and different purpose would result in different regulations. The foreign 
exchange regulations were complicated and detailed. Under China’s foreign exchange 
framework, Chinese individual subjected to strictest rules. Officials had slightly more 
relaxed rules. Foreign investors or individuals enjoyed special treatments than Chinese 
business entities. Short-term visitors and government staffs enjoyed more relaxed rules 
than business personals.  
 
The main purpose of the Interim Regulation, as the article one under General 
Principle, asserted: “increasing China’s foreign exchange reserve and improving 
                                               
173 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waihui guanli zanxing tiaoli (中华人民共和国外汇管理暂行条
例) [Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China], 
adopted by State Council on Dec. 18, 1980, accessed July 25, 2017, 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/irofec454/.  
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prudence foreign exchange expenditure.”174 Article 1 paragraph 2 outlined the scope of 
the application, which included “inflow and outflow of all foreign exchange revenue and 
spending, all kinds of payment instruments in foreign currency, and the carrying of 
foreign exchange, precious metals and payment instruments in foreign currency.”175 
Foreign exchange under Interim Regulation referred to:176 
1. foreign currencies, including banknotes, coins, 
2. securities in foreign currency, including government bonds, treasury bills, 
corporate bonds and debentures, stocks, and interest coupons, 
3. instruments payable in foreign currency, including bills, drafts, checks, bank 
deposit certificates, postal savings certificates.177   
 
China’s foreign exchange policy, as it clearly laid out by article 4 “prohibition on 
free circulation, use, and mortgage of foreign currency; sale and purchase with 
authorizations.”178 It further stipulated that all foreign exchange revenues by any entity 
or individual must be sold to BOC unless exempted by laws, decrees other 
regulations.179 The Interim Regulation designated State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (hereinafter SAFE) as the agency enforce the law, and BOC is the designated 
                                               
174  Art. 1,1980 Interim Regulations. 
175 Art. 1 ¶ 2, 1980 Interim Regulations.  
176  Art. 2, 1980 Interim Regulations 
177 Ibid.  
178 Art. 4, 1980 Interim Regulations 
179 Ibid.  
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bank to process foreign exchange transaction180. The 1980 Interim Regulation had seven 
chapters with 34 articles, which established the foundation for China’s foreign exchange 
framework.181 Chapter two, three, four, and five respectively dedicated to special 
groups of entities or individuals, which were: state and collective ownership entity and 
their representatives, a private Chinese citizen, foreign official entities and their 
representatives, and Chinese overseas enterprises and EJV and WFOE and their 
representatives. In order to fully implement regulations related to the foreign business 
entities and Chinese individuals, SAFE adopted following administrative legislation:  
       
1. 1981 Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of 
Applications by Individuals for Foreign Exchange,182 
                                               
180 Art. 3, 1980 Interim Regulations 
181 For example:  
Chapter I: General Provisions 
Chapter II: Foreign Exchange Control Relating to State Units and Collective Economic 
Organizations 
Chapter III: Foreign Exchange Control Relating to Individuals 
Chapter IV: Foreign Exchange Control Relating to Foreign Resident Representative 
Offices in China and Their Personnel  
Chapter V: Foreign Exchange Control Relating to Enterprises with Overseas Chinese 
Capital, Foreign-Capital Enterprises, and Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures and Their 
Personnel 
Chapter VI: Control Relating to Carrying Foreign Exchange, Precious Metals and Payment 
Instruments in Foreign Currency into and out of China 
Chapter VII: Supplementary Provisions 
182 See:  Shenpi geren waihui shenqing shixing xize (审批个人外汇申请施行细则[国家外汇管理
总局)Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of Applications by 
Individuals for Foreign Exchange [hereinafter Individual FE Examination], enacted by SAFE on 
December 31, 1981. Replaced by Foreign Exchange Control Regulation in 1996. accessed July 31, 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rftiofecrti747/.    
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2. 1981 Rules for the Implementation Foreign Exchange Control Relating to 
Individuals FE Control,183 
3. 1983 Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regulations 
Relating to Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Foreign-Capital 
Enterprises, and Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] [hereinafter foreign 
business FE Control,184 
4. 1985 Implementing Rules on Punishment for Violation of Foreign Exchange 
Control.185 
These regulations formed the basis of China’s foreign exchange control framework. 
                                               
183 Dui geren dewaihui gaunli shixing xize (对个人的外汇管理施行细则) [Rules for the 
Implementation Foreign Exchange Control Relating to Individuals Foreign Exchange Control 
[Individual FE Control], enacted by SAFE on December 31, 1981. Replaced by Foreign Exchange 
Control Regulation in 1996, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rftioteaaoabiffe1002/.  
184 Dui qiaozi qiye, waizi qiye, zhongwai hezi jingying qiye waihui guanli shixing xize (对侨资企
业、外资企业、中外合资经营企业外汇管理施行细则) [Rules for the Implementation of 
Foreign Exchange Control Regulations Relating to Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, 
Foreign-Capital Enterprises and Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] [hereinafter foreign 
business FE Control]enacted by SAFE on August 1, 1983, replaced by Foreign Exchange Control 
Regulation in 1996, accessed July 31, 
2017,http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rftiofecrrtewoccfeacejv1832. Other regulations 
including：Guojia waihui guanliju dui waihui guijingshu he waihui piaozheng deng jinchu guojing 
de guanli shixing xize (国家外汇管理局对外汇、贵金属和外汇票证等进出国境的管理施行细
则) [Rules Governing the Carrying of Foreign Exchange, Precious Metals and Payment 
Instruments in Convertible Currency into or out of China], adopted by SAFE ON August. 10, 
1981, accessed July 25, 2017, http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=1058&Db=chl.  
185 Weifan waihui guanli chufa shixing xize(违反外汇管理处罚施行细则) [Implementing Rules 
on Punishment of Violation of Foreign Exchange Control] [hereinafter FE Control Punishment  
adopted by SAFE on April 5, 1985, and replaced by Foreign Exchange Control Regulation in 1996.  
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The 1980 Interim Regulation installed a strict foreign exchange control. For 
example, all domestic entities’ spending and receiving of foreign exchange subject to 
the central plan.186 Such entity could not privately hold foreign exchange or deposit 
foreign exchange (including payment instrument) abroad.187 This means such entity 
needs permission from SAFE for any foreign exchange transaction. Article 10 further 
stipulated Chinese Custom must inspect the payment of balance and trade receipt to 
ensure compliance of the foreign exchange control by state trading company.188 At the 
beginning of the Reform and Open Up, the central authority placed strict regulations on 
domestic firms. At the end of the 1980s, the authority lifted some bans in response to 
decriminalize profit-seeking behavior by increase foreign exchange retention quota for 
domestic firms.189 
 
The 1980 Interim Regulation and 1981 Individual FE Examination and 1981 
Individuals FE Control governed foreign exchange transactions conducted by Chinese 
                                               
186 Art. 5, 1980 Interim Regulations.  
187 Art. 6, 1980 Interim Regulations. “Unless approved by the SAFEC or its branch offices, 
organizations within the territory shall not possess foreign exchange, deposit foreign exchange 
abroad, offset foreign exchange expenditure against foreign exchange income, or use the 
foreign exchange belonging to State organs stationed abroad or enterprises and institutions 
established by the State in foreign countries or in the Hong Kong and Macao regions, by way of 
borrowing or acquisition.” 
188 Art. 10, 1980 Interim Regulations.  
189 Art. 1 Zhongwai hezi, hezuo jingying qiye zhongfang touzizhe de waihui guanli guiding (中外
合资、合作经营企业中方投资者的外汇管理规定) [ Admnistration on Chinese investors in 
FIE ] adopted by SAFE January 7, 1989.  
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individual. These regulations placed a strong bias against a private citizen. For example, 
an individual could privately hold foreign exchange revenue if the revenue originated 
from his service as a state representative or state-sponsored students.190 However, if a 
private citizen obtains foreign exchange through other venues, such as publishing or 
rewards, he or she cannot retain the money without permission from the authority.191 In 
addition, a private citizen is not allowed to retain any foreign exchange received from 
overseas privately. If one receives money more than 3000 RMB, then he or she can only 
retain 10%, the rest of the money must be sold to BOC.192 These regulations 
demonstrated a strong position that against a private individual possess any economic 
capacity independent from the central authority.  
                                               
190 Art.5 and art. 6 1981 Individuals FE Control. Art. 5 “When personnel are sent by the State to 
work in foreign countries or in Hong Kong Macao or other regions return home upon completion 
of their missions/assignments, they must promptly remit or bring back to China the 
remaining/balance foreign exchange from wages, allowances, etc. that belongs to them, and 
such remaining/balance shall not be kept abroad. They shall be permitted to retain the foreign 
exchange based on the certification issued by the Chinese organization stationed abroad.” Art. 6 
“Students, trainees, postgraduate students, scholars, teachers, coaches and other personnel 
who are sent by the State to study in foreign countries or in Hong Kong, Macao or other regions 
must, upon their return, promptly remit or bring back to China the remaining amount of the 
foreign exchange that they have received during their stay abroad, and it shall not be kept 
abroad; they shall be permitted to retain the foreign exchange that they are entitled to receive, 
based on the certification issued by Chinese organization stationed abroad.” 
191 Art. 7, 1981 Individuals FE Control. “The foreign exchange from fees for publication, copyright 
royalties, awards, stipend, author's remuneration, etc. earned by individuals for publications of 
their inventions, writings and the like abroad, for speeches and lectures made in their own 
names outside China, for their contributions to foreign newspapers, magazines and specialized 
journals, etc., must promptly be repatriated and shall not be kept abroad; individuals shall be 
permitted to retain the foreign exchange that they are entitled to receive according to the 
relevant provisions approved by the State Council or the ministries or commissions concerned, 
or with the approval of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control.” 
192 Art. 2, 1981 Individuals FE Control.  
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There were also various restrictions over the foreign business. For example, all 
foreign exchange revenue and spending must be processed through bank account from 
the BOC. SAFE would conduct periodical inspection over the company book to ensure 
the compliance in pursuant to article 2 of the Foreign Business foreign exchange 
control.193 The most controversial restrictions perhaps related to the article 24 and 
article 25 of the 1980 Interim Regulation, which allows the business entity, such as EJV, 
CJV or WFOE to remit all profit overseas but discriminate against a foreign employee, 
which stated only 50% of the post-tax salary could be remitted outside China.194 With 
strong criticism and complaints from the foreign investment community, article 25 of 
the 1983 foreign business FE Control stipulated that employee’s salary can be remitted 
                                               
193 Article 2 provided that “In Chapter V of the Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control 
of the People's Republic of China, the term "enterprises with overseas Chinese capital" refers to 
corporations, enterprises or other economic entities registered in China with overseas Chinese 
capital or capital of compatriots from the Hong Kong and Macao regions, and managed 
independently or jointly with Chinese enterprises; the term "foreign-capital enterprises" refers 
to corporations, enterprises or other economic entities registered in China with foreign capital, 
and managed independently or jointly with Chinese enterprises; the term "Chinese-foreign 
equity joint ventures" refers to enterprises jointly established, owned and run in China by 
corporations, enterprises, other economic entities or individuals with overseas Chinese capital, 
capital from compatriots in the Hong Kong and Macao regions or foreign capital and Chinese 
corporations, enterprises or other economic entities.” see, article 2 Foreign Exchange Regulation 
on FIEs.  
194 Art. 25 Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control. “An amount not exceeding 50% of 
their after-tax legitimate net earnings from wages, etc. may be remitted or taken out of China in 
foreign currency by staff members and workers of foreign nationality and those from the Hong 
Kong and Macao regions employed by enterprises with overseas Chinese capital, foreign-capital 
enterprises and Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures.”  
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outside China with SAFE permission, provided such portion of foreign exchange would 
be taken out from foreign business entity’s bank account. 195 
 
Table 1. Foreign Exchange Control during the early 1980s. 
 Government, 
SOE, and 
Collective 
Ownership 
Entities  
Individual Chinese 
resident  
Foreign 
Government and 
Civil entity and 
employee  
Foreign Joint 
Ventures and 
Foreign investors  
Free to Deposit  No, must 
deposit in 
Bank of China  
Partially, amount 
exceed the quota 
must sell to Bank 
of China 
Free  No, must deposit 
in Bank of China  
Free to spend  No, unless No, must sell to Free  N/A 
                                               
195 Art. 15 Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regulations Relating to 
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Foreign-Capital Enterprises and Chinese-Foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures.  “Staff members and workers of foreign nationality and those from the 
Hong Kong and Macao regions employed by enterprises with overseas Chinese capital, foreign-
capital enterprises and Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures may remit abroad their wages and 
other justified earnings, after taxation according to law, and if the remittance exceeds 50% of 
their wages and other earnings, they may apply to the SAFEC or its branch offices. The amounts 
remitted shall all be debited to the foreign exchange deposit accounts of the enterprises 
concerned.” 
Also see, Zhang Lixing, “The Statutory Framework for Direct Foreign Investment in China,” 
FLORIDA INT'L LJ.  4 (1989): 289-290.   
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SAFE 
approves 
under the 
PLAN 
Bank of China  
Free to transfer  No, unless 
SAFE 
approves 
under the 
PLAN 
Cannot privately 
bring it across the 
broader.  
Free Require SAFE 
Approve,  
Foreign 
employee of JV 
can only transfer 
50% of salary 
outside China 
unless approved 
by SAFE  
Free to obtain/ 
receive foreign 
loan/ funds   
No, unless 
SAFE 
approves 
under the 
PLAN 
Must sell to Bank 
of China  
N/A  
Possession of 
foreign bank 
No, unless 
SAFE 
No  Free to have No, unless SAFE 
approves  
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account  approves  
*see relevant articles from Provisional for Foreign Exchange Control and supplementary 
legislation.  
 
 
On April 5, 1985, SAFE adopted Detailed Rules on Violation of Foreign Exchange 
Control [hereinafter FEC Punishment].196 This was the first comprehensive 
administrative regulation concerning how to punish acts violate foreign exchange 
control until it was replaced by 1996 Foreign Exchange Control Regulation. This rule 
defined three types of illegal conducts:  
1. Unlawful procurement of foreign exchange  
2. Evasion of foreign exchange control  
3. Disruption of financial stability  
Under this rule, depends on the nature of the conduct, there were three different 
agencies to enforce the rule and sanction. For example, for cases involving smuggling of 
goods, it would be handled by Custom. For cases involving payment instrument, it 
would be handled by SAIC.197 Multiple transactions were provided by the rule, normally, 
depends on the consequence of the conduct, the sanction could range from oral 
                                               
196 Weifun waihui guanli chufa shixing xize (违反外汇管理处罚施行细则 )[Detailed Rules on 
Violation of Foreign Exchange Control] adopted by SAFE April 5 1985, accessed July 25, 2017, 
http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/3/3-2-10.html  
197 Art. 13 FEC Punishment.   
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warning and self-criticism to large monetary penalty. The penalty could be either 
confiscation or additional penalty fees.198  
 
Chinese foreign exchange control prohibits the Chinese partner in JV obtains 
large disposable foreign exchange without control from the central authority. On 
September 24, 1985, SAFE issued General Reply on Certain issues concerning FIE Foreign 
Exchanges, which specified that FIE couldn't accept foreign exchange coupon without 
permission from SAFE. In addition, Chinese partners in JV cannot provide RMB for the 
foreign investor when a foreign partner has RMB shortage for any domestic business.199    
 
In accordance with the central authority's foreign exchange control, local 
government would adopt detailed implementing rules to enforce foreign exchange 
control. For example, on  July 1, 1988, Beijing government adopted Provisional 
Measures of Beijing FIE Foreign Exchange control [hereinafter Beijing FIE FE Control].200 
The main purpose of such regulation was to provide detailed guidance to any FIE 
registered with Beijing municipality or located within the jurisdiction of Beijing 
                                               
198 Art. 5 Punishment.   
199 Guojia waihui guanliju guanyu sanzi qiye waihui guanli ruogan wenti de zonghe dafu (国家外
汇管理局关于“三资”企业外汇管理若干问题的综合答复) [General Reply on Certain issues 
concerning FIE Foreign Exchanges] [hereinafter 1985 SAFE Reply] issued by SAFE on September 
24, 1985.  
200 Beijing shi waishang touzi qiiye waihui guanli zanxing banfa (北京市外商投资企业外汇管理
暂行办法) [Provisional Measures of Beijing FIE Foreign Exchange control] adopted by People’s 
Government of Beijing on July 1, 1988.  
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municipality. One of the highlights for this regulation was to list some exceptions for FIE 
domestic, foreign exchange transaction. Under Beijing FIE rule, FIE could pay the 
domestic vendor with foreign exchange under certain exceptions.201 Such as FIE 
purchased service to produce domestic shortage product or purchase products from the 
export trading company. Other situations required  written permission from the SAFE 
branch office. For example, for the business involved with advanced technology or 
import substitute products,  written permission from SAFE was required. FIE could open 
a foreign bank account after obtaining permission from SAFE.202 However, such practice 
was not absolute. According to the Regulations on FIE Overseas Bank Account, the 
overseas bank account is only permitted under certain conditions.203 Besides these 
conditions, FIE must submit board of director resolution on the overseas bank account 
and accountant opinion on whether FIE fully paid subscribed investment.   
 
The Interim Foreign Exchange Regulations, Individual Foreign Exchange Controls, 
Individual Foreign Exchange Purchase Application Regulations, Regulations on WFOE, 
EJVs and CJVs, and Punishments for Violations of Foreign Exchange Controls formed the 
basis of China’s foreign exchange regulatory framework during the 1980s. Foreign 
                                               
201 Art. 10 Provisional Measures of Beijing FIE Foreign Exchange control 
202 Art. 4 Provisional Measures of Beijing FIE Foreign Exchange control.  
203 Guanyu waishang touzi qiye zai jingwai kaili zhanghu de guanli guiding (关于外商投资企业在
境外开立帐户的管理规定) [Regulations on FIE Overseas Bank Account] adopted by SAFE on 
January 7, 1989. For example, FIE would have frequent foreign exchange income and such 
income would later transfer to China. Or FIE would have frequent foreign exchange spending. 
Other special needs.  
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investors were frustrated by China’s currency issues. The central authority designated 
this framework for two purposes: 1) to maintain a balance of payments by limit the 
outflow of foreign exchanges. 2) to maintain a stable foreign exchange rate to protect 
RMB. These two purposes concerning the stability of the foreign exchange rate because 
the central authority was struggled from a lot of foreign debts resulted from 
“unplanned” purchases made by previous political leaders. China’s strict foreign 
exchange rules were biased against Chinese individual and foreign employees. The state 
trading company enjoy special exchange rate while Chinese individual must sell the 
majority of the foreign exchange to BOC at an undesired rate. A foreign employee could 
only remit 50% of the salary oversea. Permissions from SAFE was required for 
remittance beyond 50%. These restrictions prevent foreign investors from future 
investment. In addition, they promoted rent-seeking behavior for foreign exchange 
control evasion.  
 
e. Labor regulation framework  
During the 1980s, State Council and Ministry of Labor and Personnel adopted 
series administrative legislation and directives, which formed the FIE labor regulatory 
framework. Under this framework, Provisions on Labour Management in Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures [Hereinafter EJV Labor Provision] and Implementing 
Measures of the EJV Labor Provisions were the basis of the framework.204 The local 
                                               
204 Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli guiding (中外合资经营企业劳动管理规定) 
[Provisions on Labour Management in Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures ]adopted by State 
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authority would make their implementing rules, for example, Beijing Municipality 
Supplementary Rule on Implementing Provisions on Labour Management in Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures [Hereinafter Beijing labor rule].205According to the MOL 
Reply concerning whether accept labor dispute arbitration for FIE employee under three 
conditions, labor dispute would be governed by arbitration provided under Interim 
Regulation on SOE Labor Dispute. 206 
 
Labor management had always been an issue for FIEs during the 1980s. The main 
conflicts concerned the policy of China’s labor welfare, particularly job security, and 
FIE’s autonomous rights of profit incentive-based labor management.  According to the 
EJV Law article 6, the employment, the discharge will be governed by JV agreement and 
contract.207 This rule only provided a basic principle for the labor issue. Because all JV 
agreements and contracts must be verified and approved by the relevant authority, FIE’s 
freedom of contract was much limited, which means local authority could interfere FIE’s 
                                               
Council on July 26, 1980. Also see Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli guiding shishi 
banfa (中外合资经营企业劳动管理规定实施办法) [Implementing Measures for the Provisions 
on Labor Management in Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] adopted by Ministry of Labor on 
January 19, 1984.  
205 Beijing shi shishi zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli de guiding (北京市实施中外合资
经营企业劳动管理规定)的补充规定 Beijing Municipality Supplementary Rule on Implementing 
Provisions on Labour Management in Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] [Hereinafter 
Beijing labor rule] adopted by Beijing People’s Government on March 20, 1986. 
206 See Guoying qiye laodong zhengyi chuli zanxing guiding (国营企业劳动争议处理暂行规
定)[Interim Regulation on SOE Labor Dispute]  adopted by State Council on July 31, 1987.  
207 Art. 6 EJV Law.  
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labor management through the verification process. On July 26, 1980, State Council 
adopted EJV Labor Provision.208 Later, the MOL adopted Implementing Rule in 1984.209 
These two laws formed the basis of FIE labor management during the 1980s until they 
were replaced by PRC Labor Law in 1994.210 The 1980 EJV Labor Provision demonstrated 
China’s socialist command economy labor management system, which disregarded free 
labor market and incentive-based labor management. Under 1980 EJV Labor Provision, 
the FIE could not independently hire an employee without permission from local labor 
authority.211 Otherwise, labor authority would provide the employee in accordance with 
the regional labor plan.212 Instead of signing contract with each individual, FIE had to 
sign a contract with the labor representative, which subject to labor Authority's 
approval prior to the date of the contract. 213The power of punishing and discharging 
labor was limited under article 5. The FIE cannot independently punish or discharge an 
                                               
208 Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli guiding (中外合资经营企业劳动管理规定 ) 
[Provisions on Labour Management in Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures ]adopted by State 
Council on July 26, 1980.  
209 Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli guiding shishi banfa (中外合资经营企业劳动管
理规定实施办法) [Implementing Measures for the Provisions on Labor Management in Sino-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] adopted by Ministry of Labor on January 19, 1984.  
210 See 1994 PRC Labor Law  
211 Art. 3 EJV Labor Provision. “The workers and staff members of a joint venture who have been 
either recommended by the authorities of the locality in charge of the joint venture or the labor 
management department, or recruited by the joint venture itself with the consent of the labor 
management department, shall all be selected by the joint venture through careful 
examinations. Joint ventures may run workers' schools and training courses to train managerial 
personnel and skilled workers.” 
212 Ibid.  
213 Ibid.   
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employee without approval from the local labor authority.  214 The EJV Labor Provision 
outlined dispute resolution mechanism. Because China did not have modern HR system 
under command economy during the 1980s, the employee could first resolve the 
dispute internally with the board of director.215 If the board of director cannot settle, 
then both party can try arbitration. However, such arbitration was not final because any 
party disagrees with the outcome can file litigation to people’s court.216  
 
The 1980 EJV Labor Provision demonstrated a biased policy against FIE’s freedom 
of contract and autonomous rights of labor management, which caused many 
complaints from the investors. However, such policy may result from China’s command 
economy labor system. China’s command economy provided job security and various 
labor welfares. Under this system, each individual would be allocated to a specific 
position after the graduation. The central authority would manage and determine the 
benefits of the labor in accordance with the central plan. Thus, when the employee was 
hired by a FIE, the central authority wished to maintain a form of labor policy coherency 
at the cost of the FIE. In order to balance the conflict between the policy of labor 
welfare and FIE internal operation, MOL adopted Implementing Measures for EJV Labor 
Provision in 1984.217 The Implementing Measures took a compromise that FIE could 
                                               
214 Art. 5 EJV Labor Provision.  
215 Art.6 EJV Labor Provision. 
216 Art. 14 EJV Labor Provision. 
217 Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye laodong guanli guiding shishi banfa (中外合资经营企业劳动管
理规定实施办法) [Implementing Measures for the Provisions on Labor Management in Sino-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] adopted by Ministry of Labor on January 19, 1984. 
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stipulate a trial session for labors recommended by the local authority. If such person 
failed his or her duty or failed to pass the employment exam, then FIE could dismiss 
such person.218 One of the progress for the new Measures was to remove the 
requirement of obtaining permission from labor authority prior to punish or discharge 
an employee.219  The punishment or discharge decision must be made by either 
manager or vice-manager. In addition, such decision must be filed with local labor 
authority for the record.220 The 1984 Implementing Measures also allow FIE to decide 
the standard of salary and benefit without reference or on par with local SOE.221 Last 
but not the least, FIE can negotiate labor insurance and benefits standard with local 
labor authority if such FIE disagreed with the general standard.222   
 
To further promote FIE’s right of internal labor management, State Council 
adopted Further Implementation of the Policy of Granting Decision-Making Power to 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment for the Employment of Working Personnel 
[Hereinafter State Council FIE Employment Policy] in 1988.223 This policy further relaxed 
                                               
218 Art. 3 EJV Labor Provision. 
219 Art. 10 EJV Labor Provision.  
220 Art. 10 EJV Labor Provision.  
221 Art. 12 EJV Labor Provision.  
222 Art. 14 EJV Labor Provision.  
223 Guowuyuan Ban gongting zhuanfa laodongbu, renshibu, guanyu jinyibu luoshi waishang touzi 
qiye yongren zizhongquan de yijian (国务院办公厅转发劳动部、人事部关于进一步落实外商
投资企业用人自主权意见的通知) [Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the 
Approval and Transmission of the Proposals Submitted by the Ministry of Labour and the 
Ministry of Personnel Concerning Further Implementation of the Policy of Granting Decision-
Making Power to Enterprises with Foreign Investment for the Employment of Working 
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restrictions on FIE’s freedom of contract on labor management. For example, article 1 
and article 2 supported FIE to fire anyone they need from the community without 
permission from local labor authority.224 The chart illustrates the labor management 
framework during the 1980s:  
 
Table 2. Labor regulations during the 1980s. 
 Free to hire labor  Free to discharge or punish 
labor 
1980 EJV Labor Provision NO, need labor authority 
permission  
No, need labor authority 
permission 
1984 Implementing Measures 
on EJV Labor Provision 
Can install trial session and 
examination, dismiss 
unqualified applicant prior 
former employment   
Yes, but need to file a record 
to local authority  
1988 Hereinafter State 
Council FIE Employment 
Policy 
Yes, local authority must 
provide assistant   
Yes,  local authority must 
provide assistant    
                                               
Personnel] adopted by State Council May 5, 1988. [Hereinafter State Council Notice on Ensuring 
FIE Autonomous Labor Management] 
224 Art.2 State Council FIE Labor Opinion.    
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*1980 EJV Labor Provision and 1984 Implementing Measures on EJV Labor 
Provision were replaced by the 1994 PRC Labor Law  
 
One of the recurring themes of Chinese FDI policy and law between the 1980s 
and early 1990s was the flexibility of the law enforcement. The need for decentralized 
reform is incoherent with the goal for strict law enforcement. Early FDI laws were vague 
and ambiguous, which relied greatly on administrative interpretation. The central 
authority normally issued different internal directives in order to accommodate the 
need for the political object and further reform. For a state proclaimed the superiority 
of the central planning, the flexible law enforcement seemed to be arbitrary and lack of 
consensus over the extent and area of the reform. As Edward Duff pointed out, this is 
not an indication of “absence of law, but rather a pragmatic reaction to China’s highly 
political environment.225”  
  
Based on previous discussions on the FDI legal framework, there were problems 
concerning the substance and operation of the FDI framework during the 1978-1991 as 
well as China’s management style. There were four major problems presented within 
the substance of the FDI regulations. First, a lack of domestic legal infrastructure. For 
example, the concept of LLC under EJV Law was hard to define due to the lack of 
company Law. The concept of limited liability was hard to enforce when there was no 
                                               
225 Edmund C. Duffy, “Business Law in China: Evolutionary Revolution,” Journal of International 
Affairs 49, no. 2 (1996): 557-571, accessed July 29, 2017,  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357571.  
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mortgage law in China, which means loan might have to be guaranteed by the parent 
company of the foreign investors. This effectively eliminated the benefits of limited 
liability.226 Thus, the limited liability company under EJV Law was merely a title without 
substance.227 Second, limited guidance from the EJV Law created vagueness and 
confusions. For example, in the process of registration, the authority rarely explained 
the basis for their decision, which made it harder for the investor to reduce the risk by 
studying the policy. Third, rigid rules concerning the choice of law. For example, Foreign 
Economic Contract Law did not provide statutory tools for an investor to apply the 
choice of law in the JV contract. On the contrary, all contract performed within the 
territory of the People's Republic of China were subject to the law of the People's 
Republic.  
 
Other restrictions related to China’s investment policy. For example, the EJV Law 
established a narrow and strict definition of advanced equipment, which limited the 
non-cash contribution by the foreign investors. The article 27 of the EJV Law provided 
that: 
such equipment or material must be indispensable to the operation of the joint 
venture, must be unable to be produced in China or the production cost is too high. 
The price for such contribution must not higher than the international market price 
                                               
226 Crawford Brickley, “Equity Joint Ventures in the People's republic of China: the Promised 
Land is not yet in Sight For foreign investors,” U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 10 no. 2 (1988): 261, accessed July 
31, 2017, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1622&context=jil.   
227 Ibid.  
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for same or similar items. In addition, such industrial property must use to produce 
products urgently need in China or suitable for export.228  
 
In addition, there were some labor issues, such as the problem of independently hire or 
discharge labors. The lack of autonomous right in the hiring process and the difficulty in 
discharging employee became one of the problems for the effective operation of the JV. 
For example, any dismissal must be reported to the local labor bureau for approval, and 
labor union can file an objection to dismiss.229  
 
Another type of issues related to the operation of the FDI regulation. First, the 
socialist system created a conflict of interests between regulators and the business, 
which triggered risks of corruption. For example, there was no private legal service 
provider; legal service providers are also employed by the state regulatory agency, 
which results in a conflict of interest for many western investors230. Many complaints by 
the foreign investors concerned the valuation of noncash contribution. For example, 
valuation of contribution by building or land-use rights is controlled by the Chinese 
government. These arrangements provided the basis for potential abuse of power 
                                               
228 Art. 27, 28 EJV Law.  
229 Art. 4 Labor Provisions. 
230 For example, the Great Wall Law Office, which is often retained by foreign investors to 
prepare joint venture documentation, is staffed by lawyers from MOFERT, which is responsible 
for joint venture authorization. See Crawford Brickley, “Equity Joint Ventures in the People's 
republic of China: the Promised Land is not yet in Sight For foreign investors,” U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 10 
no. 2 (1988): 261, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1622&context=jil.   
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because there was no third-party independent valuation service or an effective judicial 
system to control government behavior.  
 
Second, the FDI verification and approval process was complicated and full of 
bureaucracy. For example, investors and their Chinese counterpart must obtain 
permission prior to applying for a business license. Investors were burdened by the 
requirements for “project proposal” and “feasibility study.” Proposed terms under 
project proposal were hard to change once it approved by the authority.231 There were 
confusions as to who bore the cost of these preparations, and there were confusions 
regarding the appropriate level of approving authority. 232  
 
There were also problems with the corporate governance under EJV Law. China’s 
approach to corporate governance under EJV Law was incompatible with international 
customs. Shares in equity/ ownership are not necessarily proportional to its power, 
although the liability is proportional to the contribution. For example, Majority 
shareholder would not automatically translate into majority voting rights under the 
“equal share equal rights principles.”233 A number of directors appointed by each party 
determined by consultation between the parties with reference to their equity shares. 
The chairman must be a Chinese national. In addition, a major decision by the company 
                                               
231 Crawford Brickley, “Equity Joint Ventures in the People's republic of China: the Promised 
Land is not yet in Sight For foreign investors,” U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 10 no. 2 (1988): 261, accessed July 
31, 2017, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1622&context=jil.   
232 Ibid.  
233 Art. 34, Implementing Regulation,  
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must be made through consultation under equal and mutual benefit principle.234 In 
practice, the governments interfered with the operation of the joint venture. For 
example, the Chinese government would make final decisions on product pricing and 
raw materials and energy resources allocation, in order to satisfy the enforcement of 
central planning.235  
 
 
Conclusion  
Between 1978-1991, the Chinese central authority established the conceptual 
framework for the foreign investment through ideological and constitutional reform. 
However, the debates over the legitimacy of the foreign investment program, the 
notion of the market, and profit within a conventional central planning economy 
continued throughout the 1980s. The EJV Law, CJV Law, and WFOE Law and 
supplemental regulations formed the basis of Chinese FDI regulatory framework. The 
foreign exchange and labor regulations were important elements affected core interests 
of the investors as well as the development of China’s investment environment. 
 
The FDI regulatory framework during the 1980s demonstrated the nature of 
China’s centralized command economy: (1) a multiple leveled administrative structure 
                                               
234 Art. 6 EJV Law.  
235  For example, the Chinese government makes final decisions on product pricing and raw 
materials and energy resources allocation to permit conformity with the national economic 
plan.  
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was placed on foreign investment regulation, (2) a restrictive market without a 
functioning commercial judicial system. (3) Transactions were regulated and managed 
through the central plan and regional plan by the government entities, which naturally 
caused rent-seeking and corruptions. The problem of corruption became even worse 
when the line between legal and illegal was blurred by China’s constantly changing 
policies and rules during the reform era. (4) There was no free domestic market and free 
labor market. Foreign investors initially could not hire or discipline labors without local 
labor authorities’ permission. (5) Foreign investors’ capacity of profiting from the 
domestic market or intellectual property had been limited by the FDI regulatory 
framework under the centralized planning economy. Foreign investors were encouraged 
to sell products overseas. Permissions were required for any domestic sale. (6) Foreign 
investors could not appoint a foreigner to serve the chairman of the board of the 
directors. All major corporate decisions must be determined by uanimous votes.  
 
Essentially, the FDI regulatory framework had expressed the conflicts of interest 
between the authority and the foreign investors. With all these restrictions, the central 
authority failed to create policy and regulations to attract multinational corporations. 
The central authority essentially created policy and regulations to promote a particular 
form of foreign investment: an investment with a singular investor that invested in 
export-oriented sectors. The economic data affirmed such conclusion. A singular 
investor from South Asia or Hongkong regions with investment in export-oriented 
industry was the major form of FDI during the 80s. The labor management restrictions, 
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the board of director nationality restrictions, and foreign exchange restrictions could not 
attract modern corporate management teams in China. In fact, such framework 
translated FDI into a form of bridge loans or compensation trade: a foreign investor 
contributed financial, technological means into a production of goods later could be sold 
in the international market. The FDI regulatory framework in the 1980s facilitated an 
environment of protection: first, it protected the core interests of the central planning 
and political structure associated with the central planning, and second, it used FDI as 
the foreign exchange generator to provide financial means and technological means in 
preserving China’s central planning economy. The effect of such FDI regulatory 
framework fitted with the reality: the majority of FDI inflow concentrated in textile, toy 
and other export-oriented labor-intensive sectors.  
 
To some, such FDI regulatory framework was not enough to support Chinese 
modernization, because the benefits of export-oriented labor-intensive sectors were 
marginal to a sustainable and modernized industrial powerhouse. Modernization could 
not center on a conventional central planning system without a modernized private 
market and judicial system. As the next chapter illustrated, the new Party Congress and 
Constitution amendments changed the “conventional vision,” and redefined the 
relationship between central planning and market. This ended the debates over 
socialism and the market, which affirmed Deng Xiaoping’s vision of China’s future.  
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Chapter 3 THE FDI POLICY AND LAW BETWEEN 1992-2005 
 
1. Introduction  
Since Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 “southern tour,” China speeded up the pace of the 
Reform and Open Up.236 The term “socialist market economy” was officially endorsed 
and adopted to normalize any pro-market reform measures and laws. “Socialist market 
economy” established the foundation for China’s modernized legaland economic 
system. The establishment of the “socialist market economy” was beneficial to China’s 
foreign investment. FIEs transformed Chinese economy and society. The penetration of 
the global market with “Made in China” indicated a story about China’s industrail and 
modernization reform far beyond the common narrative of developing “export-oriented 
or labour-intensive sectors.” 237 The 14th National Congress of CPC officially ended the 
ideological debate on the market and socialism by proclaiming the main path to 
modernization is the “Socialist Market Economy.”238 By concluding the “old system 
(centralized command economy)” can no longer serve the needs of the new reality, it 
                                               
236 In 1992, after Deng step down from the Party post, Deng Xiaoping orchestrated a semi-
private winter tour of China’s southern provinces and Special Economic Zone. The “southern 
tour” designed to send a political message that Deng Xiaoping personally supports the Reform 
and Open Up and foreign investment. He would not accept any polices or laws reverse Reform 
and Open Up. See last chapter on Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour.” 
237Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s 
Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 (1993):331-360. 
238 Edmund C. Duffy, “Business Law in China: Evolutionary Revolution,” Journal of International 
Affairs 49, no. 2 (1996): 557-571, accessed July 29, 
2017,  http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357571.  
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officially removed the ideological obstacles of the new reform measures.239 The 1999 
and 2004 constitutional amendments textualized these new policies by stating the state 
will “encourage, support and protect private sector,” and it added that the “state 
protect human rights.”240 The 15th and 16th National Congress of CPC established the 
principle of “rule the state in accordance with the law,” and it proclaimed that the 
legitimate interests of the private sector, as well as public sector, are “inviolable.”241 In 
addition, the 16th Party Congress adopted a pro-market and pro-competition ideological 
doctrine commonly known as Jinag Zeming’s “Three-Represents,” which asked the Party 
to reconsider its relationship with the market because the Party must “represent  
advanced social productive forces.”242 Interestingly, the Party line, the “scientific 
outlook on development,” proposed in 2003, highlighted the need for a “scientific” 
development, which implied the central authority’s role in monitoring and managing the 
                                               
239 “The old economic structure has its historical origins and has played an important and 
positive role. With changing conditions, however, it has come to correspond less and less to the 
requirements of the modernization programme. see: “Full Text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 14th 
Party Congress,” October 12, 1992, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/29/content_363504.htm.  
240 Art. 11, PRC. Constitution. “The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-
public sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the economy. The 
State encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public sectors of the 
economy and, in accordance with law, exercises supervision and control over the non-public 
sectors of the economy.”  
241 “we must go on steadily and surely with political restructuring, extend socialist democracy 
and build socialist political civilization in order to build a socialist country under the rule of law 
and consolidate and develop the political situation characterized by democracy, solidarity, 
liveliness, stability and harmony.” See,  
“Full Text of Resolution on CPC Central Committee Report,” Zhongguo wang, accessed July 31, 
2017, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Nov/48801.htm.    
242  CPC, “Three Represents,” CPC News June 23, 2006, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html.  
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market to ensure a “scientific development.” These new political and constitutional 
principles established the conceptual basis for crafting a better foreign investment law 
and policy framework.  
 
Two decades of outstanding economic performance since the launch of the 
Reform and Open Up policy in the late 1980s drew great attention from researchers 
around the globe. Many prominent studies linked China’s economic growth with the 
following factors: (1) domestic infrastructure investment, (2) the institutional reform 
and restructuring to promote investment-friendly regulations and cross-border 
economic and technological exchanges.243 From the 1990s and early 2000s, China 
gradually established the basis of the modernized commercial legal system by massive 
waves of legislation (such as Company Law, Contract Law, General Principle of Civil 
Code, and Security Law, Anti-Monopoly Law, and many others).  Academics predicted 
FDI could further benefit from these reforms in the sectors of banking, finance, and 
equity market.244  
 
Although these reforms displayed a strong pattern of pro-SOE and pro- 
centralized planning, visible progress was made: freedom of contract and private will 
                                               
243 Ibid.  
244 Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu wanshan shehuizhuyi shichangjingji tizhi 
ruoganwentidejuedng (中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定) [Decision 
on Improve Socialist Market Economy System] adopted by 16th National Congress of the 16th 
CPC on December 14, 2003, accessed July 31, 2017,   
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65411/4429165.html.   
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were promoted and respected during 1992-2005.245 Openness, transparency, 
accountability, and accessibility were no longer ideologically taboo, but treated with 
pragmatism as commonly accepted principles for the development of a mature and 
healthy investment environment. The development of the Foreign Investment Guiding 
Catalogue and the amendments of the equity joint venture (EJV) Law, contractual joint 
venture (CJV) Law, and wholly foreign owned (WFOE) Law demonstrated great 
improvements of transparency and stability of the FDI regulatory regime. The 
development of the Company Law provided a necessary basis for modernizing China’s 
corporate governance.    
  
However, problems and challenges remained. Foreign investment suffered from 
the clashes between the political vision and the market reality. Foreign investment laws 
and regulations extended these conflicts. The policymakers displayed a tendency of 
interpreting market realities as inconvenience and problems for their political vision. 
The market behavior was commonly understood as “disruptions” to the “order” of the 
economy developed and guarded by the authority.246 In this context, “order” was an 
expression of political visions of the economy. However, the “order” could not provide 
necessary guidance to the investors because it was unpredictable and unreliable.  As 
some researchers identified, the most complained issues by foreign investors were the 
                                               
245 Cai Dingjian, “Development of the Chinese Legal System Since 1979 and its Current Crisis and 
Transformation” Cultural Dynamics 11, no. 2 (1999): 135-166. 
246 Chen Xuebin, “China Enacts a New Contract Law for the New Millennium,” 4 Culture Mandala 
1 no. 1 (2000): 1-6. http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol4/iss1/2/. 
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central authority’s unfair preference of the SOE in a variety of issues. Such preference 
created unpredictable regulations for FDI.247 As a result, these regulations created less 
competitive SOE sector on the one hand and further alienated private sectors on the 
other hand.248 As the next chapter discusses, the alienated private sectors found their 
ways of obtaining financial means and investment tools outside the orbit of the central 
authority due to the development of globalization.249 Also, the SOE sector was 
victimized by such self-fulfilling paradox: more preferential policy, poorer performance; 
more protective measures against foreign competition, the weaker position for the SOE 
and the central government.    
 
As many foreign investors complained, special policies and incentives for SOE 
sector, in the form of loans, administrative approval, and resource allocation, 
discriminated against both foreign investors and private sectors in China. It created not 
only fiscal problems for the Chinese government but also created legal risks for violating 
WTO commitments.250 In addition, the political preference of SOE, created a risk of 
corruption. Corruption and ideological prejudice became the greatest threats to foreign 
                                               
247 Alyssa Greenwald, “The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA): a legal response to China's 
economic rise?” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 16 no.1 (Winter 2006): 193-
217, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol16/iss1/7/. 
248 Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun, Wentong Zheng, “Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive 
Compatibility,” J. Comp. L. & Econ 1 (2005): 123-148. 
249 Wanda Tseng and Harm Zebregs, "Foreign Direct Investment in China," International 
Monetary Fund, Discussion Policy Paper 2002. 
250 Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s 
Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 (1993):331-360. 
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investors’ interests in the area of market access and resource distribution.251 China’s 
intrusive administrative, regulatory regime had effectively undermined Chinese foreign 
investment market. Foreign investment turned into a form of bridge loan or non-voting 
right equity due to various discriminatory regulations and laws.252 Despite challenges, 
there were many opportunities for business to grow during the 1990s, FDI data 
presented a bright future for Chinese market during that period.  
 
This chapter mainly focuses on the FDI regime between 1992-2005. The purpose 
is to show the development of FDI regulatory regime in the context of the Chinese 
ideological and Constitutional framework, as well as its legal framework. The first 
section of this chapter gives an overview of the economic status and characteristics of 
the foreign investment during the period between 1992-2005. It acknowledges that 
foreign investment’s contribution to China’s industrial and trade development is 
undeniable. It concludes that even falling short by the market economy standard, 
China’s legal system demonstrated great development over the years. In addition, 
China’s accession to WTO created a new reality that the central authority’s regulatory 
power was limited by the scrutiny of international law.  
                                               
251 Jeremy B. Fox, Joan M. Donohue, Wu Jinpei, “Beyond the Image of Foreign Direct Investment 
in China: Where Ethics Meets Public Relations,” Journal of Business Ethics 56 no. 4 (2005): 317.  
252 For example, “Business China argues that foreign capital is a kind of bridge loan that has 
allowed China to grow rapidly while it tries to fix the mess in its financial system. Domestic 
savings remain stunningly high (around 40% of GDP). But the financial system is woefully bad at 
using them. Money does not flow to the deserving. Rather it goes to the inefficient, largely loss-
making, state sector.” See, “China’s private surprise,” Economist, June 17th 1999,  accessed July 
31, 2017, http://www.economist.com/node/214423  
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The second section exclusively discusses the ideological framework and 
constitutional framework during 1992-2005. The purpose of this section is to provide a 
necessary ideological and constitutional basis that assists readers in understanding the 
principles and contexts, within which the FDI legal framework operated. The main 
theme during this time was the end of the debate over the definition of socialism in 
relation to the market and profit.  The “socialist market economy” was officially 
recognized by the Party and the state constitutions. “Protecting and developing state 
and private-sectors interests” was considered as an important obligation of the 
Vanguard Party.253 This new development, on the one hand, promotes “freedom of 
contract,” for both Chinese and foreign investors, while on the other hand, presented a 
dilemma for the policymakers in the context of maintaining socialist economic order.  
 
The third section exclusively discusses the legal framework of the FDI regime 
during 1992-2005. The purpose is to illustrate the new progress of China’s foreign 
investment policy and law through the example of EJV Law, CJV Law, WFOE Law, and the 
Catalogue for Guiding foreign investment. In addition, this section would also focus on 
one feature of China’s commercial system (dualist legal system) in the context of PRC 
Company Law. It concludes that although far from western market economy standard, 
there was liberation and progress in the area of promoting “freedom of contract,” and 
                                               
253 Larry Catá Backer,Wang  Keren, “The Emerging Structures of Socialist Constitutionalism with 
Chinese Characteristics: Extra-Judicial Detention and the Chinese Constitutional Order,” Rim L. & 
Pol'y J 23 no.2, (2014): 20.  
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“transparency and clarity.” It also notes that the dualist legal system, one system 
designed for domestic firms (particularly private firms) and another system for foreign-
invested firms, was a natural product of China’s conflicting positions on the market and 
socialism. It may be self-defeating in creating undesired consequences for both SOEs 
and the private sector in the long run, as the next chapter illustrates.  
 
The background  
The FDI development during the 1990s and early 2000s displayed some 
interesting features and data. First, the impact of China’s economic development was 
reflected in China’s export sector. For example, exportation of natural resources had 
been gradually replaced by industrial products, especially textile and apparel. IMF 
reported that “By 2002 processed exports reached $180 billion and accounted for 55 
percent of China's total exports.”254  Similar sitations China’s textile exportation almost 
doubled, “from 4.6 percent in 1980 to 8.5 percent in 1998.”255 China’s share of global 
exports for apparel “more than quadrupled, from 4.0 percent to 16.7 percent over the 
                                               
254 For example, “the share of primary product exports fell by almost “four-fifths, from an 
average of 45 percent of total exports in the first half of the 1980s to only 10 percent by 1999.” 
Labor intensive manufacturing sectors, such as “textiles, apparel, footwear, and toys are China’s 
fastest growing exports during the 191990s.” Study reported that export for these items “rose 
more than tenfold, from $4.3 billion to $53.5 billion between 1980 and 1998. Among these 
items, textile is the prime example, the share of textile almost doubled from 4.6 to 8.5 between 
1980 and 1998.The rapidly increasing share of total exports contributed by processing suggests 
the importance of this initiative.” See, Nicholas R. Lardy, “Trade Liberalization and Its Role in 
Chinese Economic Growth,” (paper presented at International Monetary Fund and National 
Council of Applied Economic Research Conference, New Delhi, November 14-16 2003), 8,  
https://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/lardy.pdf.  
255 Ibid.  
131 
 
same period. Faster yet was the expansion of the world market share for toys--from 2.3 
percent in 1980 to 17.9 percent in 1998.”256 The similar situations occurred in the 
footwear sector.  “China's share of the world market for footwear rose the fastest of all, 
soaring from 1.9 percent in 1980 to 20.7 percent in 1998.”257  
 
Table 3. China’s Absorption of Foreign Fund (2001) billion USD.258 
 approved 
projects 
approved 
Contract 
value  
Actual utilized 
contract value  
Total  20549 56.727  388.21 
FDI 20549 52.201  372.53 
EJV 7033 13.773 117.45 
CJV 1267 6.702 47.51 
WFOE 12237 3.4369 198.80 
Share Holding 
Investment  
8 0.324 4.42 
Cooperation 
exploration  
3 0.019 4.2 
others 1 0.013 0.15 
International leasing   1.02 
Processing and 
assembling  
 1.521 14.60 
 
                                               
256 Ibid.  
257 Ibid.    
258 MOFCOM, “China’s Absorption of Foreign Fund (2001),”  
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tongjiziliao/v/200202/20020200000368.shtml  
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Secondly, a globalized economy benefited China’s economic development. China 
doubled its exportation in auto parts in just one year. China’s massive industrialization 
and domestic investment made China become the consumer of “40 percent of the 
world's cement in 2003.”259 Observers and researchers noted China’s excellent 
development in foreign trade and investment.260 As the 1997 World Bank report 
suggested, the transition from command to market “in one or two generation for what 
rich industrial economies took centuries to help Chinese out of absolute poverty.” 261The 
Chinese economy expanded dramatically in the past decades. Between “1978 and 1995 
real GDP per capita grew at the blistering rate of 8 percent a year and lifted 200 
million.”262 “Three indicators suggest that increased competition is having a 
transforming influence on China's domestic economy. First, the decline in employment 
in the state sector; second, the dramatic shrinkage in the rate of inventory 
accumulation; third, the upturn in profitability of China's state-owned manufacturing 
firms.” 263 
                                               
259 Chris Miller, “An intricate ALLIANCE” Aftermarket Business 115.5 (2005) 46-48, accessed July 
29, 2017, http://www.searchautoparts.com/searchautoparts/article/. For example, China 
exported $6.5 billion in auto parts in 2003, more than double what it did the previous year, 
according to Fishman. Another effect of China's growth is a spike in raw material costs. Copper, 
aluminum, zinc and oil prices have all increased due to China's demand. (Recent gas price 
increases can also be attributed, in part, to a hefty demand from China's factories.  
260 Ibid.  
261 World Bank, China 2020: China Engaged (Washington: IMF, 1997) accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/656981468743976946/pdf/multi0page.pdf.  
262 World Bank, China 2020: Development Challenges In the New Century (Washington: IMF, 
1997) accessed July 31, 2017,  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/502041468768865165/pdf/multi0page.pdf.  
263 Ibid.   
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It is estimated that China "will absorb $57.6 billion worth of direct foreign 
investment in five years, which will control 6.5% of the global economy. This estimate is 
an increase from the intake of FDI in 2001 equaling an astonishing record $46.8 
billion.”264 Studies emphasized the significance of FDI in Chinese economy . For example, 
FDI provided a significant contribution to the growth of Chinese economy during the 
1990s.265  It is impossible to ignore the needs of the foreign investors in order to harness 
the benefits from the FDI to develop China's modernization and reform further.266  By 
the end of the 1990s, China has “one-third of the emerging markets’ total stock of 
FDI.”267The links between China’s growth and FDI is undeniable. During the 1990s, China 
                                               
264   George O. White III, “Foreigners at the Gate: Sweeping Revolutionary Changes on the 
Central Kingdom's Landscape-Foreign Direct Investment Regulations & Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms in the People's Republic of China,” Rich. J. Global L. & Bus 3 (2003): 124, 95-141. 
265 For example: “The increase in China’s trade to GDP ratio-from 10 percent in 1975-1979 to 36 
percent in 1990-2004 was the 7th most rapid among 120 countries. And the increase in its 
foreign direct investment to GDP ratio-from almost zero in 1975-1979 to about 3.5 percent in 
1990-1994 was the 6th most rapid.” See, Nicholas R. Lardy, “Trade Liberalization and Its Role in 
Chinese Economic Growth,” (paper presented at International Monetary Fund and National 
Council of Applied Economic Research Conference, New Delhi, November 14-16 2003), 1-10,  
https://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/lardy.pdf.  
266 For example, “Chinese economy performance, including GDP, and Chinese people, such as 
annual income benefit tremendously from the rapid growth of global trade through developing 
labor-intensive manufacturing export trade.” Nicholas R. Lardy, “Trade Liberalization and Its 
Role in Chinese Economic Growth,” (paper presented at International Monetary Fund and 
National Council of Applied Economic Research Conference, New Delhi, November 14-16 2003), 
1-10,  https://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/lardy.pdf. 
267 For example: A World Bank 1997 report states that “the nature of China’s economic growth 
in the past twenty years has been both productivity-driven and input-driven. Each of these two 
factors contributed around half of the 9.4 percent annual GDP growth rate for the period 1978 
to 1995 and is likely to do so after these dates. The input factor is attributed to the significant 
increase in capital in which foreign direct investment (FDI) played an important role. Therefore, 
to sustain the growth momentum, China ... needs to continue to secure a critical input factor – 
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became the world's second-largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) after the 
United States. In addition, reform created many benefits for China’s FDI and domestic 
forms. For example, China’s trade company increased rapidly since the reform. “Trade 
company and joint ventures enjoyed direct trading rights without restrictions licensing 
for products and inputs.”268 “Joint venture in 1994 accounted for a third of China’s 
imports, and almost 20 percent of exports” WFOE accounted for 12 percent of imports 
and 9 percent of exports.” 269 
 
Since China’s accession to WTO, FDI development maintained a steady growth. 
“By the end of April 2003, 436,394 foreign investment enterprises obtained approvals 
from the Chinese competent administrative authority. Meanwhile, the total amounts of 
foreign investment on contracts were USD 858.588 billion and the amounts of foreign 
investment actually used were USD 465.789 billion.”270 From Jan to Nov 2005, “China 
approved and set up 39,679 foreign invested enterprises, up by 1.17% than the previous 
year; the contractual value of the foreign fund was US$167,212millon, up by 23.99%; 
actual utilized foreign fund value was US$53,127millon, decreased by 1.90% year-on-
                                               
high FDI.” see World Bank, China 2020: China Engaged (Washington: IMF, 1997) accessed July 
31, 2017, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/656981468743976946/pdf/multi0page.pdf.  
268Ibid.   
269Ibid.   
270 MOFCOM, “China’s Absorption of Foreign Fund (2005/1-11),” accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/foreigninvestment/200607/20060702700699.sht
ml.   
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year.” 271 South Asian countries and regions ranked high in regions and countries 
investing China. The top regions and countries were: “(according to actual invest value) 
were Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands, Japan, Korea, US, Singapore, Taiwan, Cayman 
Islands, Germany, and Samoa. The actual investment value of the top 10 countries and 
regions constituted 84.37% of China’s actual utilized foreign fund value.”272  
 
Third, researchers acknowledged that although China became the largest FDI 
recipient in 2002, high-quality FDI investment from OECD countries was still 
inadequately represented.273 Investors and academics agreed that China’s FDI 
framework needed to pay attention to factors that promote and facilitate a high-quality 
and sustainable development. Most frequently mentioned factors included “a 
transparent and predictable legal system, streamlined investment approval procedures, 
good corporate governance, pro-competition policies, and a competent and practical 
                                               
271 MOFCOM, “China’s Absorption of Foreign Fund (2005/1-11),” accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/foreigninvestment/200607/20060702700699.sht
ml.   
272 Ibid.    
273 For example, although China became the world’s largest recipient of FDI in 2002, the country 
continues to rank below OECD economies and several major developing countries in terms of 
FDI inflows per capita. Also, while OECD countries provide over 90% of FDI globally, their share 
of FDI in China is much smaller. Accordingly, China has now a goal of attracting long-term, 
relatively capital-intensive and high-tech projects from multinational enterprises in OECD 
countries. Improvements in the business environment that will help achieve this goal will also 
have the broader effect of increasing domestic investment. OECD, “OECD Investment Policy 
Review of China 2003,” accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/oecd-investment-policy-review-
of-china-2003.htm.  
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financial system.” 274 Since the 2000s, China started to adopt new policies to develop 
structures that were more compatible with the WTO commitment and sustainable 
development. This change also mirrored the fact that more and more high-quality FDI 
replaced labor-intensive and export-oriented small size FDI. 275  
 
With the development of China’s legal infrastructure and economic system, 
more and more foreign investors choose WFOE as the form of their business 
investment. For example, “Since 1997, WFOEs have begun to outnumber JVs. Factors 
such as Chinese partners’ competence, joint-venture (JV) management control, and 
frustration from JV failure examples, have been cited as reasons why a strict adoption of 
WFOE for conducting business in China might be preferable.276” Some researchers 
highlighted the fact that China adopted different strategies in approaching FDI. FDI 
incentives were tailored to fit local advantage.277  
                                               
274 Ibid.   
275 Freenstra, Robert C. and Alan M. Taylor, International Economics. fifth edition (New York: 
McGraw Hill Publishers, 2013), 213-223. For example, “since the early 2000s, Hong Kong 
manufacturing FIEs have been pressured by the rising labour and production costs and the strict 
environmental regulations. As the result, both total and partial relocation patterns are 
identified. Relocation destinations include designated industrial parks within the peripheral 
regions in Guangdong (the most popular destination), Western and Central China, and other 
low-cost South East Asian countries such as Vietnam.” 
276 Daniel Yan and Malcolm Warner, “Research Papers In Management Studies Sino-Foreign 
Joint Ventures’ Versus ‘Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises’ In The People’s Republic Of China,” 
https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/workingpapers/wp0111.pdf.  
277 Freenstra, Robert C. and Alan M. Taylor, International Economics. fifth edition (New York: 
McGraw Hill Publishers, 2013),213-223. For example, “Branstetter and Freenstra examined 
determinants of FDI into China during 1984-1995 period, and concluded that policies played a 
critical role in attracting FDI and policies were different for different provinces. For example, in 
1979 Guangdong and Fujian provinces became sites of "special economic zones" that gave very 
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Fourth, joining WTO transformed China’s implementing policy and law on 
international trade and FDI regime. With the signature with the U.S. and EU for the 
bilateral agreement on China’s accession to WTO in 1999 and 2000, China broke ground 
for its path to WTO admission.278  
Table 4. China’s Path to WTO. 
1984  ● China obtained observer status in GATT  
1986 ● China notified GAT of intent to renegotiate terms of membership 
 
1987 ● GATT established Working party on China membership  
 
1995 ● China applied for accession to WTO  
 
1997 ● China agreed to Nondiscrimination and Judicial Review under WTO, signed 
bilateral agreements with New Zealand, Korea 
1999 ● The United States and China signed bilateral agreement on China's 
accession  
2000 ● U.S. Congress passed legislation, EU and China signed bilateral agreement 
on China's accession  
2001  ● China's accession to WTO became effective  
• The average statutory tariff, which stood at the relatively high level of 56 percent 
in 1982, was reduced to 15 percent by 2001. The share of all imports subject to 
                                               
favorable tax and administrative treatment to foreign firms (more favorable treatment than to 
domestic Chinese firms!)”  
278 For example: The PRC began to send official observers to the GATT meeting in 1982 and joint 
GATT arrangements regarding international textile trade in late 1983. The PRC now wants to 
"restore" its membership status at the GATT, rather than join the GATT as a new member. See  
Hungdah Chiu, “Recent Legal Issues Between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China,”  Md. 
J. Int'l L. 12 no.1 (1987):1-35, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1299&context=mjil. The 
below chart illustrated the path to WTO.  
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licensing requirements fell from a peak of 46 percent in the late 1980s to fewer 
than 4 percent of all commodities by the time China entered the WTO. 279 
 
Lee Branstetter and Nicholas Lardy emphasized that “China’s aggressive liberalization of 
trade and investment in advance of deadlines built into the agreements surrounding 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).”280 China’s growth 
demonstrated a pattern of development that was coherent with the basic experience of 
Japan and Korea.281 More importantly, WTO served as an external discipline over 
China’s administrative interference of the economy through principles and guidelines 
                                               
279 Nicholas R. Lardy, “Trade Liberalization and Its Role in Chinese Economic Growth,” (paper 
presented at International Monetary Fund and National Council of Applied Economic Research 
Conference, New Delhi, November 14-16 2003), 1-10,  
https://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/lardy.pdf.  
280 For example, “Starting in the mid-1990s, the SOE reforms reflected the state’s desire to seek 
effective management and make this suit the needs of a market economy through innovative 
operations and mechanisms. Thus far, the government still aims to reform the SOEs in the hope 
that the latter can stand on their own feet... Areas like corporate governance, entrepreneurship 
and internationalization receive more and more attention. To counteract the problem of surplus 
labour in SOEs, the state resorts to the survival of the fittest, resulting in downsizing in SOEs” 
see Daniel Yan and Malcolm Warner, “Research Papers in Management Studies Sino-Foreign 
Joint Ventures’ Versus ‘Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises’ in The People’s Republic Of China,” 
https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/workingpapers/wp0111.pdf. Also 
see, Loren Brandt, Thomas G. Rawski, Lin Gang, “Inside Chinese economy : Retrospect And 
Prospect,” Asia Program Special Report (2005):1,    
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/AsiaReport_129.pdf (accessed September 04, 
2017). 
281 For example: From the perspective of earlier Asian growth spurts in Japan and Korea, China 
has opened its economic doors to imports and overseas capital to an unprecedented degree, a 
strategy that seems likely to create future industrial structures that differ widely from what we 
see in Japan and Korea today. Lee Branstetter, Nicholas Lardy, “China’s Embrace of 
Globalization,” (Cambridge: NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2006) accessed July 
31, 2017, http://www.nber.org/papers/w12373. 
http://sandraponcet.weebly.com/uploads/8/1/9/0/81902660/chinas_economy_retrospect_and
_prospect.pdf.  
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embedded in a matrix of multinational, bilateral treaties. Thus, WTO formed an external 
framework that checked China’s administrative power. 282These external rules, to some 
extent, forced the Chinese government to take actions that were more compatible with 
the global standard, particularly in the area of market access, subsidies, and 
transparency.283   
 
Fifth, China established a dualist legal system between 1992-2005 under China’s 
socialist economy. Between 1992-2005, China started massive commercial lawmaking. 
These laws formed the basis of China’s dual legal system or two-track legal system: one 
for foreign investors and one for domestic firms. This system intended to provide a set 
of policies and regulations for foreign investment, which could be more compatible with 
the international practice and norms. Another set of regulations for domestic firms were 
created to accommodate the experience of the “socialist market economy.” However, 
                                               
282 For example, one interviewer told a BBC journalist that China has traditionally been an 
authoritarian state. WTO framework provided alternative source of regulations that 
breakthrough such tradition. See “分析：入世 13 載 中國經貿得與失”(Analysis, the Gain and 
Loss of China’s Trade and Economy since WTO Accession 13 years ago), BBC November 10, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/indepth/2014/11/141110_china_wto_13_years  
283 For example, by signing on to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement), China agreed to countervailing duty actions and to gradually remove export 
subsidies. See: The concept of transparency is central to the WTO agreements. Article X of the 
GAIT 1994 requires that all trade-related laws, regulations, and rulings be promptly published 
and administered in an "impartial and uniform" manner. See: General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. X, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194．  
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as one scholar noticed, such system might create confusion and conflicts. 284 For 
example, EJV Law, CJV Law, and WFOE Law were created for FIEs. The Company Law 
was tailored for the domestic firm, which had many rules incompatible with the foreign 
investment legal framework.285 It was acknowledged that “Chinese law treats Chinese 
and foreigners unequally, or more accurately, treats Chinese nationals and legal 
persons, including those established by foreign investors, less favorably in terms of the 
establishment of enterprises and income tax than foreign investors coming directly from 
abroad.”286 The design of such dualist structure, as Huang asserted, was “to insulate 
SOEs from the reform while using FIE to reform the ‘socialist market economy.'”287 The 
PRC Company Law and SOE Law illustrated this issue. For example: 
“The Company Law, in theory, is supposed to be a unified legislation governing 
firms of all ownership types, but in fact, separate laws designed for firms of 
different ownership types have remained in force. Indeed, the Company Law has 
specifically stipulated the continuation of the separate legal regime for FIEs. 
Thus, for the FIE sector, the three landmark laws, the PRC Law on Sino-Foreign 
                                               
284 Yuan Anyuan, “Foreign direct investments in China--practical problems of complying with 
China's company law and laws for foreign-invested enterprises,” in Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 3 (2000): 484.  
285 For example, under EJV Law, WFOE Law and CJV Law, the board of directors is the highest 
power of the company. Under P.R.C. Company Law, the shareholder meeting is the highest 
power of the company.  
286 Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s 
Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 (1993):331-360. 
287 Huang Yasheng, “One country, two systems: Foreign-invested enterprises and domestic firms 
in China,” China Economic Review 14, no. 4 (2003): 408.  
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Equity Joint Ventures (1979), the PRC Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises 
(1986), and the PRC Law on Sino Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures (1988) 
remained in effect. For most of the SOEs, a critical prerequisite for SOEs to come 
under the jurisdiction of the Company Law has not been met—that they are 
reorganized into either ‘‘companies limited by shares’’ or ‘‘limited liability 
companies.’’ Thus, for the SOEs, the relevant piece of legislation continues to be 
the PRC Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned Wholly by the People promulgated 
in 1988 (hereafter SOE Law)288 
This dualist nature of the legal system attracted academic interest, some entertaining 
the thought that such design perfectly fits in the structure of “socialism conservation,” 
to preserve SOE rather than eliminate it.289 Interestingly, some researchers pointed out 
that with China’s accession to WTO and decades of FDI development, Chinese 
leadership experimented with a new tactic, such as M&A, to restructure SOE in the hope 
of creating world-class enterprises through soft government planning. 290 
                                               
288 Yuan Anyuan, “Foreign direct investments in China--practical problems of complying with 
China's company law and laws for foreign-invested enterprises,” in Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 3 (2000): 484.  
289 Ibid.  
290 For example, “In particular, beginning with the creation of the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003, China’s new leaders de-
emphasized their predecessors’ move toward a greater reliance on market forces and a lesser 
reliance on Chinese government economic planners and state-owned enterprises. Instead, the 
new leaders set out to bolster the state sector by seeking to improve the operational efficiency 
of state-owned enterprises and by orchestrating mergers and consolidations in order to make 
these enterprises stronger. These actions soon led to institutionalized preferences for state-
owned enterprises and the creation of national champions in many sectors.” United States 
Trade Representative, 2016 Report to Congress On China’s WTO Compliance, January 2017, 
accessed July 2017, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-China-Report-to-Congress.pdf.   
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 Last, since the 1990s and China’s massive business law legislation, the rule of 
law started to be a frequent topic among western academics. 291One of the frequent 
themes were whether China could maintain the current pace of development in the 
1990s without meaningful development in China’s legal infrastructure. One of the 
common comments from Western academics was “China’s story defies western 
assumptions about the relationship between capitalism and the rule of law.292”As one 
scholar observed, obstacles created under China’s FDI policy and law linked to these 
issues, “the regulation either rigid without flexibility or flexible but lack transparency, 
there is no consensus on to what extent foreign capital is allowed in China’s socialist 
economy reform,” except, perhaps, a decision from leadership after long and closed 
internal debates. 293 
 
 
2. Ideological and Constitutional Framework  
As the second chapter discussed, during the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping proposed the 
“two hands theory,” which referred to the authority would one hand focusing on 
economic development while the other hand is focusing on the regulations and laws in 
                                               
291 Wang Jiangyu, “The Rule of Law In China: A Realistic View Of The Jurisprudence, the Impact 
Of the WTO, and The Prospects For Future Development,”  
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2004): 349. 
292 Carol A.G. Jones, “Capitalism, Globalization and Rule of Law : an Alternative Trajectory of 
Legal Change in China,” Social & Legal Studies 3 no.2 (1994):195-221, https://doi-
org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/10.1177/096466399400300201.  
293 Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s 
Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 (1993):331-360. 
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response to complaints about legal system by foreign investors.294 During the 1990s, a 
massive wave of commercial, civil, administrative, criminal laws designed to build 
China’s legal system. Legislation benefited FDI tremendously. These laws and 
regulations were the extensions of China’s foreign investment policies and underlying 
ideological and constitutional framework. Thus, it is important to exam the ideological 
and constitutional context of China’s judicial modernization. These discussions provide a 
necessary context to understand the extent and forms of China’s commercial system 
reform, which would be helpful in understanding the conflicts between the goal of 
preserving a revolutionary socialist agenda and the goal of promoting freedom of 
contract and foreign investments under a market system.  
 
The first part of this section outlined the progress in China’s ideological reform, 
which identified that the authority relaxed the ideological prejudice against market and 
profit. This progress provided an excellent basis for China’s further relaxation on FDI 
regime, as the next section FDI legal framework demonstrated. The second part of this 
section focused on the constitutional development of the China’s economic system, 
which suggested that the consistency between the ideological reform and constitutional 
reform. It further provided a textual analysis considering the issue of a socialist 
                                               
294 The two hands policy meant that on the one hand, the economy must be developed while on 
the other hand, the legal system must be strengthened. The four modernizations referred to the 
need to modernize agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. See 
Randall Peerenboom, “Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative 
Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China,” Berkeley J. INT'L L. 19 (2001): 
161-163. See the previous chapter on Deng Xiaoping “Two hands” Theory.  
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economic order under the Constitution, which illustrated the dilemma between the 
political agenda of the authority and the economic interests of the foreign investors for 
securing freedom of contract.  
 
a. Ideological Framework  
 In 1997, the 15th National Congress of CPC report proposed “rule the state in 
accordance with the law.”295 It highlighted the implication of this new agenda, as it 
pointed out “Rule the state in accordance with the law is the basic strategy, the 
necessity of developing the ‘socialist market economy’ and important sign of civic 
progress, and an important guarantee for the long-term stability and security of the 
state.” In 1990, Administrative Law and Litigation Procedure Law clarified the scope of 
administrative litigation, the responsibility of the government agency under different 
conditions.296 This legislation gave investors and private citizens a chance to ask court 
review government action. In 1994, the Standing Committee of the NPC adopted State 
Compensation Law, which stipulated the scope of compensation, standard, procedure, 
and applicability. This legislation offered a legal framework for investors and private 
citizens to settle their disputes with the government agency in the courthouse. Although 
                                               
295 “Building socialist politics with Chinese characteristics means ruling the country by law and 
developing socialist democracy under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and with 
the people as the masters of the country.” See, Jiang Zemin's Report at the 15th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, "Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping 
Theory for an All-round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics to the 21st Century," accessed July 31, 2017. 
http://academics.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/308S/Readings/jzm15CCP.htm.  
296 See: PRC Administrative Law and Litigation Procedure Law 
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these laws were far from perfect in theory and in practice, the significance was 
undeniable. In addition, Administrative Reconsideration Law was promulgated in 1999, 
which provided statutory oversight on the government action.297 These measures 
improved the accountability of the government. On a side note, since China restored the 
judicial system, China started to rebuild people’s court, people’s procuratorate, 
arbitration system and lawyer system. Until 2006, there are about 190,000 judges, 
140,000 prosecutors, and 130,000 lawyers.298 These new professionals formed the basis 
of China’s rule of law system.  
 
The most important ideological reform between 1992-2005 focused on the 
relationship between socialism and the role of the market. The reform involved with 
three stages. The first stage normalized the notion of the market economy by 
establishing the new party line the “socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics” in 1993.299 The goal is to desensitize the negative connotation of the 
market and profit. The second stage further opened the market by removing practices 
of a centralized command economy, creating free price market, restructuring SOE 
management, and developing the commercial legal system. These measures 
substantially transformed China’s command economy. It also introduced a new notion 
                                               
297 Guo jianan, Zha qingjiu, “中国法治与经济发展,” [Rule of Law in China dn Economic 
Development]中国法律 [Chinese Law] 1 (2008): 17, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx/pay/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=qikan&Gid=1510090192.    
298 Ibid.  
299 Ibid.  
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of replacing government command with market and court. The third stage was to 
decriminalize bourgeoisie by allowing them to join the communist party. These new 
developments expressed a historical coherence after Deng Xiaoping’s legacy policy of 
the Reform and Open Up, which were all embedded and reflected in the Constitutional 
amendments. These reforms officially ended the debates of socialism and capitalism 
throughout the 1980s and concluded that the old system existed for historical reasons, 
and now it is time to move forward to the “socialist market economy,” which is more 
appropriate to serve the socialist modernization.300 FDI policy and law during this period 
benefited tremendously from these new reform measures because first, a free domestic 
market started to emerge in China when government gradually stepped back from their 
intrusive role in the economic transaction. Second, the expansion of market reform 
created a domestic market with practices compatible with the global common standard. 
China gradually adopted Company Law, Contract Law, Security Law, Antitrust Law, 
Insurance Law and many others to build a modernized legal system and professional, 
and competent legal service industry.  
 
On the part of political development, the 14th National Congress of CPC 
redefined China’s economic system by concluding China would move away from the 
                                               
300 Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianli shehui zhuyi shichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de jueding 
(中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定)[Resolution of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Issues concerning the Establishment of 
the System of Socialist Market Economy], December 17, 1993, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/134902/8092314.html.   
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“old system.” 301 It concluded that previous economic system “existed for historical 
reasons” with “certain great contributions.”302 However, it was time to move forward 
because such system had been increasingly inadequate to serve the “development of 
modernization.” 303 The 14th National Congress of CPC proposed a new party line of 
developing the “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”304  
 
On the part of the economic reform. The Third Plenary Session of the 14th 
National Congress of CPC adopted Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of the 
Socialist Market Economy [hereinafter the Resolution on the Socialist Market 
Economy].305 The 1993 Resolution on the Socialist Market Economy ended ideological 
debates and reaffirmed the necessity of further Open up. It declared that the socialist 
market economy is embedded with a socialist system.306 The nature of the “socialist 
                                               
301 “The old economic structure has its historical origins and has played an important and 
positive role. With changing conditions, however, it has come to correspond less and less to the 
requirements of the modernization programme. The most profound change brought about by 
the reform in the last 14 years is that many ideological and structural shackles have been shaken 
off. This has released the initiative of the masses, so that China, with its 1.1 billion people, is 
now creating a vigorous socialism.”  see: Full Text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 14th Party 
Congress, October 12, 1992, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/29/content_363504.htm.  
302 Ibid.   
303 Halverson Karen, “China's WTO accession: economic, legal, and political implications,” B. C. 
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev 27, no. 2 (2004): 319-370.  
304 “Full Text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 14th Party Congress,” October 12, 1992, accessed July 
31, 2017, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/29/content_363504.htm. 
305 Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Issues 
concerning the Establishment of the System of Socialist Market Economy.   
306 §1 ¶2 Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Issues 
concerning the Establishment of the System of Socialist Market Economy.  
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market economy” was to let market allocate the resources with state macroeconomic 
regulation and control. The resolution outlined area of reform, which included tax, bank, 
SOE corporate governance, and legal system.307   
 
The Resolution first explained that the “socialist market economy” system 
embedded with China’s socialist system. The main purpose of the socialist system was 
to let the “market played a vital role in the allocation of the resource under the state 
macroeconomic regulation and control.”308 In addition, the Resolution redefined the 
role of the central planning. According to the Resolution, central planning “study and 
create a strategic plan based on the market.” 309This new policy substantially 
transformed the conventional role of the intrusive central planning under the command 
economy system.310 The 1993 Resolution continued the export-oriented FDI policy, 
which focused on creating a desirable investment environment to attack export-
oriented or technologically advanced foreign investment.311 One of the highlights under 
                                               
307 Ling zhijun, Ma ke, Deng ke, “朱镕基的 1994 改革年：“经济沙皇”捅了马蜂窝,”[Zhu Rongji 
Reform: Economic Tsar disturbed beehive]  South China Weekly  March, 8, 2003, accessed July 
31, 2017, 
http://news.eastday.com/epublish/gb/paper148/20030308/class014800018/hwz899794.htm.  
308 Carol A.G. Jones, “Capitalism, Globalization and Rule of Law : an Alternative Trajectory of 
Legal Change in China,” Social & Legal Studies 3 no.2 (1994):195-221, https://doi-
org.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/10.1177/096466399400300201. 
309 Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Issues 
concerning the Establishment of the System of Socialist Market Economy.   
310 §4 ¶(21) Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some 
Issues concerning the Establishment of the System of Socialist Market Economy. 
311 §4 ¶(39) Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some 
Issues concerning the Establishment of the System of Socialist Market Economy. 
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the Resolution was the fact that the political rhetoric relaxed the tone on the market, it 
further emphasized that the important role of the market and law in balancing the 
economic development. As the Resolution pointed out: “The main measure is economy 
and law, and the administrative interference is supplementary.”312  
 
In response to the Resolution on the Socialist Market Economy, State Council 
adopted series implementing directives on economic reform, which further relaxed the 
market access and transparency for the foreign investors. On June 8, 1994, State Council 
issued Key points in Implementing Economic System Reform.313 This program provided a 
detailed explanation on areas of the reform. Which can be categorized by the 
following314: 
1. Financial System Reform,315 
                                               
312 Ibid.   
313  国务院 1994 年经济体制改革实施要点 [Key points in Implementing Economic System 
Reform] adopted by State Council on June 8, 1994, available at: 
http://gaige.rednet.cn/c/2008/06/30/1539912.htm.  
314 For example, the Government Law and Order Reform, Investment System Reform, Foreign 
Trade System Reform and Foreign Exchange Reform were the four programs related to FDI 
regulatory regime. The foreign exchange reform ended foreign exchange retention system and 
foreign exchange coupon. It calls for establishing foreign exchange market between banks. RMB 
under general account can be converted to foreign exchange without administrative permission. 
The foreign trade system reform call for decentralization of regulation by delegating more 
power to local authority.    
315 Guowuyuan guanyu jingrong tizhi gaige de jueding(国务院关于金融体制改革的决定) 
[Decision of the State Council on Reform of the Financial System], adopted by State Council on 
December 25, 1993, avilable at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6265&CGid=.   
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2. Tax Division Reform, 316 
3. Foreign Exchange Reform,317 
4. Economic System Restructuring,318 
5. Foreign Trade System Reform,319 
6. Investment System Reform,320 
7. Government Law and Order.321   
With the developments of the ideological reforms, the 16th National Congress of the 
CPC adopted the Decision on Improve the “Socialist Market Economy” System, which 
established a new theoretical framework for China’s modernization. It proclaimed to 
                                               
316 Ibid.   
317 adopted by State Council on December 25, 1993, available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-07/28/content_5090286.htm.  
318 Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu gaige waihui guanli tizhi de tongzhi(国务院关于进一步改革外汇
管理体制的通知) [Notice on further reform Foreign Exchange System]adopted by State Council 
on , Guowuyuan guanyu jingji tizhi gaige shishi yaodian (国务院经济体制改革实施要点) [State 
Council Main Points for Implementation of Economic Restructuring], adopted by State Council 
on ,available at: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1994/gwyb199414.pdf.  
319 Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu shenhua duiwai maoyi tizhi de jueding (国务院关于进一步深化
对外贸易体制改革的决定) [Decision of the State Council on Reform of the Foreign Trade 
System ] adopted by State Council on January 11, 1994, available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2010-11/15/content_1429.htm.  
320 Guowuyuan guanyu touzi tizhi gaige de jueding (国务院关于投资体制改革的决定) [Decision 
of the State Council on Reforming the Investment System]adopted by State Council on July 16, 
2004, available at: http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/dotscortis628/.   
321 Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang zhengfu fazhi gongzuo de jueding (国务院关于加强政府法制工
作的决定) Decision on Strengthen the Law and Order of Government work 
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establish “a unified, open modernized market system that is competitive with the 
order.” In addition, it called for a sustainable socio-economic development system.322  
 
The 16th National Congress also ratified Jiang Zemin’s “Three Representatives” 
theory, a theory essential to further decriminalize and normalize bourgeois. Jiang 
Zemin's "three represents" campaign, which emphasized the CCP's role in representing 
the interests of people, including capitalists and workers and peasants.”323 In the second 
chapter, the Party vocally questioning the role of the bourgeoisie in Chinese economy . 
The foreign investment policies and laws extended the central authority’s limited 
supports to the market economy and private sectors. The new “three representatives” 
implied Party’s relaxation on the market and central control. The CCP had opened its 
party membership to entrepreneurs.324 The “three” refers as: 
                                               
322 Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu wanshan shehuizhuyi shichangjingji tizhi 
ruoganwentidejuedng (中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定) [Decision 
on Improve Socialist Market Economy System] adopted by 16th Natioanl Congress of the 16th 
CPC on December 14, 2003, available at:  
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65411/4429165.html.   
323 Comrade Jiang Zemin first propounded the important thought of Three Represents during his 
inspection tour of Guangdong Province in February 2000. He emphatically pointed out, "An 
important conclusion can be reached from reviewing our Party's history over the past 70-odd 
years; that is, the reason our Party enjoys the people's support is that throughout the historical 
periods of revolution, construction and reform, it has always represented the development 
trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture, and 
the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. See “Three 
Represents Three Represents,” CPC News. June 23, 2006. Accessed April 20, 2017.  
http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html.  
 
324 Full Text of Jiang's Speech at CPC Anniversary Gathering, July 1, 2001, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.chinaembassy.cz/cze/xwdt/t127032.htm. 
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● “Represents advanced social productive forces" stands for economic production 
● "Represents the progressive course of China's advanced culture" stands for 
cultural development 
● "Represents the fundamental interests of the majority" stands for political 
consensus.325 
The above reform further removed cultural and political obstacles against market and 
profit, which were unprecedented for foreign investment in the 1980s. Under this new 
agenda, China’s private sector no longer needed to hide behind the veil, which 
established a foundation for the development of Chinese market system by promoting 
an open and inclusive investment environment.  
 
 
b. The Constitutional Framework  
The ideological reform that benefited China’s investment environment had been 
affirmed by the Constitution Amendments. Few months prior to 14th Central CPC 
Congress, the NPC adopted the 1993 Constitution Amendment. This landmark 
amendment involved certain paragraphs in the Preamble and the General Principle 
section, which laid out a new foundation to assure China’s economic modernization. The 
main theme of the amendment was the “socialist market economy,” which removed 
                                               
325 Communist Party must represent not only the workers' and the peasants' interests but also 
the development needs of the country's advanced productive forces. See, e.g., Full Text of 
Jiang's Speech at CPC Anniversary Gathering, July 1, 2001, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.chinaembassy.cz/cze/xwdt/t127032.htm. Also see: Three Represents - Wikipedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Represents_Theory (accessed August 19, 2017).  
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ideological taboo of private ownership by constitutionally supporting private sector and 
replacing central planning economy with the less intrusive economy management 
system. The amended paragraph of the Preamble established a theoretical basis for the 
“socialist market economy” and foreign investments, as it provided that:  
“China is at the primary stage of socialism. The basic task of the nation is to 
concentrate its effort on socialist modernization in line with the theory of 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics.326” 
To implement modernization, the Preamble asked that: 
“Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all 
nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and 
the socialist road, persevere in reform and opening to the outside world, steadily 
improve socialist institutions, develop socialist democracy.”327 
The 1993 Constitution Amendment adopt new economic system the “socialist 
market economy” under article 15, and redefined the state economy and its relationship 
with socialism, as it provided that: 
“The State practices “socialist market economy.”The State strengthens economic 
legislation, improves macro-regulation and control." "The State prohibits in 
accordance with law any organization or individual from disturbing the socio-
economic order.”328 
                                               
326 Preamble, Constitution 1993.  
327  Preamble, Constitution 1993.  
328 Article 15, Constitution 1993. 
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The 1993 Amendment signified a major transition of the narrative over the 
nature of the private sector. On many levels, it ended the vacuum of silence and 
uncertainty around the Reform and Open up after the Tiananmen Protest with full 
confident on the further economy and institutional reform.  New national economic 
policy and ideology reform had been contextualized by the 1993 Constitution 
amendment. The Amendment provided that “China is at the primary stage of socialism. 
The State practices socialist market economy.” 329 The Constitution amendment 
specified the new expression of state economy as the “socialist market economy.” The 
second part of the article 15 seems provided additional information to explain the part 
of “socialism” as it pointed out "The State strengthens economic legislation, improves 
macro-regulation and control." "The State prohibits in accordance with law any 
organization or individual from disturbing the socio-economic order."330  
 
The socioeconomic order was a common term under command economy 
system, which normally referred to the central command or central plan. Clearly, this 
new amendment was troublesome for its lack of precision and clarity under the legal 
text. As the previous chapter illustrated, many government’s intrusive plans created 
more problems than it solved for foreign investors. The 14th National Congress of CPC 
                                               
329 PRC. Const. Art. 15. “The State practices socialist market economy." "The State strengthens 
economic legislation, improves macro-regulation and control." "The State prohibits in 
accordance with law any organization or individual from disturbing the socio-economic order." 
330 PRC. Const. Art. 15.  
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proposed a new line, which moved away from the central command by redefining the 
relationship between market, central plan, and law. The new political line established a 
basis of interpretive principle with better and clearer guidance.  
 
Although the Constitution did not further specify the precise meaning of this 
term, it did not stop the central authority to emphasize the importance of the 
socioeconomic order. For example, China’s 1997 Criminal code dedicated one chapter 
with the title “Crimes of Disrupting the Order of the Socialist Market Economy.”331 
Based on the relevant articles under Criminal Law, crimes categorized as “Disrupting the 
Order” were common white collar crime, such as tax evasion, smuggling, piracy, fraud, 
insider trading.  In addition, this SPC’s internal directive might also shed some lights and 
help you understand the different dimension of the Social-economic order. Based on the 
internal directive, there were both legal aspect and political aspect of the socio-
economic order. The legal aspect could be found in criminal law, and other commercial 
laws, such as bankruptcy. The political aspect of the “socio-economic order” was a little 
complicated. The internal directive judged the political aspect based on the 
consequence of the law enforcement or the impact of the law enforcement on a 
community. For example, in bankruptcy cases, SPC had issued directives ask local court 
pay attention to political implication of the case or to maintain socioeconomic order by 
                                               
331 See Chapter III   Crimes of Disrupting the Order of the “socialist market economy”, Criminal 
Law of the People's Republic of China [hereinafter Criminal Law], revised at the Fifth Session of 
the Eighth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on March 14, 1997, is 
hereby promulgated and shall enter into force as of October 1,1997, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm.  
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asking a local court to coordinate with the local authority in cases with potential impacts 
on the local community in large:  
After debtors enter into the bankruptcy procedure, as it involves the interests of 
many parties including creditors, debtors, investors and employees, the 
contradictions among them are particularly prominent, improperly handling such 
contradictions would lead to mass incidents or unexpected events and sabotage 
social stability. Therefore, in the trial of enterprise bankruptcy cases, the 
people's courts shall adhere to the leadership of the local Party committees and 
give full play to the role of the risk warning mechanism, the cooperation 
mechanism, the capital guarantee mechanism and other coordination 
mechanisms established by the local governments so as to provide assistance for 
the governments to maintain stability in handling enterprise bankruptcy cases.332 
 
The above quotation demonstrated a unique feature of Chinese constitutional 
system concerning the relationship between the party and the state in the context of 
commercial law, which was also a contentious issue for many interested academics and 
investment community. This internal directive provided reasons justified foreign 
investors concerns over the independence and fairness of China’s judicial system. The 
                                               
332 最高人民法院关于正确审理企业破产案件为维护市场经济秩序提供司法保障若干问题的
意见 [Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning Correctly Trying 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases to Provide Judicial Protection for Maintaining the Order of Market 
Economy] issued by SPC on June 12, 2009, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7757&CGid=.  
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internal directive asked the court to “coordinate” with local political and government 
entities raised many questions. Although, a textual analysis of the Constitution would 
found a constitutional basis to support government’s interest in maintaining social 
orders, for example, in bankruptcy cases, the forms and manners of carrying out this 
duty by the court suggested by the internal directive raised many questions.333 It is 
undeniable that there is a legitimate government interest in ensuring social order and 
basic rights of the victims under bankruptcy cases. However, the above internal 
directive presented a more troubling message: a lower court is not trusted by 
governments and people to reach professional opinion in measuring and judging 
different interests.  
 
Although there have been problems with the enforcement of Rule of Law, the 
Constitution did pledge to support a better legal system for private sectors. The 2004 
Constitution Amendment clearly stated to “encourage support and guide non-public 
sectors in accordance with the law,” and it protects “human rights.”334 Article 16 of the 
Constitution, which reads, "State enterprises have decision-making power with regard 
                                               
333 China’s Constitution provided conceptual framework and legal basis for Party’s leadership in 
forming guiding principles for social governance. The problem with such directive, was the 
manner of implementation. For example, see PRC. Const. Art.1.  
334 "The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-public sectors of the economy 
such as the individual and private sectors of the economy. The State encourages, supports and 
guides the development of the non-public sectors of the economy and, in accordance with law, 
exercises supervision and control over the non-public sectors of the economy." PRC. Const. Art. 
11. For example: Art. 33.  "The State respects and preserves human rights." The original third 
paragraph is changed to be the fourth. 
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to operation and management within limits prescribed by law, on condition that they 
submit to unified leadership by the State and fulfill all their obligations under the State 
plan. State enterprises practice democratic management through congresses of workers 
and staff and in other ways in accordance with law", was revised to read, "State-owned 
enterprises have decision-making power with regard to their operation within limits 
prescribed by law. State-owned enterprises practice democratic management through 
congresses of workers and staff and in other ways in accordance with law."335 This 
amendment further removed the central planning system from Chinese economy , 
which promoted the modernized economy system for both private and foreign 
investors.  
 
3. FDI Legal Framework 1992-2005 
EVJ Law was the first comprehensive legislation concerning foreign investment in 
mainland China. This short fifteen articles legislation was later supplemented by EVJ 
Implementing Rule in 1983, and other various administrative laws concerning tax, 
labors, land use, foreign exchange, and business legislation. 336The CJV Law and WFOE 
Law were created in 1986, but the Implementing rule for CJV Law was not promulgated 
until 1995. With the ideological, political and constitutional reform throughout the 
1980s, China further relaxed regulations in investment and market access. On the one 
hand, new amendments removed multiple restrictions plagued the investment 
                                               
 
336 See EJV Law, previous chapter discussions.  
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communities in the 1980s, such as restrictions on labor management, restrictions on 
market access, or exportation. On the other hand, new policies opened new industries 
for foreign investors, especially after WTO accession. The development of the security 
and insurance market since 1993 also opened new opportunities for the foreign 
investors. However, structural issues remained: the lack of transparency and 
predictability of the FDI legal system not only created an unfair treatment for investors 
but also created risks of corruptions. This happened when the central authority 
produced policies and regulations without proper consideration of the market reality. 
One common example would be foreign investors use Chinese firms as the straw man to 
invest or control a restricted industry. 337 
 
This section mainly focused on new developments between 1992-2005: first, the 
emerging of the new FIE registration process and regulatory agency restructure. It will 
outline the basic FIE registration process and regulatory framework. Second, the 
development of the EJV, CJV, and WFOE regulatory framework. It will pay special 
attention to the differences between the regulations in the 1980s and 1990s to 
showcase the relaxation of the investment regulations. In addition, it highlights the 
special legislation that protects Taiwanese investors. Next, it will focus on the 
publication of Catalogue for the Guidance of Industries for Foreign Investment. Fourth, 
it will discuss the promulgation of People’s Republic of China Company Law and its 
                                               
337 Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s 
Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 (1993):331-360. 
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implication to China’s FDI regulatory framework. Last, it will briefly discuss the issue of 
the rule of law during this period with special attention to Chinese business culture that 
interpreted by western writers. The main purpose of this section is to show: first, the 
progress of FDI regime under the “socialist market economy”; second, the effects of 
China’s FDI regime expressed conflicted agenda between the revolutionary principle of 
supporting central planning under socialism and the principle of socialist modernization 
in supporting freedom of contract.  
 
a. Development of the framework  
Before examining the new developments in EJV, CJV, WFOE framework, it is 
necessary to have an overview of the regulatory agency and the general registration 
process that evolved between 1992- 2005. To better serve China’s “socialist market 
economy,” legal and institutional reforms started simultaneously between 1992-2005. 
MOFERT, the department used to charge the verification and approval of the FIE 
project, had been restructured as Ministry of Commerce (MOC).338 Under the new 
administrative system, MOC’s duties had been separated into three areas: 
                                               
338 Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu shangwubu lvxing xianxing xingzhengfagui, 
guowuyuanwenjianzhong xiangying zhize de tongzhi(国务院办公厅关于商务部履行现行行政
法规、国务院文件中相应职责的通知)[General Office of State Council Notice on MOC Carrying 
Out certain Duties prescribed by Current Administrative Law and State Council Directives], 
issued by State Council General Office on October 20, 2003. For example, this document 
outlined the jurisdiction of MOC: 
1. Any duties involved with MOFERT or MOFEC under laws and decrees will be carried out 
by MOC.   
2. Recording of the cases processed by local authorities.  
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1. FDI Policy study and draft,  
2. Verification for special FDI project involving investment above statutory 
threshold,  
3. Supervising and coordinating local authority’s work. 339    
A multi-level approval process for FIE registration developed between 1992-
2005. Under this process, FIE started from the step of submitting a letter of intent 
describing the proposed JV to the MOC branch office. The branch office would send the 
proposal to a corresponded industrial supervisory department. This department would 
review the business proposal. State Planning Commission would involve in this process if 
the proposed project exceeded the amount of investment, which required a further 
review to ensure such project would not disrupt the state annual economic plan. 340 At 
                                               
3. Verification and recording of the FIE contract, agreement, feasibility study involving oil, 
natural gas exploitation  
4. Exportation license involving exportation of goods subject to quota regulation; 
5. Verification and approval cases involving FIE establish oversea branches  
339 See: General Office of State Council Notice on MOC Carrying Out Certain Duties prescribed by 
Current Administrative Law and State Council Directives. A list of MOC duties can be found on 
the State Council Notice:  
1. policy studying and policy drafting (study and analysis nationwide FDI status, routine 
report to State Council, policy draft, and legislation),  
2. verification and approval for a certain project (verification, approval for JV contract, 
article of association for the project above a threshold or restricted industry sector, or 
involved quota) or verification and approval for an amendment of JV contract or article 
of association; increase or reduce registered capital; transfer of shares, and M&A,   
3. supervision JV contract and article of association,  
4. comprehensive coordination, internal department management for policy enforcement,  
5. statistic,   
NDRC and MOC jointly produce and issue the Catalogue.   
340 Edmund C. Duffy, “Business Law in China: Evolutionary Revolution,” Journal of International 
Affairs 49, no. 2 (1996): 557-571, accessed July 29, 2017,  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357571.  
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the meantime, a joint feasibility study must be conducted by both Chinese and foreign 
parties as the part of the application. If the project is below the $30 million thresholds, 
then this application can be processed by agencies at municipality or provincial level. 341 
Logistically, it was easier for foreign investors to have a local authority process their 
applications.  
Figure 1. FIE establishment process evolved during 1992-2005.  
 
1. Permission from MOC,  
2. Business license, Enterprise with Foreign Investment or an investment from 
Hong Kong or Macao Investment (FIE) shall apply business license or amendment 
of license from SAIC within 30 days of receiving Certificate of Approval for 
Establishment of Enterprise with Foreign Investment in People’s Republic of 
China or Certificate of Approval for Establishment of Enterprises with Investment 
of Hong Kong, Macau, and Chinese Oversea in People’s Republic of China (FIE 
certification).  
3. Other registration, for example, applicable SAFE or Custom registration.   
 
This multiple leveled registration was not without problems. One of the 
problems was the delay. To avoid the complex and time-consuming approval process, 
some investors would, even under recommendations of certain local officials, to 
intentionally separate an intended investment project into several smaller projects. For 
example, the provincial authority could verify and approve a project below 30 million 
dollars. In order to attract more investors, local authorities might recommend foreign 
                                               
341 Provincial government examination and approval (project below 30 million dollars)  
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investors to register a smaller investment project with the local authority. An investor 
could either set up numbers of smaller projects and later merge them together or later 
increase the investment of the initial small project.  Such practice was prohibited by the 
central authority. 342  The Central authority issued multiple directives to prohibit local 
authority or investor explore such mechanism to bypass the investment threshold.343 
For example, Kumho Tire and Nanjing Tire formed an EJV in 1994, the total investment 
was 119 million dollars, which would trig approval process from the central authority. 
However, Nanjing authority and Kumho Tire conspired together with an investment 
project under the provincial authority threshold. The investor later increased 
investment and shares in four separate times, which discovered by the State Council. 
The central authority revoked all beneficial tax policy for Kumho Tire and issued Tax 
charges. Although Kumho received monetary punishments, an official at Nanjing 
government only received a warning from the government.344  It was true that such 
sanctions were unfair to the investor because it only sanctioned foreign investors (such 
                                               
342 Ding limin, “Taiwan touzi dalu, qieji huazheng wei ling,” (台商投资大陆，切忌“化整为零” 
) [Taiwan investors shall avoid applying “separation of investment project” scheme to bypass 
administration approving process] avialable at http://www.humanelawyer.com/model8.htm.   
343 For example: 1991 State Council issued 国务院办公厅关于当前审批外商投资企业有关问
题的紧急通知  [State Council Notice on Strengthening Examination and Approval Procedures 
for Large-Scale Foreign Investment Enterprises].  
344 Guowuyuan bangongting guan yu nanjing shi youguan bumen yuequan shenpi zhonghan hezi 
nanjing jinghu luntai youxian gongsi xiangmu de tongbao( 
国务院办公厅关于南京市有关部门越权审批中韩合资南京锦湖轮胎有限公司项目的通报) 
[General Office of State Council Issue Anouncmenet concerning Nanjing authorities exceeding 
authority in approving Nanjing Sino-Korea Kumho Tire Project ] accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://chinabaike.com/law/zy/xz/bgt/1336313.html.   
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as revoke the permission for FIE project) without imposed strong punishments against 
officials violate these rules. 345 
 
The 1979 EJV Law, later amended in 1990 established the basis of China’s FIE 
regulatory framework throughout the 1980s.346 During the 1990s, China started a 
massive wave of commercial legal system construction with legislation such as Company 
Law, Contract Law, Labor Law, etc. Many laws adopted during the 1990s was later then 
amended after China’s accession to WTO. On March 15, 2001, The Ninth National 
People’s Congress adopted EJV Law amendment, which focused on the following area: 
1. Labor  
2. Domestic Purchase 
3. Dispute resolution  
 
                                               
345 See: Guowuyuan bangong ting guanyu dangqian shenpi waishang touzi qiye youguan wenti 
de jingjitongzhi (国务院办公厅关于当前审批外商投资企业有关问题的紧急通知) [State 
Council General Office Urgent Notice on Certain Issues Concerning Verification and Approval of 
FIE Project]  
See: Guowuyuan guanyu yanhai diqu fazhan waixiangxing jingji de ruogan buchong guiding(国务
院关于沿海地区发展外向型经济的若干补充规定) [State Council Supplementary Regulation 
on Developing Export Oriented Economy in Coast Regions]adopted by State Council on March 
23, 1988.  
346 中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-
Foreign Equity Joint Venture (promulgated July. 1, 1979, amended 1990, amended 2001) 
[hereinafter 2001 EJV Law].  
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Article 6 of the amended EJV Law requiring all employees of FIE must sign a contract.347 
In addition, in pursuant to article 7, FIE must provide necessary assistance to the 
operation of a labor union.348 The amended EJV Law no longer requiring FIE purchase 
insurance from Chinese insurance company. As a compliance to WTO, FIE can purchase 
any insurance plan from an insurance company located in mainland China.349 Moreover, 
FIE could freely purchase supplies from any vendor or supplier. The article 10 of the 
amended EJV Law removed the preference of domestic vendor. It provided that FIE can 
purchase material and goods from the domestic or international market on the basis of 
“fair and reasonable.”350 Last but not the least, the amended EJV Law now specified that 
JV could litigate their dispute in court when no arbitration clause was provided by the JV 
contract or both parties failed to agree for arbitration.351   
The 2001 EJV Law Implementing Regulation Amendment was the first 
amendment since the end of the 1980s. China’s commercial environment and the 
                                               
347 Art. 6 2001 EJV Law.  
“The matters of an employee of a joint venture, such as employment, dismissal, 
remuneration, welfare, labor protection, and labor insurance shall be specified by 
concluding a contract in accordance with the law.” 
348 Art. 7 2001 EJV Law.  
“An EJV shall provide, to the labor union of its own, the necessary conditions for 
carrying out activities.” 
349 Art. 9 2001 EJV Law. “All insurances of an EJV shall be covered by insurance companies within 
China.” 
350 Art. 10 2001 EJV Law. “The raw materials, fuel, and other materials as needed by an EJV 
within the approved business scope may be purchased on the domestic or international market 
based on the principles of fairness and reasonableness.” 
351 Art. 15 2001 EJV Law. “Where each Party thereto has neither provided an arbitration clause 
in the contract nor subsequently reached a written arbitration agreement, an action may be 
filed with a people's court.” 
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economic system changed dramatically since the 1980s. With the massive price, tax and 
SOE reforms since the 14th National Congress of CPC, China established an economic 
system with a mix of market economy and small central planning elements. The 2001 
amendment largely removed sections concerning the central planning system. For 
example, all sections concerning the “department in charge” had been removed.352 
“Department in charge”was part of the central planning system: each enterprise or 
business entity would be assigned to one corresponded government entity. This 
government body would monitor, enforce and coordinate business operation with the 
central planning. During the 1980s, even FIE had to work with a “department in charge.”  
In addition, the EJV Implementing Regulation ended the policy of asking FIE to purchase 
supplies from domestic vendors. Another important development was the publication of 
State's Provisions on Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment and Industry Catalog. 
The catalog provided a comprehensive guidance on which industry enjoy relaxed 
regulations and which industry require a special approval process.353 During the 1990s, 
the central authority started SOE reform. As one of the reform measures, foreign 
investors were allowed to purchase shares or even engage in SOE operations from 
certain industry sectors. Other new measures include: first, FIE could reduce registered 
capital with permission from the authority.354 Second, the EJV Law amendment 
                                               
352 The title of chapter 8 changed into purchase and sale without mention of planning.   
353 Art. 4, 2001 EJV Law.  
354 Art. 19, 2001 EJV Law Implementing Rules. “An EJV shall not decrease its registered capital 
within the duration of operation thereof. If the decrease is truly necessary due to change of the 
total investment, production and operation scale, etc., the approval of the relevant Examination 
and Approval Authority shall be obtained.” 
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removed all restrictions placed on non-cash contributions. The authority no longer 
required contribution in the form of the machinery need to the kind of machinery that 
would be unavailable to produce domestically.355 However, intellectual transfer 
agreement still requires the investor to transfer information to the authority.356 Last, 
the amendment removed payment of balance rule for FIE. The new amendment no 
longer requires FIE to maintain a balance of payment for foreign exchange.  
 
The CJV Law, the Implementing Regulation, and MOFERT CJV Implementing 
Regulation Explanation formed the basis of the Sino-foreign Cooperative Enterprises 
regulations. The CJV Law offered basic framework and principle. The Implementing 
Regulation provided details regarding a certain aspect of the CJV enterprises.357 It 
specified the conditions of a permitted project and approval process. The Explanation 
provided necessary interpretation for the enforcement of the regulation. As the 
previous chapter discussed, the CJV Law adopted very similar regulatory framework 
with the EJV Law.   
                                               
355 Art. 24, 2001 EJV Law Implementing Rules. “he machinery and equipment or other supplies 
contributed to the capital of an EJV by the foreign party thereto shall be necessarily required by 
the production of the EJV. The valuated price of the machinery and equipment or other supplies 
shall be no higher than the then-current prevailing price on the global market for the same type 
of machinery and equipment or other supplies.” 
356 Art. 26, 2001 EJV Law Implementing Rules. “he machinery and equipment or other supplies 
contributed to the capital of an EJV by the foreign party thereto shall be necessarily required by 
the production of the EJV. The valuated price of the machinery and equipment or other supplies 
shall be no higher than the then-current prevailing price on the global market for the same type 
of machinery and equipment or other supplies.” 
357 Zhongwai hezuo jingying qiye fa shishi xize (中外合作经营企业法实施细则) [CJV Law 
Implementing Rule] adopted by MOFERT on Septermber 4, 1994.  
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The 2000 CJV Law amendment removed the preference of asking FIE to purchase 
from a domestic supplier. In addition, it removed the general article describing the tax 
benefits for the CJV company. The CJV Implementing Regulation was the first 
supplementary regulation for the CJV Law.358 The CJV Implementation regulation 
provided more details regarding the nature and conditions of CJV enterprises.359 Based 
on the reading of CJV Law and CJV Implementing Regulation, the CJV enterprise is a 
form of a business entity without legal person status. It cannot independently be held 
liable for outsiders. The CJV contract can specify the liability of each investor. 
Interestingly, unlike the EJV Law require unanimous board decision, the CJV 
Implementing Regulation adopted majority vote rule for operation issues: “Each 
resolution adopted at a meeting of the board of directors or joint management 
committee shall be approved by a majority of the directors or members present at the 
meeting.”360 For important matters, the CJV Implementing Regulation still followed 
unanimous decision rule, but it allowed the investors to specify other additional 
scenarios require unanimous votes in the CJV contract.361  
                                               
358 Zhonghua remin gongheguo zhongwai hezuo jingying qiye fa(中华人民共和国中外合作经营
企业法) [Law of People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Venture] 
promulgated by National People’s Congress on April 13, 1988.  
359 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongwai hezuo jingying qiyefa shishi xize (中华人民共和国中
外合作经营企业法实施细则) [PRC Contractual Cooperative Joint Venture Detailed 
Implementing Regulation]  [Hereinafter Implementing Regulation], adopted by MOFERT on 
September 4, 1995.   
360 Art. 28 CJV Implementing Regulation.  
361 See article 29 CJV Implementing Regulation:  
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WFOE law had been amended by Standing Committee of NPC in 2000. The 
Implementing Rule was amended in 2001. These amendments represented China’s 
relaxation of WFOE regulation. For example, the central authority no longer required a 
WFOE project must be a kind that involving advanced technology.362 FIE was no longer 
required to purchase from a domestic supplier.363 The 2001 WFOE Implementing 
Regulation removed the exportation and domestic sale quota restriction. It further 
allowed WFOE to sell their product in the domestic market independently or through an 
agent.364  
 
Table 5. A brief comparison between the EJV, CJV, and WFOE regulations in the 1980s 
and 1990s.   
 The 1980s regulation  1990s regulation   
Contribution must be 
advanced technology  
YES NO NEED 
                                               
(1) Amendment to the articles of association of the Cooperative Joint Venture; 
(2) Increase or decrease of the registered capital of the Cooperative Joint Venture; 
(3) Dissolution of the Cooperative Joint Venture; 
(4) Mortgage of assets of the Cooperative Joint Venture; 
(5) Merger, division or change of organizational form of the Cooperative Joint Venture; or 
(6) Other matters that need to be unanimously approved by the directors or members present 
at the meeting of the board of directors or joint management committee as agreed upon by the 
parties to the Cooperative Joint Venture. 
362 Art. 3, 2000 WFOE Law.  
363 Art. 15, 2000 WFOE Law.  
364 See Decision of the State Council on Amending the Rules for the Implementation of the Law 
of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-capital Enterprises. 
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Reduce Registered Capital  NO YES 
Domestic supplier  YES, PREFERRED  NO NEED 
Balance of Payment  YES  NO NEED  
Domestic sale quota or 
restrictions  
YES  NO NEED  
*since the 14th National Congress of CPC on Reforming investment system, China further 
relaxed its FDI regulatory framework by removing many central planning restrictions.  
 
Unlike the 1980s, the central authority did not provide clear guidance on which 
industry was restricted to the foreign investors. The central authority created to new 
guidelines to help foreign investors understand the investment policy. Some industry 
sectors were restrictive to foreign investors. There were multiple ways to deter an 
investment. Normally these restrictions ranging from qualification of the investor, the 
registration process, and operation restriction, profit restrictions. Take the example of 
commercial enterprise sector. The retail sector was one of many protected industries in 
China during the 1990s, the 1999 Measures on the Pilot Project for Foreign-invested 
Commercial Enterprises (hereinafter 1999 Commercial Investment Measure) provided 
an excellent example illustrating these restrictions.365 For example, under 1999 
Commercial Investment Measure, the registered capital for JV in retail must exceed 50 
million RMB. wholesale business must exceed 80 billion RMB. A qualified foreign 
                                               
365 (外商投资商业企业试点办法) [Measures on the Pilot Project for Foreign-invested 
Commercial Enterprises] adopted by SETC and MOFERT on June 25, 1999.  
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investor only limited to an investor whose annual sales exceeded 20 billion dollars in 
three consecutive years prior the application. 366 In addition, the foreign investor’s asset 
must exceed 200 million dollars in the preceding year prior to application.367 In order to 
limit investment in retail sectors, the measurement created a laborious application 
process. The feasibility study must be submitted and approved by local economic and 
trade commission. The local authority would file the report to state economic and trade 
committee before this committee would consult with MOFERT for making the final 
decision.368Even the authority approved JV; there were various restrictions on the 
structure of the JV. For example, Chinese investor shares must exceed 51% in such JV if 
the retail business expanded for more than 3 branches. In the wholesale business, the 
Chinese investor’s shares must exceed 51%. 369Moreover, such JV could only operate 
within a limited year. JV operation could not exceed 30 years unless the business was in 
the western rural regions.370 In retail JV, the authority limited the foreign investors’ 
capacity to profit from trademark and importation by requiring that trademark royalty 
could not exceed 0.3% of the annual profit of the JV. 371 Importation of products could 
not exceed annual sales value for 30%. 372 
                                               
366 art.5 (1) 1999 Commercial Investment Measure.  
367 Art. 6 (2)1999 Commercial Investment Measure.  
368  Art. 8, 1999 Commercial Investment Measure.  
369 Art. 6 (4)  1999 Commercial Investment Measure.  
370  Art. 6 (6) 1999 Commercial Investment Measure. 
371  art. 7, 1999 Commercial Investment Measure.  
372 Art. 15, 1999 Commercial Investment Measure.  
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Table 6. Restrictions on foreign investors in the retail industry (in comparison with the 
2004 regulation.  
Foreign-invested Commercial 
Enterprises 
1999 2004 (repealed in 2016) 
Verification process  Must be verified and 
approved by local and central 
economic and trade 
committee before 
consultation and 
determination with MOFERT 
Local MOC preliminary 
examination, MOC final 
decision. 
 
Local MOC authority 
preliminary review, Central 
MOC authority makes 
decision     
Registered capital  50 million RMB for regular 
commercial enterprises  
80 million RMB for wholesale  
Same as domestic firm  
Restrictions on years of JV 
operation  
30 years (rural middle west 
region 40 years) 
30 years (rural middle west 
region 40 years) 
Shares in JV  Chinese investor must exceed 
51% shares  
Except for agricultural and 
related products, no 
restrictions by 2016.  
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Trademark restriction  Trademark royalty cannot 
exceed 0.3% of the annual 
profit of the JV.  
No  
Importation restriction  Importation of products 
cannot exceed annual sales 
value for 30%.  
 
No  
*The regulations on foreign-invested retail or commercial sectors had been through a 
long history. The first regulation was adopted by MOFERT on April 4, 1995. 
Supplementary regulations were created in 1996 and 2001. The Interim regulation was 
then amended in 2004 and again amended in 2006 and 2015 until it was officially 
appealed in 2016. 373  
 
One of the highlights of the FDI regime development was the regulations 
concerning Taiwanese investors. On March 5, 1994, the Standing Committee of the NPC 
adopted the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Investment of 
Taiwan Compatriots [hereinafter Protection of Taiwan Investors]. 374  Due to Taiwan’s 
special condition, investors from Taiwan were not protected by any bilateral treaties 
                                               
373 Guanyu waishang touzi juban touzixing gongsi zanxing guiding (关于外商投资举办投资性公
司的暂行规定) [Interim Regulation Regulation on Foreign invested Investment Companies] 
adopted by MOFERT on April 4 1995, also see the Supplementary Regulation, adopted on 
August 24, 1999.  Supplementing Regulation 2 adopted on May 31, 2001.  
374 Zhonghua remin gongheguo Taiwan tongbao touzi baohufa(中华人民共和国台湾同胞投资
保护法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan 
Compatriots] adopted by Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on March 5, 
1994.  
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protecting foreign investors. In addition, Taiwanese are not technically considered as 
“foreign investors.” In addition, there was no formal judicial channel or cooperation 
between Taiwan and China during the early 1990s. Thus, the NPC adopted new laws, 
which designed to protect the interests of the Taiwanese investors. In general, the 
conceptual framework established by Protection of Taiwan investor was consistent with 
China’s foreign investment policy. The only noticeable difference was the time limits for 
authority reviewing and verifying the project. Under Protection of Taiwan Investor, all 
investment projects, whether it was a JV or WFOE or CJV, the project must be reviewed 
within forty-five days by the authority. 375  In 1999, in order to specify terms and 
conditions for enforcing Protection of Taiwan Investor, the State Council adopted 
Implementing Regulations.376 Interestingly, the article 8 of the Implementing Regulation 
listed permittable forms of the investment including stock holding, purchasing of real 
estate and even purchase small and medium-size SOE.377 It was noticed that the EJV 
                                               
375 Art. 8 Protection of Taiwan Investor.  
376 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo taiwan tongbao touzi baohu fa shishi xize(中华人民共和国台
湾同胞投资保护法实施细则) [Implementing Regulations on Law of the People's Republic of 
China on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots] adopted by State Council on 
December 5, 1999.  
377 See art.8 of the Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots:  
Investment of Taiwan compatriots may take any of the following forms of investment in 
accordance with the law: 
(1) to establish equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures or enterprises with all 
capital invested by investors who are Taiwan compatriots (hereinafter generalized as 
enterprises with investment of Taiwan compatriots); 
(2) to cooperate in the exploration and exploitation of natural resources; 
(3) to engage in compensatory trade, processing and assembling or cooperative 
production; 
(4) to purchase stocks or bonds of enterprises; 
(5) to purchase house property; 
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framework did not specify whether a foreign investor could engage in these activities, 
although local ordinance permit investor to purchase stocks or real estate.378 Thus, 
under this rule, Taiwanese investors enjoy an extra privilege that supported by statutory 
language: to invest China’s small and medium-sized SOEs. In order to further facilitate 
investors from Taiwan, the central authority Taiwan AffairOoffice established 
coordinator networks, which provide communication service between the Taiwanese 
investors and China’s regulatory agencies. Some local government, such as Beijing 
established Taiwanese investor service center to accept complaints from the investors. 
Fujian People’s Court established special Taiwanese tribunal exclusively handling 
commercial disputes involved Taiwanese investors.379  These mechanisms were 
developed to mitigate the lack of bilateral investment treaties between Taiwan and 
China.  
 
b. The Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment  
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the EJV Law, WFOE Law and CJV Law and 
implementing regulations established the basis of FDI regulatory framework, which 
defined the conditions of the qualified and disqualified FIE projects. One of the most 
                                               
(6) to acquire a land use right for development and operation; 
(7) to purchase a small State-owned enterprise or collective or private enterprise; or 
(8) other forms as permitted by laws or administrative regulations. 
378 For example, the Si Chun Provincial Ordinance on Encourage Foreign Investment allow 
foreign investor to purchase property or invest in stock market. See  Sichuan sheng 
guliwaishangtouzi tiaoli(四川省鼓励外商投资条例) [Si Chun Provincial Ordinance on Encourage 
Foreign Investment] adopted by Sichuang PC on December 24, 1996.  
379 National People’s Congress Report on the Enforcement of Taiwanese investor protection law  
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significant legislation about China’s foreign investment was the Interim Provisions on 
Guiding Foreign Direct Investment [hereinafter the Investment Guideline] adopted by 
State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
and the State Economic and Trade Commission on June 20, 1995. It provided a 
comprehensive and detailed guidance for investors, which largely improved the 
transparency, accessibility, and predictability for the FIE regulation. The main purpose of 
this regulation was to design a new investment guideline system. Under this new 
regulation, a foreign investor can refer to Catalogue for the Guidance of Industries for 
Foreign Investment for relevant administrative verification and review information.380 
This catalog had been amended several times (1997, 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2015). The 
current version is 2017 Catalogue. Under this new system, all investment projects are 
categorized into four categories:  
1. encouraged,  
2. permitted,  
3. restricted,  
4. prohibited 
 
The catalog only listed three types of industry: encouraged, restricted and prohibited. 
Any industry outside the catalog would consider as permitted. The catalog signified 
                                               
380 Waishang touzi chanye zhidao mulu (外商投资产业指导目录) [Catalogue for the Guidance 
of Industries for Foreign Investment], Decree No. 7 of the State Planning Commission, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 
December 31, 1997.  
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China’s new approach with the FDI. On the one hand, it offered a clear and easy 
guidance on the conditions and benefits for foreign investors. On the other hand, it 
borrowed some elements from China’s planned economy: the authority can manipulate 
the development of the economy. The publication of the catalog improved 
transparency, efficiency, and reliability for the investor community: the investor could 
investigate the relevant policy through the publication before starting project 
planning.381 Under the Interim FDI Guidance, the restricted industries normally were 
subject to the following restrictions: 
• the JV contract must state terms of JV operation. 382   
• Fixed asset investment by Chinese investor must be funded by funds belong to 
the Chinese investor or owned by a Chinese investor.383  
• The verification and approval must be conducted by the central authority (state 
council relevant industrial department) 384 
                                               
381 Zhidao waishang touzi fangxiang zanxing guiding (指导外商投资方向暂行规定) [Interim 
Provisions Guiding Foreign Investment] adopted by State Planning Commission; State Economic 
and Trade Commission; Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on June 20, 1995. 
It was later amended in 2002     
382 Art. 9 Interim FDI Guidance. “Restricted foreign investment projects must comply with the 
relevant laws and administrative regulations of the State, as well as the following provisions: 
(1) Chinese-foreign joint venture projects coming under the restricted category must have an 
agreed term of operation; and (2) In restricted foreign investment projects (A), the fixed assets 
invested by the Chinese party shall be the funds owned by the Chinese party itself or the assets 
owned by it.” 
383 Ibid.  
384 Ibid.  
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• Restricted industry project can turn into permitted if 70% of products are for 
exportation 385 
In addition, the interim FDI guidance laid out sanctions for project violating these 
conditions: the project permission would be revoked within 30 days of discovery. In 
addition, the contract, article of association, would be voided.  
 
One of the issues for the above regulation was the part restrict the asset 
ownership for Chinese investor in a restricted industry. The intent of the regulator was 
to avoid foreign investor investing in a restricted project. Particularly, it tries to prevent 
foreign investor using Chinese investor as a straw man to circumvent these regulations. 
However, the statutory language was poorly drafted, which cannot fully meet the 
expectation of the policy maker. For example, the term “asset belongs to Chinese 
investor” was quite ambiguous.386 In practice, some foreign investors would agree to 
transfer funds to a Chinese investor in exchange for managerial rights or equity rights in 
the enterprise under a private “shareholding agreement.” The term “belong to” could 
not precisely identify this problem.  It is important to note that, China’s public disclosure 
system was not fully developed during this period. New approaches and globalized 
                                               
385 Art. 11 Interim FDI Guidance. “Restricted foreign investment projects (A) within the scope 
specified in subparagraph (1) of Article 6, if their export sales of products account for over 70 
percent of the total sales of products, with due approval, may be deemed as permitted foreign 
investment projects, and shall not be subject to the restriction of Article 9 of these Provisions. 
Restrictions may be appropriately eased to the above mentioned foreign investment projects 
that can really make full use of the superiority in resources in the mid-west regions, and 
conform to the industrial policies of the State.”  
386 Art. 9 Interim FDI Guidance. 
179 
 
public disclosure system have been advanced for the past few years, which would be 
discussed in the next chapter.   
 
 
Figure 2. How to bypass China’s investment restrictions.  
 
1. Chinese investor with funds sponsored by foreign investor  
2. Chinese investor agrees to transfer all managerial rights or any rights and benefits of 
equity to foreign investor  
3. Chinese investor register business entity with the funds provided by foreign investor  
4. The Foreign investor uses Chinese investor structure as a straw man to invest restricted 
industry.  
 
 
The interim FDI guidance was later amended in 2004. The 2004 amendment 
demonstrated a liberalized view on FDI. Take the example of the general principle laid 
out by the FDI guidance on the definition of the restricted industry: 
Table 7. Restrictive investment industry (1995 and 2004).   
1995 Interim FDI Guidance  2004 FDI Guidance  
(1) Projects involving technology that has 
been developed in or has been 
introduced into the country, and the 
production capacity can already meet the 
demands of the domestic market; 
(1) Lagging behind on a technological 
level; 
 
 
Foreign 
investor
Chinese 
Investor 
(Strawman)
Enterprise in 
restricted 
industry
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(2) Projects in industries designated by 
the State as pilot industries to absorb 
foreign investment or as industries 
wherein monopoly of sales is practiced; 
(2) Detrimental to saving resources and 
improving the ecological environment; 
(3) Projects for exploring or mining rare 
or precious mineral resources; 
(3) Exploring or exploiting the specific 
types of minerals that are under 
protective exploitation as specified by the 
State; 
(4) Projects involving industries that call 
for the State's overall planning; or 
(4) Falling within the industries to be 
gradually deregulated by the State; or 
(5) Other projects that are restricted by 
laws and administrative regulations of 
the State. 
(5) Other circumstances specified in laws 
and administrative regulations. 
 
The above comparison displayed the central authority’s relaxed view on FDI. Compared 
with 2004 Guidance, the 1995 Guidance was more protective. For example, the 2004 
Guidance would deny an investment project if it involved outdated technology. 1995 
Guidance would deny a project when the market is balanced. Another great 
improvement under the 2004 Guidance was to remove the sanction that a JV contract 
and article of association would be voided if they violate Guidance. As an administrative 
guidance, the 1995 Interim FDI Guidance lacked the legitimate constitutional authority 
to void an agreement between two private parties. Such regulation itself might violate 
China’s constitution. In fact, whether the contract is void or not would be a legal 
question determined by the court. State Council could not announce the validity of a 
contract without a specific delegation by the Constitution. Thus, it was a good 
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development when the 2004 FDI Guidance removed such sanction. In addition, the 
Supreme People’s Court even stated that “although FDI project may violate state law, 
certain relevant contract clause can still be effective and enforceable under the principle 
of separation.”387   
 
c. PRC company law and corporate governance   
The promulgation of 1993 PRC Company Law was an important development in 
China’s commercial legal system and FDI regulatory regime.388 Another great legislation 
was the General Principle of the Civil Code.389 On the one hand, these landmark laws 
fulfilled the gap of China’s modern corporate governance system. On the other hand, 
these laws created a dualist legal system that potentially conflicts and confuse foreign 
investors. The intention of the dualist system was clear: one legal framework specially 
dedicated to foreign investors and another one regulate domestic firms. However, the 
conflict between the PRC Company Law and China’s FIE regulation framework was 
inevitable. First of all, the PRC Company Law did not specifically exclude the application 
of the Company Law to FIEs. For example, the article 18 only established a very vague 
principle for the applicability of the law:  
                                               
387 See Art. 57, P.R.C Contract Law. “If a contract becomes invalid, or is rescinded or terminated, 
the validity of the independent clauses therein that pertain to dispute resolution methods shall 
not be affected.”  
388 The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated Dec. 29, 1993 by the Fifth 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress of the People's 
Republic of China) [hereinafter PRC Company Law][zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa 中
华人民共和国公司法]  
389 See discussions about legal person from pervious chapters.  
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“The present Law shall apply to limited liability companies with foreign 
investment. Where laws concerning Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, 
Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures, and foreign-funded enterprises 
provides otherwise, such provisions shall prevail.” 
For example, the application of the PRC Company Law article 36 and article 53 
concerned the procedure of establishing a board of supervisor. 390  These rules might 
conflict with the corporate governance under article 36 of the EJV Law Implementing 
Regulation.391The EJV Law was modeled on American corporate law, which established 
the board of directors as the highest authority in the corporation. The PRC Company 
Law article 36 stipulated shareholder meeting as the governing body exercising powers. 
                                               
390 Yuan Anyuan, “Foreign direct investments in China--practical problems of complying with 
China's company law and laws for foreign-invested enterprises,” in Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 3 (2000): 484. Also see art. 36, P.R.C. Company Law, “The 
shareholders' meeting of a limited liability company shall be composed of all shareholders. The 
shareholders' meeting is the company's governing body, and shall exercise its powers in 
accordance with this Law.” art. 53 P.R.C. Company Law “The board of supervisors or, in the 
absence thereof in a company, the supervisors shall exercise the following powers: (1) 
Conducting inspection of the financial issues of the company; (2) Supervising the performance of 
duties by the directors and senior management personnel, and submitting a proposal on the 
removal of any director or senior management person who violates laws or administrative 
regulations, the company's articles of association, or any resolution of the shareholders' 
meeting; (3) Requiring the directors or senior management personnel to correct their conducts 
that prejudice the interests of the company; (4) Proposing to convene interim shareholders' 
meetings, and convening and presiding over shareholders' meetings when the board of directors 
fails to perform the duties of convening and presiding over shareholders' meetings as specified 
in this Law; (5) Putting forward proposals to the shareholders' meeting;” 
391 Art. 36 EJV Law Implementing Regulation. “he general manager executes the various 
resolutions of the board meetings, and organizes and leads the daily operation and 
management of the EJV. Within the scope of authority granted by the board, the general 
manager externally represents the EJV and internally appoints and dismisses the personnel 
under his/her management as well as exercises other authorities granted by the board.” 
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In addition, PRC Company Law stipulated that the board of the director is responsible 
for the budget and profit distribution. 392 Additional observations under Chinese 
company law including:   
 
1. The Chinese company law did not recognize the fiduciary duty and derivative 
proceeding. This might be an issue for minority shareholders. 
2. During the early 90s, the administration would enforce strict rules on “scope of 
the business,” the investors could not easily amend the business registration. For 
example,  
The business of manufacturing chocolate could not suddenly engage in soft drink 
production because the government agency would follow a strict interpretation 
on the business registration.  
 
The differences between 1993 PRC Company Law and western corporate 
practice reflected China’s unique economic system. The law stipulated that the 
shareholder meeting is the highest authority of the company, a different approach 
compared with other western market countries. China adopted an approach of 
shareholder activism, which gives more emphasizes on the. The 1993 Company Law 
                                               
392 See Art. 45 Company Law, Art. 37 EJV Implementation rule regarding legal representative 
creates some corporate governance issues when the legal representative, who has statutory 
authorization to bind entity for transaction and contract, appointed by the shareholder 
meetings as the president of the board of directors or executive director in smaller LLC, may 
disagree with a transaction approved by the board by refusing to sign on the contract. The 
available solution for this was a time consuming bureaucratic application process.  
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gave liberty to investors to let them decide if it is necessary to have a formal board of 
director or supervisory board.393 Considering the limited development of China’s 
commercial market and legal system, the idea of establishing a supervisory board 
seemed to be an appropriate policy.394  In the United States, shareholders are the owner 
                                               
393 See art. 37 P.R.C. Company Law. “The shareholders' meeting of a company shall exercise the 
following powers: 
(1) Making decisions on the company's operation guidelines and investment plans; 
(2) Electing and replacing the directors and supervisors who are not the representatives of the 
staff members, and making decisions on the matters concerning the remunerations of the 
directors and supervisors; 
(3) Approving the reports of the board of directors through deliberation; 
(4) Approving the reports of the board of supervisors or those of the supervisors through 
deliberation; 
(5) Approving the annual financial budget plans and final accounts of the company through 
deliberation; 
(6) Approving the profit distribution plans and loss recovery plans of the company through 
deliberation; 
(7) Making resolutions on the increase or decrease of the company's registered capital; 
(8) Making resolutions on the issuance of corporate bonds; 
(9) Making resolutions on the merger, division, dissolution or liquidation of the company or on 
the conversion of the corporate form; 
(10) Modifying the company's articles of association; and 
(11) Exercising other powers specified in the articles of association. 
Where all the shareholders have reached a written consensus on a matter listed in the 
preceding Paragraph, a decision may be directly made without convening a shareholders' 
meeting, provided that all the shareholders shall affix their signatures and seals to the decision 
document.” 
394 See Anna M. Han, “China’s Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In a Transitional Economy,” 
Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 5 (1995):457, 1995, accesed July 27, 2017,  
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1488&context=facpubs.  
 “China currently lacks any meaningful securities regulation to ensure that the market reflects 
the value of the stock and to prevent manipulation of the market by individuals or government 
entities. Although China issued Provisional Regulations on the administration of the Issuing and 
Trading of Stocks on April 23, 1993 ("Provisional Regulations") and Interim Procedures for 
Prohibiting Securities Fraud ("Interim Procedures"), aimed at trading on inside information and 
fraud such as use of material information to affect the market, these measures do not provide 
clear definitions or remedies to stockholders who are harmed by these activities.” Ibid.  
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of the company, which enjoy the fruits of their investment from the success of the 
corporation managed and controlled by the management, such as the board of the 
directors. This regulatory model largely relied on the development of an advanced 
security market, competent public disclosure system, and highly sophisticated legal 
system. During the early 90s, it might not be realistic to have China directly transport 
the western corporate regulatory framework. However, as the next chapter indicated, 
with the development of Chinese economy , China gradually adopted regulatory 
frameworks that are compatible with the common practice of the West market 
economy. PRC Company Law limited the distribution of dividends, transferability of the 
shares. PRC Company Law adopted supervisory board instead of relying on security 
market and security commission.395In other words, China’s Company Law focused more 
on small size LLC that resembling American limited partnership. 396For example, the 
numbers of shareholder were limited to 50 peoples. 397  
                                               
395 There were quite a lot discussions by western academics questioning Chinese supervisory 
board scheme. For example, “To monitor corporate activities, China could adopt mechanisms 
currently used in other markets. For example, stock markets and securities commissions can 
regulate such behavior as insider trading and stock manipulations by management. Outside 
creditors can also monitor the decisions of the management for profit maximization. Boards of 
directors can monitor management and respond to inefficiency by firing and hiring. The 
existence of a supervising board with broad powers will frustrate the desired market efficiency if 
the supervisors are not familiar with the company's business and have no incentive to see the 
company profit.” Ibid.    
396 Interestingly, the distribution of profits in a limited liability company is almost like a limited 
partnership in the United States. The distribution of profits is according to the percentages of 
contributed capital by the shareholders, not according to their shareholdings…  For companies 
limited by shares, distribution is in accordance with the shareholders' shares.' See Art. 45 
Company Law, Art. 37  EJV Implementation Rule.  
397 See art. 24 PRC Company LAW “The establishment of a limited liability company shall be 
subject to the capital contribution by not more than 50 shareholders.” 
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d. The rule of law  
At the beginning of the new millennium, China’s legal and investment 
environment still rated poorly by the westerns. For example: “The Wall Street Journal 
and Heritage Foundation rated China in 2002 as a ‘‘mostly unfree economy (given a 
bright yellow color to join the likes of India, Cambodia, Romania, and Bulgaria)” even 
after more than 20 years of remarkable economic reforms. According to the cited study, 
‘‘China’s legal and regulatory structure remains so riddled with contradictory internal 
(neibu) unpublished guidelines and exceptions that foreign businesses say progress in 
the rule of law has actually slowed in recent years.”398   
 
Complaints about China’s FDI law concentrated on the substance of the law and 
operation of the law. The law was obscure, ambiguous, and lack of transparency, 
conflict of rules between different levels of bureaucracy, inconsistent interpretation of 
the law, and regulation incompatible to global practice. 399 With China’s painful process 
of massive business law legislation and reform, foreign investors and academics 
acknowledged the problems of the rule of law in China. On the one hand, it was 
important and necessary to have a modern legal infrastructure with transparent and 
                                               
398 The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal (2002).2002 index of economic 
freedom. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation. See Huang Yasheng, “One country, two 
systems: Foreign-invested enterprises and domestic firms in China,” China Economic Review 14, 
no. 4 (2003): 407.  
399 Anna M. Han, “China’s Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In a Transitional Economy,” Pac. 
Rim L. & Pol'y J. 5 (1995):457, 1995, accesed July 27, 2017,  
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1488&context=facpubs. 
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predictable legal guidance for business transactions, on the other hand, they were 
frustrated by China’s painful process of cultivating and building a modern legal system. 
As one concluded that “law is equated with a numbing bureaucratic process, entangling 
sound business projects in an endless review, overlapping government ministries with 
no evident purpose and endless opportunities for corruption and gratuities.”400 
 
Regulatory obstacles for business entities during the 1990s concentrated in three 
areas, which related to China’s industrial policy of protecting SOEs and inherited issues 
of China’s transition from a central planning economy to a market economy.  The first 
area concerned on the role of industrial association and self-regulation. 401 During the 
1990s, to further promote self-regulation, many government agencies had been 
restructured as industrial associations. These associations tended to create a 
preferential treatment to SOEs or promote measures protect the industry at the cost of 
the consumer and the competition.402 The second area concerned regional bias by the 
                                               
400 “Western academics noticed the discrepancy between the law in practice and law in book. 
This became problematic for foreign investors when Chinese legal system or administrative 
procedure law did not provide an adequate mechanism to prevent, punish and correct 
government's behavior of not following EJV Law or PRC Company Law. The analysis also pointed 
out the core of the conflicts lies on the superiority of Communist Party in China’s constitutional 
framework.” Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the 
People’s Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 (1993):331-360. 
401 Bruce M. Owen,  Su Sun, Wentong Zheng, “Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive 
Compatibility,” J. Comp. L. & Econ 1 (2005): 130,123-148. 
402 For example, see: In those key industries, the dominant firms remain mostly state owned. As 
a result, the government plays a double role; it is both the owner of the major players and the 
referee, i.e.  the regulator. Second, in the sectors where the government has retained its 
regulatory presence, many of the government ministries or regulatory agencies have 'affiliate 
companies' and give preferential treatment to them. This problem is particularly serious at the 
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government agencies. 403For example, local authorities would produce laws and rules 
protect local business with discriminatory ordinances. The third area related to the 
government function. Certain government entities with approval authority might 
require business purchase service from certain business as a condition for 
administrative approval. 404  
 
Unstable legal and regulatory framework” was one of many problems and 
challenges deterred foreign investors.405  The uncertainty was a great threat to China’s 
foreign investment regime. The lack of predictability and coherence was one critical 
                                               
local levels.  A good example of this phenomenon is that some local civil affair agencies in 
charge of issuing marriage licenses require applicants to take pictures only at designated photo 
shops, which are 'affiliates'  of the  agencies. Third, the governments at provincial and local 
levels are well known for creating and maintaining barriers to competition from other localities.  
For example, many local governments force dealers of beer, fertilizer, and medicines to only sell 
goods that are produced within their own jurisdictions.” Gary J. Dernelle, “Direct Foreign 
Investment and Contractual Relations in the People’s Republic of China,” DePaul Bus. L.J. 6 
(1993):331-360. 
403 Ibid.   
404 For example, “Administrative monopolies have been subject to extensive criticisms by China's 
policy-makers and intellectuals.  There is a national consensus that more competition needs to 
be introduced into the industries that are dominated by the state, and some concrete measures 
have already been taken to achieve that goal. The restructuring of China's telecommunication 
industry provides an example of China's commitment to promoting competition in state-
dominated industries.” David L. Weller, “The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means for 
Foreign Investors to Challenge,” 98, no. 5 Columbia Law Review (1998): 1238-1282, accessed 
July 31, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123382. 
405 Ibid. David Weller, in his paper, detailed documented the excruciating administrative 
examining and approving process for the establishment of a FIE. he analyzed the regulatory 
framework and identified the decline of FDI with China’s overreaching and abusive regulatory 
regime.405   
189 
 
issue for a foreign investor. 406Foreign investors normally relied on the published rules 
and regulations to make business plans, the sudden disruptions of the policy would 
create an undue burden for the investors. 407 One of the most striking examples would 
be the pilot program of investing commerce industry in China during the early 1990s. 
The State Council failed to predict the market, which later suspended the investment 
approval for a period of time until the central authority developed new regulatory 
schemes.  Many approved projects were restricted for any expansion because of the 
State Council ban. Another quite controversial example was China’s telecommunication 
industry. Foreign investors fell into a similar predicament when the central authority 
suddenly revoked approvals from lower government authority. 408 When the central 
authority believed massive inflow of FDI projects in telecommunication created 
regulatory difficulties, the central authority just issued blank ban in all 
telecommunication sector by forcing foreign investor selling their investment to the 
state.409   
                                               
406 For example, See “The China Syndrome,” Economist, June 9th, 2012,  difficulties of doing 
business in China, local competition, and "some unfriendly political decisions"including a 
"sudden and arbitrary tax on imported capital  Goods.  
407 “Foreign investors often try to minimize such risk through contractual stabilization clauses, 
which aim to grandfather the foreign- investment vehicle in the event of certain changes in the 
law. PRC law and practice has permitted such clauses in certain limited.” See David L. Weller, 
“The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China: Legal Means for Foreign Investors to Challenge,” 98, no. 
5 Columbia Law Review (1998): 1238-1282, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123382. Also see Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments 
in China: Chimera of Protection and Predictability?, 34 Va. J. Int'l L. 615, 625 (1994). 
408 Leontine D. Chuang, “Investing in China 's Telecommunications Market: Reflections on the 
Rule of Law and Foreign Investment in China,” Nw. J. Int'l L. & Busno 20 no.3. (2000): 510.  
409 “The China Syndrome,” Economist, June 9th, 2012, accessed by July 31, 2017, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21556587. “These instances run the gamut, including: a Sino-
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These problems encountered by foreign investors illustrated the lack of internal 
coordination between China’s complex bureaucratic bodies. A bureaucratic agency 
might approve one FIE project, but a different agency might take a different position or 
change its position without proper coordination or notification to stakeholders. This 
became worse when there was no adequate legal system provided any meaningful 
remedies to foreign investors. 410 The problem with the central planning also reflected 
by Chinese authority’s ignorance to EJV property rights. For example, the local 
government would revoke pre-approved land using rights when the government later 
decided to have a public transportation project build on the same land that previously 
allocated for EJV without any compensation.411  
 
These problems also perfectly illustrated the underdevelopment of the rule of 
law: the central authority cannot establish a credible and accountable system that 
serving national and political interests in the desired manner. One may conclude that 
Chinese authority’s reaction to the market demonstrates a difficulty in managing a 
                                               
Japanese joint venture being directed to stop selling television sets outside the local province 
because it was "taking advantage of disparate regional pricing," apparently making the joint 
venture guilty of "profiteering"; a joint venture's general manager being removed by the 
company's department-in-charge; and reluctance of foreign exchange and bank officials to 
release hard currency earned from international sales by JV.”  
410 For example: see Tianjin Otis EJV dispute with the Tianjin Transportation Department 
regarding the land using rights. See Timothy A. Steinert, “Note, If the BIT Fits: The Proposed 
Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and the People's Republic of China,” J. 
Chinese L. 2(1988):405, 446-450. 
411 Ibid.  
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modern regulatory framework with a variety of interests. A lack of experience in 
managing conflicted interest can be mitigated by more reforms and more practice. 
However, what truly troubling was a notion that “the rule of law” would be 
inconvenient in building China’s socialist market. Similar narratives can be found both in 
China and the West within the context of developing a better investment environment. 
One may argue China’s economic data tended to gloss over the quality of the 
development with the quantity.  
 
In fact, the issue with China’s FDI regime expressed the conflicts between 
coherence, reliability, and predictability of the law and the changing nature of the FDI 
reform progress.412 FDI framework in the 1980s included a strong element of centralized 
planning. The FDI regime in the 1990s presented a more relaxed tendency. However, 
the extent and pace of the change have always been in debates. Although the 
centralized authority created general or abstract expressions about Chinese reform 
agenda through the Party Congress and Five-Year Plan, these vehicles lacked the level of 
certainty that a reasonable investor would normally require in formulating an 
investment project. With this reality in mind, it was not hard to explain most FDI 
projects during the 1990s were large JVs associated with the government for large 
                                               
412 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1997). Indicating that one of the elements generally identified 
as necessary to the rule of law is "the supremacy of legal authority" and that "law should rule 
officials.  
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infrastructure constructions or smaller FDI projects associated with export-oriented 
labor-intensive industry sectors.  
 
In summary, there are two forms of deviations from rule of law in the context of 
foreign investment regulatory framework. First, weaponizing laws to serve Beijing’s 
political interest. This type of deviation disregards the reliability and internal coherence 
of the law for political interest. Such interests are normally justified by the recognition 
or understanding or misunderstanding of a social-economic theory or ideological 
preference. The telecommunication sector is one good example explaining this issue. 
Second, commodifying judicial or administrative authority to serve personal interest. 
This type of deviation disregarded the integrity and honesty of the governance power, 
which is a form of corruption. Both forms of deviation share similar mechanism by 
taking advantages of an ambiguous law.  However, while the second form of deviation is 
illegal and common around the world, the first form of deviation compromises the 
authority of the law because it suggests that administrators are either unable to utilize 
the law for the public good or unable to devise a reliable and coherent mechanism to 
serve complex political objectives.  The Party possesses the supremacy of authority 
under China’s party-state system, the disciplinary framework of CPC established a 
foundation to explore a meaningful mechanism to check on officials in connection with 
the state government and legal system. 413  In fact, the rule of law recognize that law 
                                               
413 Larry Catá Backer,Wang  Keren, “The Emerging Structures of Socialist Constitutionalism with 
Chinese Characteristics: Extra-Judicial Detention and the Chinese Constitutional Order,” Rim L. & 
Pol'y J 23 no.2, (2014): 20. Also see,  Alice Tay & Coniasc Leung, “Introduction: The Relation 
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could be a tool for social governance. The core of the rule of law requires that people 
aware and understand the law. This means the rule must be communicated to the 
audience in a fashion that the audience can understand and then take it as a guide for 
their behavior. However, the development of China’s foreign investment regime 
demonstrated a troubled pattern: the authority would disregard the reliability of the 
law when it considers investors could outsmart the regualtors. In fact, this was the 
dilemma in China: well-defined rules could not be used to achieve complex governing 
goals by the authority.   
 
During the 1990s, Chinese business culture had been intensively discussed by 
many western writers. From a retrospective, these views depicted a pattern of the 
business transaction during the 1990s, which provided us more insights over China’s 
foreign investment development. Two of the most iconic views about Chinese business 
culture during the 1990s could be identified: first, Chinese businessmen or negotiators, 
unlike their western counterparts, tend to ignore the details of the contract during the 
business transaction. Second, Chinese partners prefer mediation or arbitration over 
litigation. This study concluded that Chinese culture is not the cause or the reason to 
explain such business behavior.  On the contrary, this study considers Chinese culture 
                                               
Between Culture, Commerce and Ethics,” in Greater China: Law, Society and Trade (A. Tay & C. 
Leung eds. 1995): 170.  
 “The Chinese official and the Chinese citizen are part of a political structure in which the Party's 
will and policies have been the most effective law ....  Laws and regulations have to be 
understood in this wider context of a society in which the formal legal position is only one 
consideration and still often not the most important.  
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plays an insignificant role in shaping Chinese business behavior. The legal system and 
rules helped to form China’s business culture. 
 
First, it is true that Chinese investors tend to act in a more sensitive manner 
when personal authority or reputation is perceived to be threatened. However, avoiding 
contact details or litigations may not be the result of Chinese investors’ psychological 
tendency or Chinese culture. During the 1990s, most Chinese partners that a western 
investor worked with were linked to government or semi-government entities. SOE 
managers are de-facto government officials. Thus, in the contract negotiation settings, 
“being diplomatic” is one feature of government official language. For example, many 
investors and academics asserted that Chinese partners prefer abstract principle instead 
of detailed facts through a nonbinding letter of intent during the joint venture 
negotiations. Many explanations or theories for Chinese investors behavior linked to 
Chinese Confucian Cultural and psychological factors such as for avoiding public 
humiliation or confrontation to protect one’s personal authority or reputation. 414  
                                               
414 “ Foreigners at the Gate: Sweeping Revolutionary Changes on the Central Kingdom's 
Landscape-Foreign Direct Investment Regulations & Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the 
People's Republic of China,” Rich. J. Global L. & Bus 3 (2003): 128-129.  For example, “Generally 
speaking, contract negotiations in China are broadly based, where the Chinese "seek general 
principles," rather than detailed rules explicitly built into to contract… Chinese step back from an 
actual agreement and begin negotiations by  presenting  a  letter  of understanding  that  
outlines  general  principles.  US managers are often put off because they want to get to details.  
They're not averse to  the  rhetoric  of the preambles, but they  want to  build a relationship  on 
facts.  For their part,  the  Chinese  stress  friendly introductions  as  a  way  of  establishing  their 
relationship. Therefore, the  Chinese  do  not  place  priority  on  contractual specificities, but on 
"other social precepts such as mutual benefit, social harmony and long-term objectives as their 
guiding principles in observing the  spirit of the transaction.” Nicholas R. Lardy, “Trade 
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Unlike small and middle-sized export-oriented FIE in the southern province 
operated by Hong Kong or Taiwan investors, western FIE project normally involved large 
investments with Chinese SOE partners. Thus, it was quite normal that these projects 
were negotiated and managed by Chinese SOE managers or officials tended to treat the 
project as one political task rather than a business task. With the development of 
China’s private sector and reforms, new generations of contract negotiators or business 
cultural speak the similar language with their western counterpart.  
 
Western academics and investors accurately pointed out that Chinese prefer 
non-litigation forms of dispute resolution. Many westerns attributed such preference 
for Chinese Confucian cultural, the reality was far more complex. Although traditionally 
Asians preferred non-confrontational mechanism to resolve a personal dispute, it was 
important to note that the underdeveloped legal system would be the main reason 
shaped China’s business practice. There was no meaningful judicial system could handle 
most commercial litigations during the 1980s and early 1990s.  China did not have a 
modern legal service market at the beginning of the 1990s. The most commercial laws 
were developed throughout the 1990s. The litigation system and litigation market were 
not fully developed until the late 1990s. Litigation was formal and transparent, which 
                                               
Liberalization and Its Role in Chinese Economic Growth,” (paper presented at International 
Monetary Fund and National Council of Applied Economic Research Conference, New Delhi, 
November 14-16 2003), 1-10,  
https://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/lardy.pdf. 
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was standard practice for a multinational corporation in resolving commercial disputes. 
However, China’s undeveloped legal system did not create sufficient litigation 
experience for Chinese business community. The first generation of the EJV Law 
framework acknowledged this reality and asked disputed parties to resolve disputes 
through arbitration; litigation was an option. Thus, the lack of meaningful litigation 
system would be  the true reason for these transaction behaviors.415  
 
Conclusion  
Since the launch of the Reform and Open Up in 1978, Chinese foreign investment 
inflow expanded rapidly. The foreign investment inflow between 1992-2005 maintained 
the momentum of the domestic and foreign investment, which fueled economic growth. 
The central authority’s investment policy suggested two important transitions. First, the 
central authority recognized the importance of market and private interest by claiming 
to establish the “socialist market economy.” The Constitution further proclaimed that 
“private interest is protected and guided as part of the socialist market economy.”416 
Secondly, China needed to attract high-quality foreign investment through promoting 
the rule of law. This period signified China’s massive waves of commercial rulemaking. 
                                               
415 For example, one scholar observed that “Most foreign investors generally consult with 
lawyers before and during the process of FDI negotiations. However, it is normal for the Chinese 
to not consult with lawyers because this would infer that they did not trust the parties involved 
in the negotiations.  Nicholas R. Lardy, “Trade Liberalization and Its Role in Chinese Economic 
Growth,” (paper presented at International Monetary Fund and National Council of Applied 
Economic Research Conference, New Delhi, November 14-16 2003), 1-10,  
https://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/lardy.pdf. 
416 PRC Constitution Preamble.  
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China gradually established a “dualist” regulatory framework with one system 
concerning China’s domestic firms, and another concerning foreign firms. This chapter 
concluded that although the dualist legal system accommodated China’s economic 
reality, it promoted discriminatory treatment among SOEs, private sectors, and foreign 
sectors. As next chapter points out, such arrangement became problematic and 
counterproductive in promoting a fair, transparent and open market under 
globalization. In addition, this chapter considered that the underdevelopment of China’s 
legal system shaped China’s business behavior of avoiding litigation during the dispute 
resolution and avoiding the contract details during the business negotiation. The study 
concluded that Chinese culture played an insignificant role in creating such behavior.  
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Chapter 4 THE FDI POLICY AND LAW BETWEEN 2006-2016 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The increasing demands for the relaxation of commerce and investment 
regulations and the goal of maintaining balanced and steady economic growth 
presented an acute tension to China’s policymakers since the emergence of new 
conditions and issues between 2006-2016. China needed new channels to ensure future 
economic growth because the traditional pattern of that development reached its limits. 
First, the economic benefit of the export-oriented manufacturing industry with cheap 
labor reached its limits due to the labor cost increases, global consumer market 
saturation and environmental and labor rights concerns.417 Second, the economic 
benefits of domestic infrastructure investment led by local government reached its 
limits due to market saturation and the risk of nonperforming government loans. A 
relaxed and investment-friendly environment might largely restrain the central 
authority’s capacity of enforcing regulations and rules designed to reduce market risk 
and fluctuation of the national economy in a more effective manner.418  In essence, the 
reformers and policymakers were facing a quagmire from which it could not escape, as 
                                               
417 Heriberto Araújo and Juan Pablo Cardenal, “China’s Economic Empire,” June 1, 2013, The 
New York Times, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/opinion/sunday/chinas-economic-
empire.html?mcubz=3.  
418 Latham & Watkins Mergers & Acquisitions Practice, “China: Deregulation of the Foreign 
Direct Investment Regulatory Regime,” accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-China-Deregulation-of-the-Foreign-Direct-
Investment-Regulatory-Regime.  
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one put beautifully: the low-hanging fruits for reforms were all picked, now we are in a 
new situation. 419 
 
Currently, China’s policymakers proposed multiple new policies and regulations 
targeting these issues. First, the central authority started Shanghai Free Trade Zone 
(SFZ) experiment in 2013, which was designed to streamline the foreign investment 
verification system.420 By 2016, many policies implemented in SFZ are now expanded 
nationwide and written into new FDI regulations with legislation proposals.421 Second, 
the central authority proposed One Belt One Road program, a multinational investment 
project designed to find solutions for the Chinese saturated infrastructure investment 
market and SOEs, although suspicions for the risk of economic errors by many western 
academics have been strong.422 Third, the central authority pushed a series of new 
policies and measures to relax restrictions on domestic entrepreneurship. On the part of 
private equity (PE) market, the authority had been taking precautionary moves:  in order 
to avoid the negative effects and risks for the large inflow and outflow of the capital, the 
central authority developed a complexed capital control regime with rules and 
                                               
419 Kevin Yao, “In Fixing the Economy, China Aims for Low Hanging Fruit,” July 29, 2013, The New 
York Times, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/business/global/in-
fixing-the-economy-china-aims-for-low-hanging-fruit.html?mcubz=3.  
420 “Introduction of Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone,” accessed July 31, 2017, http://en.china-
shftz.gov.cn/.  
421 “Farewell to the Era of Case-by-Case Foreign Investment Approvals,” accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5ecc03ca-7d14-4bf1-88ed-511e98cd90d3.  
422 FT View, “One Belt, One Road — and many questions,” Financial Times, accessed July 31, 
2017, https://www.ft.com/content/d5c54b8e-37d3-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec.  
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regulations covering various economic sectors, such as PE market, finance, insurance 
and foreign exchange.423 The prime example for such control includes Qualified 
Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(QFII) experiments and foreign exchange regulations.424 Essentially, QDII and QFII 
regimes and other foreign exchange control measures were expressions of the central 
plan system 2.0. Only certain screened large institutional investors were allowed to 
engage in investment activities under the supervision of the central authority while 
individuals, and smaller investors are blocked out. However, there were exciting 
developments in the last few years. The success of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone 
experiment resulted in a new foreign investment regulatory framework that provided a 
certain level of national treatment for a foreign investor in certain industries. The 
policymakers started preferred share experiment, which ended “equal share, equal 
rights” corporate law principle by allowing investors to diversify their investment 
options and enabling modern corporate governance reform. The exciting new 
                                               
423 Judy Deng, “The Regulatory Landscape for Private Equity Investment in the Secondary Market 
in China,” The Journal of Private Equity 16, no. 3 (2013) 41, accessed July 31, 2017,  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43503774.  
424 The Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor program (QFII) is pilot capital investment program 
designed to allow qualified foreign institutional investors to invest Chinese stock market under 
certain restrictions since 2002. A variation of this program, RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors (RQFII) was established in 2011 to enable permitted institutional (entity/ legal person) 
to use oversea RMB funds for security investment in Mainland China. See Article2, Measures on 
the Pilot Program of Securities Investment in Mainland China by RMB Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors.  
Ma Guonan, Robert N McCauley, “Do China’s capital controls still bind? Implications for 
monetary autonomy and capital liberalization,” BIS Working Papers No 233, accessed July 31, 
2017, http://www.bis.org/publ/work233.pdf.  
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development of the business structure “Wechat economy,” as the latter section would 
discuss, created cashless, government-less, and self-regulating investment and business 
model that would revolutionize China’s foreign investment framework in the future. In 
the meantime, the central government started to work with the international legal 
framework by entering into various international agreements, such as the one targeting 
money laundry or tax evasion. Recently, China adopted new CSR (Common Standard 
Reporting system) and developing China’s public disclosure framework to promote a 
transparent and robust investment market.425    
 
In this chapter, the main focus is the new development of the foreign investment 
policy and law from 2006 to 2016 with new opportunities and challenges. A brief 
overview of the economic data of the FDI development for the past decades would be 
presented in the rest of the introduction as a reference. The data acknowledged that 
the impact of China’s foreign investment on the world order is undeniable, and the 
relationship between China and the world is reciprocal. In order to illustrate how the 
central authority interpreted China’s new foreign investment framework, this chapter 
follows the same structure from previous chapters. The ideological and constitutional 
frameworks provide a necessary ideological and constitutional basis that assists readers 
in understanding the principles and contexts, within which the FDI legal framework 
                                               
425 “Chinese financial institutions have started carrying out due diligence on customer’s tax 
residency.” See “Time to comply: China implements OECD's financial info exchange” 
International Financial Law Review, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3744696/Time-to-comply-China-implements-OECDs-financial-info-
exchange.html. 
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operated. The main theme during this time was the recognition of rebalancing the 
relationship between market and the government by promoting a unified market access 
and market self-regulation. In addition, it has been promoting a transparent, fair and 
open market. It called for further reform on the government function in order to 
provide convenience for foreign investors.  
 
Before the fourth section summarizes this study, the third section exclusively 
discusses the legal framework of the FDI regime during 2006-2016. This section would 
cover three issues: first, the new developments of the foreign investment regulatory 
framework with the Preferred Stock experiment; second, the new challenges of Chinese 
foreign investment framework in maintaining a reasonable government control without 
hurting the market activities; third, the new opportunity for Chinese foreign investment 
regulatory framework with China’s “wechat economy” and the international legal 
framework of public disclosure schemes in managing market behavior for public good. It 
concludes that the current policymakers acknowledged the importance of market 
freedom and the legitimate interest of protecting the public good. However, more 
reforms are necessary to maintain a reasonable, fair and transparent investment 
framework. This chapter will start with a brief overview of the foreign investment 
performance between 2006-2016. Then it follows the same structure of previous 
chapters by discussing the ideological framework and legal framework before the end of 
a short conclusion.  
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During the past thirty years, China has maintained a rapid rate of economic 
growth, “the average annual growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) has been 
9.4 percent, and the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita is 8.2 
percent.”426 Although China had taken the position for the largest exporting country in 
2013, almost half of the exports has come from firms “in which foreign investors have at 
least some ownership.427“World Bank data indicate that China's GDP grew by 10.6 
percent from 1990 to 2000 and by 9.6% from 2000 to 2010. Some of the reasons for this 
tremendous increase have been the increased liberalization, freer markets, freer trade, 
higher labor productivity, efficient use of resources, and also the role of foreign direct 
investment.”428 With Chinese economic development, export oriented and labor-
intensive sectors have been facing pressures from the rising labor and production costs 
and the strict environmental regulations. As a result, relocation to “Western and Central 
China, and other low-cost South East Asian countries such as Vietnam” became 
inevitable.429 
                                               
426 Liu Xiangbo, Luo Yu, Qiu Zhigang, and Zhang Ru, “FDI and Economic Development: Evidence 
from China’s Regional Growth, “Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 50 (2014): 87-106.   
427 Kulkarni, Kishore G; Tapas, Poornima; Dangre, Rita R, “FDI Comparatists: China and India,” 
SCMS Journal of Indian Management 13, no. 1 (2016) 50.  
428 Ibid.   
429 For example, “in contrast to the supply chain of the Taiwanese PC industry and the clustering 
of the Japanese auto industry, the US food and chemical industries need not organize a wide 
spectrum of suppliers producing raw materials or components for their final products… 
Moreover, the US FIEs tend to focus on institutional environment in the expansion destinations 
and expect high transparency in government procedures and decision-making. Compared with 
Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors, the Americans are relatively unfamiliar with Chinese 
culture and are reluctant to become involved in the guanxi-based communication.” Xu zhihua, 
Yeh Anthony, “Origin Effects, Spatial Dynamics and Redistribution of FDI in Guangdong, China” 
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Between 2006-2016, the foreign investment performance was steady. “From 
January to  October 2016, Newly Approved Foreign-invested Enterprises amounted to 
22580, up by 7.4% year on year; and the actual use of foreign investment reached RMB 
666.3b（USD 103.91billion, up by 4.2% year on year.” 430  The top ten nations and 
regions with investment in China were still concentrated in South and East Asia: “Hong 
Kong (USD71.16 billion), Singapore (USD4.89 billion) , Republic of Korea (USD4.12 
billion), United States (USD3.49 billion) , Macao (USD3.35 billion) , Taiwan 
Province(USD2.98 billion) , Japan (USD2.46 billion) , Germany (USD2.44 billion), U.K. 
(USD2 billion) and Luxembourg (USD1.38 billion). Investments from these countries 
accounted for 94.6% of the total actual use of foreign investment in the country.”431 
 
Table 8. FDI data 2006-2016.  
 Newly approved  Actual use contract 
value  
2016 22580 $103.91billion 
2009 18,163 $70.871 billion 
2008 27,514 $92.395 billion  
2006 41485 $63.21 billion 
                                               
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie [Journal of Economic & Social Geography], 
104, no. 4, (2013) 439-455.  
430 MOFCOM, “China’s Absorption of Foreign Fund (2006/1-10),” accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/sys/print.shtml?/statistic/foreigninvestment/201612/201612021
65831.    
431 Ibid.    
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*data: MOFCOM China’s absorption of Foreign Investment 432 
On the part of the Outbound Direct Investment (ODI), Chinese enterprises made 
a nonfinancial direct investment of “US$14.53 billion in 53 countries along Belt and 
Road. The investment mainly flew to Singapore, Indonesia, India, Thailand, and 
Malaysia.” 433The number of the contracts “signed by the Chinese enterprises in 61 
countries along the Belt and Road reached 8,158 in 2016, and the value of the newly-
signed contracts amounted to US$126.03 billion, taking up 51.6% of China’s total 
contract value of the contracted projects over the same period, The turnover reached 
US$ 75.97 billion, taking up 47.7% of the total, up 9.7% year on year.”434 
 
                                               
432 In January-October 2009, the number of newly approved and established foreign-funded 
enterprises in China totaled 18,163, down by 20.11% year-on-year, and the foreign investment 
in actual use reached US$70.871 billion, down by 12.61% year-on-year. In October, the number 
of the newly approved and established foreign-funded enterprises in China reached 1,815, down 
by 6.2% year-on-year; and the foreign capital in actual use was US$7.105 billion, up by 5.7% 
year-on-year. From January to October this year, the top ten countries/regions (calculated by 
the actually utilized value of foreign capital) investing in China were: Hong Kong (US$41.062 
billion), Taiwan (US$5.607 million), Japan (US$3.609 billion), Singapore (US$2.985 billion), USA 
(US$2.831 billion), Korea (US$2.261 billion), UK (US$1.168 billion), Germany (US$1.088 billion), 
Canada (US$ 770 million) and Macao (US$643 million). The actual inflow of foreign capital of the 
said ten countries/regions accounted for 87.5% of the country’s total.   
MOFCOM, “China’s Absorption of Foreign Fund (2006/1-10),” accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/sys/print.shtml?/statistic/foreigninvestment/201612/201612021
65831.    
433 MOFCOM, “Investment and Cooperation Statistics about Countries along Belt and Road in 
2016,” accessed July 30, 2017, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/foreigntradecooperation/201702/201702025222
80.shtml   
434 Ibid.    
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A new draft of the Foreign Investment Law was released in the spring of 2015 to 
reform the governance of foreign investment by granting national treatment to foreign 
investors in both admission and operation. However, such draft had not yet been 
finalized due to China’s complicated foreign exchange issue, an important obstacle to 
China’s foreign investment. 435 Currently, the lawmakers are still working on the draft. 
Various new reforms and new legislation were created to promote the FDI regime. For 
example, the Shanghai Free Trade Zone was designed to streamline the verification and 
approval process for foreign investors. It was designed to provide national treatment for 
foreign investors in industries that the central authority considered less important. For 
important industry sectors listed on the “negative list,” the investor would be subject to 
the traditional investment verification process. This reform designed to simplify the 
registration process for foreign investors. Under the new rules, a foreign investor does 
not have to prepare feasibility study if the investment project is not named on the 
negative list. The amendment of the EJV Law, CJV Law, and WFOE Law later affirmed 
these new reform measures. A new National Security Review was also created to 
balance the growing interest of the M&A by foreign investors and the need for 
protecting national security.  
 
                                               
435 See, Bian Yongmin, “A Revisit to China’s Foreign Investment Law: With Special Reference to 
Foreign Investment Protection,” Journal of East Asia & International Law 8, no. 2 (2015): 447. 
Also see MOC, “Shangwubu jiu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheheguo waiguo touzifa caoan zhengqiu 
yijiangao gongkai zhengqiu yijian” [MOC Announcement on Seeking Public Opinion on the Draft 
of the P.R.C. Foreign Investment Law], January 19, 2015, 
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/as/201501/20150100871010.shtml  
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In addition, in order to maintain a payment of the balance, China imposed strict 
foreign exchange control, which strongly affected normal commerce and foreign 
investment activities. Due to China’s close connection with the world economy, China’s 
mega foreign exchange reserve started to cause concerns from both domestic and 
foreign watchers. Theoretically, Yuan’s revaluation would attract foreign investment in 
China and lower the cost of imports, but it could also cause financial risk when China’s 
bank sector has a large number of bad loans that cannot provide a healthy and 
sustainable investment environment. 436The issue with China’s foreign exchange control 
demonstrated the difficulty of maintaining a strong central controlling economy and a 
market system.437  
 
With China’s rapid FDI development, academics realized that the impact of 
global trade and investment is reciprocal: the world is changing China and Chinese 
people, vice-versa the West became more and more susceptible to China. 438   “China 
represents 23 percent of the world’s population”, put in perspective, China’s impact is 
undeniable. More than 10 percent of what China ships to the U.S. ends up on Wal-
                                               
436Mark A. Scott, “China's influence on the American legal system resulting from China's rise to 
power, ” Suffolk Transnational Law Review 32.1 (2008), accessed July 29, 2017, 
http://www.suffolk.edu/law/student-life/16963.php.   
437 Gu Wenbo, “A comparative study on foreign investment legal system in China,” Frontiers of 
Law in China 5, no. 3 (2010): 453.  
438 Mark A. Scott, “China's influence on the American legal system resulting from China's rise to 
power,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review 32.1 (2008), accessed July 29, 2017, 
http://www.suffolk.edu/law/student-life/16963.php.  
208 
 
Mart's shelves. 439 The rise of China’s economic power under globalization connects 
China and the global market. China’s impact on global trade, investment, transaction 
behavior and the legal system is undeniable.440 More importantly, China’s experience 
provides an alternative narrative and discourse about the social and legal system, which 
will be discussed in this chapter.  
 
When sizable investment and transaction made by corporations in China under 
China’s system embedded with Chinese cultural values and ideology, one cannot 
venture the idea to what extent the world will be affected by China. China’s growth will 
inevitably inject its influence over the pattern and culture of business transactions 
globally. Particularly, China’s legal system and legal culture, in the area such as “contract 
law, property law, dispute resolution” would cause interest and comparison with the 
common practice in other areas of the world. Such comparison would both create more 
knowledge of China and more bias toward China. 441 It is important to point out that the 
                                               
439 Chris Miller, “An intricate ALLIANCE” Aftermarket Business 115, no.5 (2005) 46-48, accessed 
July 29, 2017, http:// proquest.com.  
440  “As such, Chinese expropriation law offers policies and goals that U.S. citizens may find 
appealing because they fall within American legal norms and traditions and therefore could 
possibly be adopted. At the very least, Chinese expropriation law may offer a model to further 
embolden the current just compensation debate.”   See Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., "Court-
Performed Mediation in the People's Republic of China: A Proposed Model to Improve the 
United States Federal District Courts' Mediation Programs,” OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL  1, no. 5 
(2000) 391. 
441 See Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., "Court-Performed Mediation in the People's Republic of China: 
A Proposed Model to Improve the United States Federal District Courts' Mediation Programs,” 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL  1, no. 5 (2000) 391. For example, “the U.S. Consular reported that in 
1979, 523 visas were issued to students and scholars from China. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 1979-
1986: CONSULAR REP. tbl. 5-1 (1987). "In 2002, about 65,000 Chinese students were enrolled in 
209 
 
meaning of Chinese characteristics is still subject to debates and developments and it is 
more of a symbol to signify people who identify and acknowledge a pattern of problem 
analysis and solutions under certain abstract and evolving principles and ideology. The 
Western paradigm acknowledged the extraordinariness of China’s transformation. 
However, China’s story and experience in FDI is extraordinary in a sense that it engaged 
in many compromises that would be considered culturally, politically, and 
constitutionally unique for a different country. These compromises may have implied 
the difficulty of duplicating.  
 
 
2. Ideological Framework 
 
Since the establishment of the principle of socialist modernization at the 3rd 
plenary session of the 11th National Congress of CPC in 1978, the main theme of China’s 
past decades of development was the Reform and Open up.442 Each era gives a new 
meaning to this term. As previous chapters discussed, during the 1980s, the main focus 
of the authority was to define the role of the market and profit under China’s 
centralized planning system.443 the 1980s established the foundation of the FDI 
framework. During the 1990s, China reformed the centralized planning system by 
                                               
universities in America, and Chinese students accounted for the highest percentage of 
international students on many American campuses." T.K. Chu, 150 Years of Chinese Students in 
America, HARV. CHINA REV. 7, 7 (2004).   
442 See chapter 2, 3rd plenary session of the 11th Central CPC.  
443 See discussion on FDI policy and law during 1978-1991.  
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establishing a socialist market economy.444 A dualist commercial law system was 
developed to curate Chinese economy  with the intent to revitalize China’s SOE sector, 
on the one hand, to develop foreign invested economy sectors on the other hand. The 
most significant ideological and constitutional progress has been the recognition of the 
legitimate interest of China’s private sectors. This progress further affirmed China’s 
commitment to the market economy.445  
 
Since 2006, new conditions and issues emerged: the rapid growth of China’s ODI, 
return investment and outflow of the capital raised concerns about the sustainability of 
China’s FDI policy and investment environment. The emerge of wechat economy under 
globalization presented new opportunities to central authority’s understanding of the 
role of the government and market participants. The rapid outflow of capital and the 
complexity of money laundry scheme presented new challenges to China’s foreign 
investment regime.  
 
Thus, the main issue of the foreign investment framework since 2006 has been 
the relationship between the market and central authority within the context of 
developing the socialist modernization. This means, how to balance the political interest 
of the central authority in maintaining goal-oriented prosperity, the interest of the 
freedom of contract, and the interest of the rule of law.  This section focused on new 
                                               
444 See discussion on FDI policy and law during 1992-2005.  
445 See discussion on 2004 Constitution amendment in previous chapter.  
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developments in ideological framework between 2006-2016 within the context of 
foreign investment by reviewing policies and principles proposed by the 17th and 18th 
Party Congress. The discussion will provide a necessary context for better understanding 
the foreign investment legal framework discussed in the next section. It is noted that 
there was no constitutional amendment during the selected period of the time.   
 
a. The 17th Party Congress  
 
Between October 15-21, 2007, the 17th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China was held in Beijing.446 This meeting elected new Party cadres and 
summarized the past reform and policies. In this meeting, it redefined socialism with 
Chinese characteristic and called for reforms to build a “reasonable, efficient and 
secure” financial system. It restated the principle of the Reform and Open Up and 
pledged to keep developing FDI regime under the globalization, and guided by the 
principle of mutual benefit. The 17th National Congress of CPC defined a socialist path 
with Chinese characteristic as: 
socialism with Chinese characteristics means we will, under the leadership of the 
CPC and in light of China's basic conditions, take economic development as the 
central task, adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and persevere in reform and 
                                               
446 Hu Jingtao, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics and Strive 
For New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects, October 15, 2007, 
accessed July31, 2017, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2007-
11/20/content_86325.htm.   
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opening up, release and develop the productive forces, consolidate and improve 
the socialist system, develop the socialist market economy, socialist democracy, 
an advanced socialist culture and a harmonious socialist society, and make China 
a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern 
socialist country. The main reason this path is completely correct and can lead 
China to development and progress is that we have adhered to the basic tenets 
of scientific socialism and in the meantime added to them distinct Chinese 
characteristics in light of China's conditions and the features of the times. In 
contemporary China, to stay true to socialism means to keep to the path of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics.447 
The Party Congress’ definition of the socialist path with Chinese characteristic 
demonstrated a historical continuity since the establishment of the socialist 
modernization and Four Cardinal Principle. This pattern represented China’s policy 
commitment to the foreign investment. 
 
The 17th Party Congress restated socialism with Chinese characteristic theory, 
which included principles developed by past leaders.448  On the part of financial and 
                                               
447 Ibid.    
448 “Theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics constitute a system of scientific theories 
including Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents, and the Scientific 
Outlook on Development and other major strategic thoughts. This system represents the Party's 
adherence to and development of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and embodies 
the wisdom and hard work of several generations of Chinese Communists leading the people in 
carrying out tireless explorations and practices. It is the latest achievement in adapting Marxism 
to Chinese conditions, the Party's invaluable political and intellectual asset, and the common 
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investment regime reform, the 17th Party Congress showed supports but with self-
restraint, as it called for building “reasonable structure, complete function, efficient and 
secure” modern financial system.449 Perhaps due to the complexity of the foreign 
exchange issue, the 17th Party Congress made a more pragmatic promise that calls for 
future instead of present RMB reform. As it provided that:  
We will improve the RMB exchange rate regime and gradually make the RMB 
convertible under capital accounts. We will deepen reform of the investment 
system and improve and strictly enforce market access rules. We will improve 
the state planning system.450  
The Speech also took the same position on the future of market regulation, as it stated:  
                                               
ideological foundation for the concerted endeavor of the people of all ethnic groups. It is an 
open system that keeps developing. Practices since the publication of the Communist Manifesto 
nearly 160 years ago have proved that only when Marxism is integrated with the conditions of a 
specific country, advances in step with the times and is tied to the destiny of the people can it 
demonstrate its strong vitality, creativity and appeal. In contemporary China, to stay true to 
Marxism means to adhere to the system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” 
See: Hu Jingtao, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics and Strive 
For New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects, October 15, 2007, 
accessed July31, 2017, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2007-
11/20/content_86325.htm.   
449 Deepen fiscal, taxation and financial restructuring and improve macroeconomic regulation. 
We will proceed with financial reforms to develop various types of financial markets and build a 
modern financial system that is inclusive of different forms of ownership and different ways of 
operation and that features a reasonable structure, complete functions, efficiency and security. 
Ibid.     
450 See: Hu Jingtao, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics and 
Strive For New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects, October 15, 
2007, accessed July31, 2017, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2007-
11/20/content_86325.htm.   
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We will give play to the guiding role of national development plans, programs, 
and industrial policies in macroeconomic regulation and combine the use of 
fiscal and monetary policies to improve macroeconomic regulation.451 
It is noted the Party Congress acknowledged the issue with the RMB exchange system 
but only stated it “will” reform the system. In fact, SAFE issued stricter rules weakening 
individual's capacity in purchasing foreign exchange by placed a quota of 50,000 dollars 
a year for foreign exchange purchasing. Although Chinese economy  improved 
drastically, the central authority never increases the quota since 2007.452 As discussions 
in the next section suggested, this measure showed a tension between the private 
interest and public policy. China’s investors could not freely invest their own property 
because the central authority could not predict the fluctuation of the market or 
maintain a balanced growth. In addition, the quota restriction, like its predecessors (i.e., 
dual foreign exchange rate system in the 1980s) could not fully curtail the market 
behavior as it used to.  
 
b. The 18th Party Congress 
On the part of foreign investment and trade, the 18th Party Congress called for 
“integration” and “win-win” cooperation with foreign business under the 
                                               
451 Ibid.    
452 Guojia waihui guanliju guanyu wanshan waizi binggou waihui guanli wenti de tongzhi (国家外
汇管理局关于完善外资并购外汇管理有关问题的通知) [Notice of the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange on Relevant Issues on Perfecting Administration of Foreign Exchange Relating 
to Merger and Acquisition with Foreign Funds ] adopted by SAFE on January 24, 2005.   
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globalization.453 Furthermore, it made a promise that “innovative” channel would be 
adopted to utilize foreign investment, which suggested the possibility of a more relaxed 
regulatory regime.454 However, these new policies might be conditioned, as the Party 
Congress emphasized that foreign investment would be constructed under the principle 
of mutual benefit.455 
 
                                               
453 “Expand opening up in scope and depth and improve our open economy. Adhering to the 
basic state policy of opening up, we will better integrate our ‘bring in’ and ‘go global’ strategies, 
expand the areas of opening up, optimize its structure, raise its quality, and turn our open 
economy into one in which domestic development and opening to the outside world interact 
and Chinese businesses and their foreign counterparts engage in win-win cooperation, and one 
that features security and efficiency, in order to gain new advantages for China in international 
economic cooperation and competition amid economic globalization.”  See, Resolution of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, November 15, 2013, available at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm. 
454 We will make innovations in the way of using foreign capital, improve the structure of foreign 
investment utilized, and let the use of foreign capital play a positive role in facilitating 
independent innovation, industrial upgrading and balanced development among regions. We 
will make innovations in our way of overseas investment and cooperation, support domestic 
enterprises in carrying out international operations of R&D, production and marketing, and 
accelerate the growth of Chinese multinational corporations and Chinese brand names in the 
world market. : Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some 
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, November 15, 2013, available 
at: http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.  
455 “We will deepen the opening up of coastal areas, accelerate that of inland areas and upgrade 
that of border areas, so that opening up at home and opening to the outside world will promote 
each other. We will expedite transformation of the growth mode of foreign trade, stress quality, 
adjust the mix of imports and exports, promote transformation and upgrading of processing 
trade, and energetically develop service trade. We will vigorously carry out mutually beneficial 
international cooperation in energy and resources. We will implement a strategy of free trade 
zones and expand bilateral and multilateral trade and economic cooperation. We will adopt 
comprehensive measures to maintain a basic equilibrium in the balance of payments. We must 
guard against international economic risks.” Ibid.  
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On November 15, 2013, the 3rd Plenary session of the 18th National Congress of 
Communist Party of China adopted Resolution of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensive Deepening 
the Reform [the Resolution].456 The Resolution acknowledged the necessity and 
inevitability of continuing reform. More importantly, it acknowledged the main theme 
of the reform is to “strike a balance between the role of the government and that of the 
market.” 457The Resolution understood the difficulty of the task, which was why it laid 
out a cautiously worded assessment about China’s problems:   
To deepen the reform comprehensively, we must bear in mind the fact that 
China is still in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time 
to come. We should adhere to the major strategic judgment that development is 
still the key to solving all problems in China, take economic construction as our 
                                               
456 “Economic system reform is the focus of deepening the reform comprehensively. The 
underlying issue is how to strike a balance between the role of the government and that of the 
market, and let the market play the decisive role in allocating resources and let the government 
play its functions better.” See, Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, November 15, 
2013, available at: http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-
01/16/content_31212602.htm.   
457 It is a general rule of the market economy that the market decides the allocation of 
resources. We have to follow this rule when we improve the socialist market economy. We 
should work hard to address the problems of market imperfection, too much government 
interference and poor oversight. Also see: We must actively and in an orderly manner 
promote market-oriented reform in width and in depth, greatly reducing the government's role 
in the direct allocation of resources, and promote resources allocation according to market 
rules, market prices and market competition, so as to maximize the benefits and optimize the 
efficiency. See, Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some 
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, November 15, 2013, available 
at: http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm.  
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central task, give full play to the leading role of economic system reform, balance 
the relations of production with the productive forces as well as the 
superstructure with the economic base, and promote sound, sustainable 
economic and social development.458 
This assessment implied the relationship between policy and development: policy is 
created to serve development, if the policy fails, it must move forward to ensure the 
progress of development.459 In the context of foreign investment framework, the 
Resolution suggested that “too much intervention” from the government without 
proper oversight.460 It emphasized the importance of “market rule”: letting market 
instead of the government directly allocate the resource. The Resolution redefined the 
duty of the government as:  
● maintain the stability of the macroeconomy,  
● strengthen and improve public services, safeguard fair competition, strengthen 
oversight of the market, maintain market order,  
                                               
458 Ibid.    
459 “the national business system has carefully implemented the decisions and deployments of 
the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, built a favorable business environment and 
cultivated and consolidated the new advantages of foreign investment focusing on constructing 
a new open economic system, strengthened the mission and took the initiative to make 
contributions.” See MOC, “2017 National Foreign Investment Work Conference Held in Beijing,” 
MOC, March 1, 2017, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201703/20170302525718.s
html.  
460 Ibid.   
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● promote sustainable development and shared prosperity, and intervene in 
situations where market failure occurs.461 
 
One of the highlights for the Resolution was to call for unified market access 
without invisible barrel discriminate against private sectors and foreign investors. The 
2004 Constitution proclaimed to protect “private property ownership.”462 The political 
rhetoric under the Resolution expressed a more modernized view, which provided that 
“public property ownership, as well as private property ownership, are inviolable.”463 
The Resolution listed numbers of guidelines to promote new market reform, as it 
provided: 
1. Private sector and public-sector property are equally inviolable,464  
                                               
461 Ibid.    
462 Art. 11, PRC. Constitution. “The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-
public sectors of the economy such as the individual and private sectors of the economy. The 
State encourages, supports and guides the development of the non-public sectors of the 
economy and, in accordance with law, exercises supervision and control over the non-public 
sectors of the economy.” 
463 Improving the property rights protection system. Property rights are the core of ownership. 
We need to improve the modern property rights system with clear ownership, clear-cut rights 
and obligations, strict protection and smooth flow. The property rights of the public sector are 
inviolable, as are those of the non-public sector. See, Resolution of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the 
Reform, November 15, 2013, available at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm. 
464 The resolution also emphasized the importance of the non-public sectors. “Supporting the 
healthy development of the non-public sector. The non-public sector plays an important role in 
sustaining growth, stimulating innovation, increasing employment, increasing tax revenues and 
so on. We will persist in equality of rights, opportunities and rules, abolish all forms of irrational 
regulations for the non-public economy, remove all hidden barriers, and adopt specific 
measures for non-public enterprises to enter franchising fields.” See, Resolution of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively 
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2. Unified transparent market access,465 
3. Promoting mixed economy with cross holding by both state and non-state 
sectors,466   
4. National treatment for foreign investors. 467 
 
It is important to point out that the first principle concerning the interest of private 
sector is an extension of the commitment made by the 16th Party Congress. The second 
principle “unified market access” concerning market reform, which refers to the 
                                               
Deepening the Reform, November 15, 2013, available at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31212602.htm. 
465 Vigorously developing a mixed economy. A mixed economy with cross holding by and mutual 
fusion between state-owned capital, collective capital and non-public capital is an important 
way to materialize the basic economic system of China...Enacting market rules that are fair, 
open and transparent. We will implement a unified market access system; and on the basis of 
making a negative list, all kinds of market players may enter areas not on the negative list on an 
equal basis and according to law. We will explore a management model for foreign investors 
with pre-entry national treatment plus the negative list. We will make the business registration 
system more convenient by reducing the number of items that require qualification verification, 
turning certification before licensing into licensing before certification, and gradually changing 
the paid-in capital registration system into a subscribed capital registration system. We will 
propel reform of our domestic commodity distribution structure while building a business 
environment under the rule of law. Ibid.  
466 The state protects the property rights and legitimate interests of all economic sectors, 
ensures that they have equal access to the factors of production according to the law, 
participate in market competition on an open, fair and just footing, and are accorded with equal 
protection and oversight according to the law. Ibid.  
467We will reform the market oversight system, implement uniform market oversight, tidy up 
and annul all sorts of regulations and methods that impede the national unified market and fair 
competition, strictly ban and punish all unlawful acts extending preferential policies, combat 
regional protection, and oppose monopoly and unfair competition. We will establish and 
improve a social credit system to commend honesty and punish dishonesty. We will improve the 
market exit system in which the good eliminates the bad, and perfect the enterprise bankruptcy 
system. Ibid.  
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proposed policy of reforming “dualist legal system” by giving domestic firms and 
foreign-invested firms equal status and treatment. In addition, this principle was 
evidenced by the Shanghai Free Trade Zone experiment. 468 
 
Comparing with the general expression of 17th CPC Party Congress, the 3rd 
plenary session of the 18th Party Congress stated more detailed policies on China’s 
financial reform. First, it clearly indicated qualified private sector could engage in the 
banking sector. Financial innovation is encouraged.469 Second, it started to speed up 
RMB exchange rate market reform and convertibility under capital account.470 Third, it 
                                               
468 Shanghai Free Trade Zone Zhongguo Shanghai ziyou maoyi shiyanqu zongti fangan (中国（上
海）自由贸易试验区总体方案) 
469 Improving the financial market. We will open the financial industry wider, and allow qualified 
non-governmental capital to set up, in accordance with law, financial institutions such as small 
or medium-sized banks on the precondition that this comes under stronger oversight. We will 
push ahead with reform of policy financial institutions. We will improve the multi-layer capital 
market system, promote reform toward a registration-based stock-issuing system, promote 
equity financing through diverse channels, develop and regulate the bond market, and increase 
the proportion of direct financing. Ibid.  
470  We will improve the mechanism for market-based Renminbi exchange rate formation, 
accelerate interest-rate liberalization, and improve the national debt yield curve that reflects 
the relationship between market supply and demand. We will promote the opening of the 
capital market in both directions, raise the convertibility of cross-border capital and financial 
transactions in an orderly way, establish and improve a management system of foreign debt and 
capital flow within the framework of macro-management, and accelerate the realization of 
Renminbi capital account convertibility...We will carry out reform measures and stability 
standards for financial oversight, improve the mechanism for oversight and coordination in the 
financial sector, and define the oversight functions and risk management responsibilities at both 
the central and local levels. We will build a deposit insurance system, and improve the market-
based exit mechanism for financial institutions. We will strengthen financial infrastructure 
construction to ensure that the financial market operates in a safe, efficient and stable way. 
Ibid.  
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asserted that the government would stay out of investment barrel in cases not involving 
strategic resource and substantial public interest by reforming administrative 
verification process.471 An objective and historical observation on these statements 
would come to some cautionary conclusions. For example, although the authority 
clearly acknowledged the structure issues with current investment regulations and 
pledged to reform such system, it emphasized “strategic and public interest” would be 
excluded from these reforms. It was noted that the 1992-2005 investment framework 
adopted similar rhetoric to insulate SOEs from market reform, which did not lead to 
desired results.   
 
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central CPC Congress focused on the market 
access and administrative verification process. The 4th Plenary Session focused on 
                                               
471 We will deepen the reform of the investment system, and ensure the dominant role of 
enterprises in investment. All enterprise investment projects, except for those concerning 
national security or ecological security, distribution of the major productive forces, strategic 
resources development and major public interests, should be decided by the enterprises 
independently in accordance with the law, and no longer require government approval. Market 
access standards will be reinforced regarding energy, land and water conservation, 
environment, technology, security, etc. and a long-term mechanism will be established and 
improved for preventing and dissipating excess production capacity. We will improve the 
development progress evaluation system, correct the bias of evaluating political achievements 
merely by the economic growth rate. We will increase the weight of other evaluation indicators 
such as resources consumption, environmental damage, ecological benefits, excess production 
capacity, sci-tech innovation, production safety and new debts, while more emphasis will be put 
on employment, residents' income, social security and public health. We will establish a unified 
national accounting system, formulate national and local balance sheets, and promote 
information sharing between government departments by setting up a nationwide database 
containing real estate and credit and other basic information. Ibid.  
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judicial system reform.472 On October 23, 2014, the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th 
Central CPC Party Congress adopted Resolution concerning Some Major Questions in 
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward 
[hereinafter the Resolution on Law]. 473 The Resolution stated that rule of law 
construction still falls short of the expectation of the popular masses, which require a 
sober understanding by Party and State.474 The Resolution further outlined some issues, 
which can be categorized as legislative issues and law enforcement issues. These issues 
are either technical issues of the legislation, which can be fixed with better law making; 
                                               
472 “The effectiveness of implementing the rule of law will be a significant indicator in judging 
the work of officials at various levels and will be taken into consideration when evaluating their 
performance. The government will promote the implementation of the rule of law at the 
community level by giving full play to the key role of community-level Party organizations.” See 
“Communiqué of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China (Excerpts),” Beijing Review, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.bjreview.com/Beijing_Review_and_Kings_College_London_Joint_Translation_Proje
ct/2014/201703/t20170321_800091805.html.   
473 CCP Central Committee Resolution concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively 
Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward (中共中央关于全面推进依法治
国若干重大问题的决定), October 28, 2014, 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-
concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-
according-to-the-law-forward/.  
474 “At the same time, we must soberly be aware that, in comparison with the development 
needs of the undertakings of the Party and the State, in comparison with the expectations of the 
popular masses, and in comparison, with moving ruling the country according to the law 
forward and modernizing our governing ability, rule of law construction still displays many 
problems where it is not adapted or unsuited.”  See: CCP Central Committee Decision 
concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country 
According to the law Forward, October 28, 2014, 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-
concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-
according-to-the-law-forward/.  
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or principal issues, which would be harder to fix without a comprehensive economic and 
judicial reform and an effective anti-corruption structure. On the part of the legislation, 
the Resolution pointed out the lack of transparency and clarity and the tendency of 
place department interest over the legislative goal and people’s will.475  On the part of 
the law enforcement, the Resolution criticized the problem of lack of transparency and 
corruption.476As the Resolution concluded that: 
“These problems violate the principles of the Socialist rule of law, harm the 
interests of the popular masses, impede the development of the undertakings of 
the Party and the country, and we must spend great efforts to resolve them.” 477 
                                               
475  some laws and regulations have not been able to completely reflect objective laws and the 
will of the people, they are not strong in terms of focus or feasibility, there are tendencies of 
departmentalization in legislative work, turf battles and shifting of responsibility are relatively 
prominent; See, CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in 
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward, October 28, 
2014, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-
decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-
according-to-the-law-forward/.  
476 “One of the significant achievements was the Plan designed to improve the quality of the 
judges. Prior to the First Reform Plan it was common to find judges who were not legally 
qualified or who lacked experience in commercial transactions. In 2001, the Judges Law of the 
PRC was amended to impose stringent qualification requirements. In addition to holding a 
university degree, judges appointed after January 1, 2002 have to pass a national judicial 
examination, the same bar examination taken by private practitioners.12 On January 1, 2001, 
the Supreme People's Court's Judge Training Regulation came into effect, which requires courts 
to provide continuing legal education to judges, regardless of seniority. Another objective of the 
First Reform Plan has been the enforcement of anti-corruption regulations. One example of this 
effort was the issuance of guidelines regulating interaction between judges and lawyers, the 
breach of which will give rise to disciplinary sanctions, and, in more serious cases, criminal 
liability.” Eu Jin Chua, “The Laws of the People's Republic of China: An Introduction for 
International Investors,” Chicago Journal of International Law 7 no.1 (2006): 133-140.  
477 “laws exist but are not followed, law enforcement is not strict and law-breakers aren’t 
punished are relatively grave, separation of powers and responsibilities in the law enforcement; 
multi-headed law enforcement and selective law enforcement still exist, law enforcement and 
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The ideological and constitutional framework within the context of foreign 
investment law and policy mainly focused on the issue of market access and 
transparency of the investment environment. The Party Congress acknowledged these 
issues by proposing new reform policies and measures, such as the Shanghai Free Trade 
Zone experiment and Yuan Internationalization. The Party Congress also acknowledged 
the challenge of the reform, such as China’s foreign exchange issue, by offering cautious 
assessment and promise for “future reform.” In general, the ideological and 
constitutional framework during this period demonstrated a historical continuity by 
further relaxing the restrictions on the market with reasonable readjustment on the role 
of government intervention. The results were not always perfect, but the commitment 
to a better and open investment environment with further global integration did not 
change.    
 
                                               
the judiciary are quite prominently not standardized, not strict, not transparent and uncivilized, 
the masses’ strongly react against the problems of judicial unfairness and corruption; the 
consciousness of a number of members of society to abide by the law, trust in the law, respect 
the law, use the law, and safeguard their rights according to the law is not strong, some State 
personnel and especially leading cadres’ consciousness about handling affairs according to the 
law is not strong, and their abilities are insufficient, and it still occurs that laws are knowingly 
violated, one’s word replaces the law, the law is suppresses through power, and the law is bent 
for relatives and friends.” See: CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major 
Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward, 
October 28, 2014, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-
committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-
the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/. 
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3. New Development in FDI Legal Framework 
a. Preferred Stocks   
On November 30, 2013, State Council issued State Council Guiding Opinion on 
launching Preferred Share Pilot Program, which signified a new era of preferred share 
experiment, as an alternative to China’s long established “equal share, equal rights” 
Company Law principle.478 A month later, CSRC and CBRC (China Banking Regulatory 
Commission) and other regulatory agencies adopted supplementary rules to enforce 
this reform.  “According to the pilot project, companies listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange are allowed to issue preferred stocks to 
qualified public investors. Blue-chips listing companies are expected to gain support 
from the first stage of the preferred stock pilot project as they are likely to be among 
the first batch piloting the new program.”479 Unlike US rules and regulations concerning 
preferred stocks, the Chinese experiment was silent on conversion rights. The preferred 
stock enjoyed preference on dividends distribution, attendance of the shareholders’ 
meeting and voting rights. 480 
Two principals were outlined by the educational material on preferred share 
provided by CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission), “an effective and functional 
legal and policy system is the foundation of market development, otherwise small 
                                               
478 State Council issued Guowuyuan guanyu kaizhan youxiangu shidian zhidao yijian [State 
Council Guiding Opinion on launching Preferred Share Initiative] On Nov30, 2013.     
479 Xu Donggen, “Rule for Preferred Stock in China: Overthrow of the Principle of ‘Equal Shares, 
Equal Rights’ From A Comparative Perspective,” Frontiers of Law in China 11, no.3 (2016): 538-
550. 
480 Ibid.  
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investors interests will be harmed” and “Financial Innovation is beneficial to the further 
development of the market.”481   
CSRC listed a few reasons for China’s preferred share reform, which are: 
1. China’s A Share Market (RMB quoted shares only listed in Shanghai Stock, 
Exchange and closed for purchasing by Chinese investors) underperformance 
since the fall of 2007, 482 
2. Majority public listed company do not provide dividends,  
3. Chinese bank needs new financing tools to supplement capital market,  
4. Diversifying investment market. 483 
The legal basis for China’s preferred shares experiment by CSRC rested in PRC 
Company Law.484 PRC Company Law Article 132 provided that: State Council can issue 
                                               
481 “Zhongguo Zhengjianhui youguan fuzeren jiu youxiangu shidian da jizhe wen” （中国证监会
有关部门负责人就优先股试点答记者问）CSRC Head Q&A on Preferred Shares Pilot Program. 
CSRC, December 13, 2013, 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ztzl/zcjd/201406/t20140604_255431.html.  
482 A-shares are defined in opposition to B-shares. B-shares are quoted in foreign currencies 
(such as the U.S. dollar) and are open to both domestic and foreign investment, although they 
are difficult to access for most Chinese investors, most notably for currency exchange reasons. 
A-shares, on the other hand, are only quoted in Chinese renminbi. Some companies have their 
stock listed on both the A-shares and B-shares market. Due to the limited access of Chinese 
investors to B-shares, stock of the same company often trades at much higher valuations on the 
A-shares market than on the B-shares market. Available at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/a-shares.asp#ixzz4oWJlLCab.  
483 “Zhongguo Zhengjianhui youguan fuzeren jiu youxiangu shidian da jizhe wen” （中国证监会
有关部门负责人就优先股试点答记者问）CSRC Head Q&A on Preferred Shares Pilot Program. 
CSRC, December 13, 2013, 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ztzl/zcjd/201406/t20140604_255431.html. 
484 See, CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively 
Moving Governing the Country According to the law Forward, October 28, 2014, 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-
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additional rules or regulations regarding different types of shares for a company to issue 
permitted shares under this law.485 Article 2 of PRC Security Law provided that “this law 
applies to stocks, bonds, any other state Council recognized security instruments...” 486 
The preferred share pilot project ended the traditional principle under Company Law 
was “equal share, equal rights.” This project was one step forward of the voting rule 
under the WFOE Law, EJV Law, and CJV Law, which adopted the unanimous voting rule 
for major corporate affairs. 487  As the previous chapter discussed, an LLC under China’s 
Company Law is similar to a limited partnership under U.S. corporate law.488 This new 
reform concerning preferred shares could be an important boost to China’s investment 
and equity market because it offers alternative financing tools to help investors develop 
modern corporate governance. In addition, to protect the minority shareholder’s rights 
under the pilot project, the project stipulated that “preferred stockholders gained the 
right to attend the shareholders’ meetings and the ability to vote together with 
                                               
concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-
according-to-the-law-forward/. 
485 Art. 132, PRC Company Law. 
486 Art. 2, PRC Company Law 
487 Art. 32, EJV Implementing Rule “The resolutions on the following matters shall be subject to 
unanimous adoption by the directors who attend the board meeting: 
(1) Amendment of the articles of association of the EJV; 
(2) Suspension or dissolution of the EJV; 
(3) Increase or decrease of the registered capital of the EJV; and 
(4) Merger or division of the EJV. 
The resolution on other matters may be made in accordance with the rules of procedure set 
forth in the articles of association of the EJV.” 
488 See chapter 3 on PRC Company Law. 
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common stockholders if, in three cumulative fiscal years or two consecutive fiscal years, 
the dividend payments owed to preferred stockholders were missed.” 489 
 
b. Shanghai Free Trade Zone experiment 
 
China’s traditional FDI registration and verification framework required foreign 
investors to study the Foreign Investment Catalogue first and then use the catalog as 
the reference to prepare administration permit from relevant government entities. The 
current FDI verification system requires a MOC verification and approval for a FIE 
project. Depends on the forms of the investment structure, the verification period can 
last from 30 days to 90 days.490 Taiwanese investors enjoy a special 45 days verification 
period for all types of investment projects.491 Thus, preparation works for establishing a 
FIE could last quite a long time even before the investor started the registration process. 
In response to the complaints from the investment communities and 3rd Plenary Session 
                                               
489  See article 11 of the Rule for Preferred Stocks. Also see article 10 “Preferred stockholders 
shall be entitled to attend the shareholders’ meeting and vote separately from common 
stockholders for the following items, each preferred stock has one voting right except for 
preferred stocks owned by the company itself: (1) Amendment of the articles of association of 
the issuing company about items in connection with preferred stocks; (2) Reduction of the 
registered capital of the issuing company up to more than 10% though one time or cumulatively; 
(3) Merger, split, or dissolution of the issuing company, or to change the legal form of the 
issuing company; (4) Issuance of preferred stocks; (5) Other items determined by the articles of 
association of the issuing company. he resolution of the above items needs the consent of two-
thirds of the common stockholders attending the shareholders’ meeting, in addition to the 
consent of two-thirds of the preferred stockholders attending the shareholders’ meeting.”  
490 Typically, EJV project generally requires 30 days verification, CJV project requires 45 days, and 
WFOE requires 90 days. See relevant discussion in previous chapters.  
491 See Taiwanese Investor Protection law in previous chapters.  
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of the18th National Congress of the CPC policy of promoting foreign investment and 
improving transparency and market access, China adopted Shanghai Free Trade Zone 
experiment. On August 30, 2013, Standing Committee of NPC adopted Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Administrative 
Examination and Approval on Authorizing the State Council to Temporarily Adjust 
Relevant Legal Provisions in the China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone [Hereinafter 
Adjustment of Law in SFZ], which officially started the SFZ experiment. 492  A few weeks 
later, State Council adopted Overall Plan for the China Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone 
[hereinafter SFZ Overall Plan] on September 18, 2013.493 
 
The main purpose of the SFZ was to streamline China’s complicated FDI 
regulatory framework by allowing certain FIE project register the business without prior 
administrative permission. According to the Adjustment of Law in SFZ, certain provisions 
under EJV, CJV, and WFOE Law and supplementing regulations would be suspended for 
                                               
492 Quanguo renmin daibiaodahui changwuweiyuanhui guanyu shouquan guowuyuan zai 
zhongguo shanghai ziyou maoyi shiyanqu zanshi tiaoheng youguan falv guiding de xingzheng 
shenpi de jueding (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于授权国务院在中国（上海）自由贸易
试验区暂时调整有关法律规定的行政审批的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress on the Administrative Examination and Approval on Authorizing the 
State Council to Temporarily Adjust Relevant Legal Provisions in the China (Shanghai) Free Trade 
Zone] adopted by Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on August 30, 2013.  
493 Zhongguo Shanghai ziyou maoyi shiyanqu zongti fangan (中国上海自由贸易试验区总体方
案) [Overall Plan for the China Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone] adopted by State Council on 
September 18, 2013.  
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3 years.494  Based on the Adjustment of the Law in SFZ, the FIE would obtain national 
treatment under this reform. In addition, the SFZ reform removed various additional 
review and approval process for foreign investors’ business. Traditionally, government 
agencies must approve the establishment or major changes in corporate finance or 
contract disputes between the investors in JVs. The SFZ experiment removed such 
cumbersome mechanism by implementing the new “record filing” mechanism.495 
Essentially, this was a form of public disclosure, a common form of regulatory 
mechanism in a market economy. This public disclosure mechanism allowed investors to 
file a public record with the agency for any major changes in the company business. The 
beneficial policies apply to FIEs not on the “negative list.”  
Figure 3. Old verification and approval mechanism.  
 
 
                                               
494 “it has been decided at the fourth session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National 
People's Congress that the State Council is authorized to temporarily adjust relevant 
administrative examination and approval items (see Appendix hereto for the list) prescribed 
under the Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, the Law 
of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures and the Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures that are applicable to 
foreign investments other than those subject to special market entry management measures of 
the State within the China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone” see: Overall Plan for the China Shanghai 
Pilot Free Trade Zone.  
495 The suspended the laws listed here: 
1. Art. 6, Art. 10, Art. 20, WFOE Law 
2. Art. 3, Art. 13, 14 EJV Law 
3. Art. 5, 7, 10, 12, 24 CJV Law   
Domestic 
Investor 
Registration Business !
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Under traditional FDI regulatory framework, the foreign investor must obtain a permit for the 
project. In the course of the business, major changes in JV contract or changes of registered 
capital also require permits from government authority.496  
Figure 4. SFZ verification and approval mechanism.  
 
Under the new FDI mechanism, any investment project not on the “negative list” can enjoy the 
national treatment, which means the investors can be exempt from the verification process. The 
investor can file record to the agency for registration.  
 
State Council SFZ Overall Plan offered an overview of the proposed FDI 
regulatory reform plan. It proposed to further open financial service, shipping sector, 
and consulting sectors by promoting open market access, and the rule of law.497 With 
                                               
496 Relevant permit restrictions can check previous chapters.  
497 “accelerating the transformation of government functions; actively promoting further 
liberalization of the service sector and the reform of the foreign investment management 
system; vigorously developing headquarters economy and new trade patterns; quickening the 
exploration of capital account convertibility and full liberalization of the financial services 
industry; exploring the establishment of a classified regulatory model based on cargo status; 
striving to create a policy support system promoting investment and innovation; exerting efforts 
to foster an internationalized business environment emphasizing the rule of law; and striving to 
build the FTZ into a world-class pilot free trade zone boasting investment and trade facilitation, 
free currency exchange, efficient and convenient regulation and a sound legal environment, so 
that the FTZ can be used to explore new ideas and channels for China to expand opening-up and 
deepen reform, and be relied upon to better serve national development.” See SFZ Overall Plan 
Foreign 
Investor 
Permit? Registration Business !
Investment  
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Registration Business !
232 
 
the progress of the reform, the SFZ experiment expanded to Tianjin and Guangdong in 
2015.498 The Tianjin, Guangdong, and Fujian Free Trade Zone. There were few 
noticeable differences between the 2015 FTZ and 2013 SFZ. First, the 2015 FTZ 
experiment acknowledged the interest of Taiwanese investors, which were not duly 
represented by the SFZ experiment.499 Since Taiwanese investors have not been 
categorized as a foreign investor for obvious reasons, the 2015 FTZ particularly 
highlighted that certain verification rules under Taiwanese Investor Protection would be 
suspended under the 2015 FTZ experiment.500 Second, the main task of 2015 FTZ 
emphasized the part of promoting the rule of law by creating advanced investment legal 
environment. It asked for public participation in the legislation process. In addition, it 
encouraged private professionals in participating legislation process for a better 
lawmaking.501  
 
The FTZ experiment started in 2013 and ended in 2016. It expanded to western 
regions in China between 2014 and 2015. It was a success for the foreign investors and 
                                               
498 See Notice of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the "Overall Plan for the China 
(Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone" and Notice of the State Council on Printing and Distributing 
the "Overall Plan for the China (Tianjin) Pilot Free Trade Zone," adopted by State Council on 
April 8, 2015.     
499 See previous chapters on Taiwanese investor protection.  
500 See NPC Standing Committee Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on Authorizing the State Council to Temporarily Adjust Relevant Administrative 
Examination and Approval Items Prescribed by Pertinent Laws in the China (Guangdong) Pilot 
Free Trade Zone, the China (Tianjin) Pilot Free Trade Zone, the China (Fujian) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone and the Expanded Areas of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone.  
501 For example, see Notice of the State Council on Printing and Distributing the "Overall Plan for 
the China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone."     
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policymakers. The Standing Committee of 12th National People’s Congress adopted 
these reform measures by promulgating Decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress on Revising the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Foreign-invested Enterprises and Other Three Laws on September 3, 2016. This 
legislation affirmed that all relevant verification and approval process would be 
removed if the FIE project not on the “negative list” of the regulation.502 Under the 
“negative list” mechanism, the process of establishing FIE mirror to domestic firms. For 
example, the Shenzhen government illustrated the registration process as the follows:  
 
Figure 4. New FDI registration process under Shenzhen local rules.  
 
Figure 5. required documents for FIE registration under Shenzhen local rules 
                                               
502 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Revising the Law of 
the People's Republic of China on Foreign-invested Enterprises and Other Three Laws （全国人
民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国外资企业法》等四部法律的决定 ）
adopted by Standing Committee of National People’s Congress on September 3, 2016. For 
example: A new article shall be added as Article 23, which shall read: "Where the establishment 
of a foreign-invested enterprise does not involve the special market entry management 
measures prescribed by the State, the examination and approval matters prescribed by Article 6, 
Article 10 and Article 20 herein shall be subject to administration by record-filing. Special market 
entry management measures stipulated by the State shall be promulgated by the State Council 
or promulgated upon approval by the State Council." 
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The negative list is a new generation of the catalog. Any industry outside of the 
“negative list” can be treated as a domestic investor. However, investment involved 
certain industry may require Nation Security Review, some M&A and Shareholding 
investment require traditional Antitrust Review. For example, the 2017 Negative list 
require foreign investor in internet news service sector must approve by National 
Security Review.  
 
c. National security review  
Although the new reform measures removed complex verification process for 
the foreign investor, this does not exempt them from a new form of reviewing process. 
On February 12, 2011, the State Council announced national security review (NSR). It 
formally set up the rules on the scope, content, mechanism, and procedures of the NSR 
in enforcing relevant articles of Anti-Monopoly Law. These rules will operate in parallel 
with the AML's anti-monopoly merger review provisions (AML Merger Review).503  The 
                                               
503 On February 12, 2011 the State Council of China announced that China would institute a new 
national security review (NSR) regime applicable to a proposed foreign investment in, or 
acquisition of, a domestic Chinese enterprise. It did this by publicly announcing a Circular 
(adopted on 3 February 2011) which formally implements certain articles of China's Anti-
receipt of the 
corporate name 
reservation 
approval of name 
reservation
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NSR framework designed to assess concerns raised by a proposed M&A transaction. A 
special panel formed by NDRC and MOFCOM would review and assess the 
transaction.504 The panel could make a request ask the foreign investor to provide a 
written explanation to explain why such project should be allowed under NSR.505  
 
The NSR Review defined the scope of the review, which including two scenarios:  
1. M&A between certain Chinese firms and foreign investors506 
2. Foreign Investor become the actual controlling shareholder of the firm507 
The companies mentioned by above quotations include:  
• domestic enterprises that engage, or are involved, in military industry, are 
located close to a military site that is key or sensitive, or any other entities 
related to defense and national security. 
• key domestic market players in certain industries or sectors (such as agriculture, 
energy, and resources, infrastructure, transportation, technology, and 
                                               
Monopoly Law (AML) and sets out rules on the scope, content, mechanism and procedures of 
the NSR. These rules will operate in parallel with the AML's anti-monopoly merger review 
provisions (AML Merger Review) Lucas Xu, Hannah CL Ha, Timothy J Keeler and Michael A 
Wallin, Mayer Brown, “China's new M&A review rules: a comparison with the US,” THOMSON 
REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW, March 1, 2011,  https://content.next.westlaw.com/6-505-
9049?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&__lrTS=20170503180652541&firstPage
=true&bhcp=1.  
504 See （国务院办公厅关于建立外国投资者并购境内企业安全审查制度的通知）[Notice of 
the General Office of the State Council on Launching the Security Review System for Mergers 
and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] adopted by State Council on 
February 3, 2011. [hereinafter NSR Review] 
505 See NSR Review 
506 Art. 1 (2) NSR Review 
507 Art. 1(3) NSR Review 
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manufacturing) but only if the transaction may affect the interests of Chinese 
national security; and that as a result of the transaction, the foreign purchaser 
would obtain control of the new entities. 508 
The NSR review further defined what constituted as control:  
• a foreign investor, together with its parents and subsidiaries, or several foreign 
investors together, obtaining ownership of 50% or more of the share capital of 
the relevant Chinese enterprise as a result of the transaction; 
• a foreign investor, holding voting rights (though less than 50%) that are sufficient 
to exercise a major influence on corporate decisions; or 
• taking actual control over decision-making, finance, human resource or 
technology of domestic enterprise through any other means. 
 
Figure 6. NSR Review Process.  
                                               
508 Lucas Xu, Hannah CL Ha, Timothy J Keeler and Michael A Wallin, Mayer Brown, “China's new 
M&A review rules: a comparison with the US,” THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW, March 1, 
2011,  https://content.next.westlaw.com/6-505-
9049?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&__lrTS=20170503180652541&firstPage
=true&bhcp=1.  
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The NSR review is a substance review, which concerned the effect of M&A on 
economic stability, national security, and social services, and impacts on key technology 
development. According to the NSR Review, the process of review involved several 
stages. First, the M&A investors must apply for NSR review through MOC. The MOC 
then forward the application to the review panel. The panel would forward the 
application to relevant department within five days. These departments provide written 
recommendations to the panel within 20 days. Upon receiving opinions from relevant 
department, the panel would issue opinions within five days for approval or disapproval. 
A special investigation process would be initiated within five days since the disapproval 
opinion. The panel must investigate within 60 days. State Council would make the final 
Application for Review
Panel forward 
application to 
relevant departments 
(5 days)
department review (5 
days) 
special investigation 
(60 days)
decision 
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decision when the panel cannot reach an agreement.509  The problem with this NSR 
review system was the lack of clear dispute resolution process. The review detailed the 
process of the review and application procedure without mention to any complaints 
mechanism, which means there is no remedy provided under NSR to address such 
concern.  
 
3. Challenges to FDI framework 
a. Outflow of the capital  
In 2014, China’s foreign exchange reserves “fell by $100bn in the third quarter, 
which was the largest drop ever, despite a trade surplus and foreign direct investment 
inflows. China had registered a $51 billion outflow beyond the current account in the 
second quarter.”510 “The reserve shrinking $323 billion in four months during 2006 
before the PBOC sold dollars to limit declines in the yuan. The number declined to $3.17 
trillion in September 2006.”511 “The problem has only worsened in 2016,” as Bloomberg 
reported, “it was estimated that outflows would total more than $900 billion this year, 
despite new restrictions on yuan movements, including prohibitions on using credit and 
                                               
509 Art. 4 (3) NSR Review.  
510 See, Henny Sender, “China’s anti-corruption push may drive wealthy overseass,” Financial 
Times, November 11, 2014, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/cb9308f2-
6983-11e4-8f4f-00144feabdc0. Also see , “Xi Jingping's Power-play Leaves Chinese economy  
Exposed,” Forbes, January 17, 2015, accessed July 22, 2017, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellingenheld/2015/02/17/xi-jingpings-power-pla.   
511 “Goldman Warns China’s Outflows May Be Worse Than They Look,” Bloomberg, October 10, 
2016, accessed July 31, 2017,  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-
10/goldman-warns-china-capital-outflows-may-be-worse-than-they-look .  
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debit cards to pay for insurance products in Hong Kong.”512 Chinese media have 
categorized the outflow of the capital as “capital flight” (资本外逃 pinyin: Ziben 
Waitao): as refugee escaped from a war zone, the term capital flight captured an 
undesired economic reality, which awkwardly in juxtaposition to China’s pledge for 
economic leadership and Yuan internationalization. 513 
 
The free flow of capital presented an increasing tension between Chinese 
authority’s political interest of maintaining a stable economic development and the 
reality of globalization. China tried to maintain a desired economic growth by caging the 
“freedom of the contract.” This form of thinking followed the traditional pattern of 
centralization, a familiar form of regulation in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the 
effectiveness and impact of this strategy have consistently been challenged by the 
decentralized global economic reality. The new globalization reality required the 
                                               
512 see Christopher Balding, “Why China Can't Stop Capital Outflows,” Bloomberg, December 5, 
2016, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-06/why-
china-can-t-stop-capital-outflows.   
513 “Capital outflows began gathering steam in 2012, when the government liberalized current-
account payment transactions in goods and services. Enterprising Chinese figured out that while 
they couldn't officially move money abroad to buy a house via the capital account -- individuals 
are barred from moving more than $50,000 out of the country each year -- they could create 
false trade invoices that would allow them to deposit money where they needed it. The result 
was a huge discrepancy between payments recorded for imports and the declared value of 
goods passing through customs, amounting to $526 billion in hidden outflows last year.” 
“significant part of the new capital is likely to find its way abroad through mis-invoicing in 
international trade, smuggling, and other channels of capital flight since the people who are 
creating the new capital have strong incentives to diversify domestic risks and to seek better 
protection of property rights.” See Ibid.  Also see Geng Xiao, People’s Republic of China’s Round-
Tripping: FDI: Scale, Causes and Implications (Mandaluyong: Asian Development Bank, 2004), 
accessed July 31, 2017,  http://hdl.handle.net/11540/3595.  
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application of new forms of soft regulations or smart regulations to manage, guide and 
facilitate freedom of contract, rather than mechanically restrict it. This section would 
exclusively discuss the conventional foreign investment regulations and challenges it 
faces.  
 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate that conventional regulation has 
difficulty in successfully manage and channel market resource into a more reasonable 
and beneficial space for the betterment of everyone in the case of managing free flow 
of capital, which also offers a sharp contrast with the new regulatory approach that 
would be discussed in the next section. First, it will introduce the development of return 
investment scheme under Chinese foreign investment regime: how investor use special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) to conceal the identity of the true controller in order to bypass 
Chinese foreign investment regulations. Second, it will discuss the issue of corruption 
under central authority’s foreign investment framework. Third, it will conclude that 
these restrictive regulations created a self-fulling that affected China’s economic 
modernization. The next section will focus on the opportunity of China’s FDI framework 
and new regulatory measures and soft law regulation through the case of “wechat 
economy.”  
 
The outflow of capital can be categorized into three scenarios based on the 
purpose of the capital. First: liquidate Chinese investment for cashing profits or 
minimize investment losses. Second, outbound investment; the holder of the capital 
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transfer funds overseas for an investment project. Third, return investment (round-trip 
investment).514 It is a subcategory of the outbound investment. Under return 
investment scheme, outbound investment project is an intermediary for capital to come 
back to China. The investor transfers funds overseas for creating an overseas entity 
(commonly known as Special Purpose Vehicle). The overseas entity will be a foreign 
investor investing Chinese projects. In this process, foreign entity served as a strawman 
for the convenience of domestic investment. This happens either because of poor 
domestic PE market requiring offshore financing, or preferential tax policy favoring 
foreign investors. The second and third scenarios require the application of an overseas 
entity. To engage in ODI or return investment, the investor must establish a special 
purpose entity (SPE) or special purpose vehicle (SPV).     
  Special Purpose Entities (SPE) or Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is a legal creation 
designed to circumvent China’s security and foreign exchange control, and FDI 
framework by concealing the identity of the actual beneficiary or actual controller of the 
investment activity.515 There are five main reasons for a company to apply SPV. As the 
following indicates:  
                                               
514 Bian Yongmin, “A Revisit to China’s Foreign Investment Law: With Special Reference to 
Foreign Investment Protection,” Journal of East Asia & International Law 8, no. 2 (2015): 447-
448. 
515 “Chinese shareholders often set up offshore SPVs as a means of financing existing Chinese 
businesses, allowing them to gain the benefit of certain tax and foreign exchange preferences 
only available to foreign investors.” See, “Chinese offshore special purpose vehicles,” Out-
Law.com February, 2013, https://www.out-law.com/en/topics/projects--construction/projects-
and-procurement/chinese-offshore-special-purpose-vehicles/.  
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1. Strict rules by CSRC on public offering make it impossible to be listed in the 
domestic stock market. SPV is applied for domestic company to be listed in a 
foreign market;  
2. Strict rules by CSRC, SAFE, and NDRC on overseas financing make it impossible to 
be listed overseas stock market. SPV is applied for domestic market directly 
obtain funds from private investors.  
3. A Foreign investor cannot invest in restricted industry. SPV is applied for 
concealing foreign investor’s identity.  
4. Domestic firm intent to enjoy the special privilege of a foreign investor. SPV is 
applied for concealing the true controller of the business.  
5. Money laundry, tax evasion or conceal the identity of the company. SPV is 
applied for concealing the actual controller of the business.  
 
Figure 7. SPV legal structure explain. Domestic firm overseas IPO.   
 
Under this model, the domestic firm A wishes to be listed in a foreign stock market 
because it cannot meet the minimum standard under Chinese IPO regulations. (many 
internet companies cannot meet this standard) a Variable Interest Entities (VIE) was 
created to resolve this problem. The SPV B would be established in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Domestic 
A
SPV B 
(offshore 
company)
A & B 
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The SPV B would enter into a private agreement with A that agrees all equity and 
security of the A would be transferred to B. Although SPV B is listed in a foreign 
jurisdiction, A is the actual firm operate in reality.  
 
Figure 8. SPV legal structure explain. Domestic firm offshore financing.  
 
Under this VIE scheme, domestic A operated in a restrictive industry that prohibits 
foreign investments (internet company). Domestic A would form SPV B in a foreign 
jurisdiction. SPV B establishes WFOE C in China. C and A would enter into private 
agreement to transfer all equity and security from A to C. Thus, B became the actual 
owner of the A through the private agreement between A and C.  
 
Figure 9. SPV legal structure explain. Domestic firm tax evasion. 
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Under this SPV scheme, a foreign entity B would be established by A. A and B entered 
into an international trade agreement for sale of goods at an extremely low price. B 
would sell the goods to international market with high profit. In this process, firm A 
avoided high tax.  
 
The above diagrams illustrate the application of SPV in bypassing China’s 
investment regulations. The first two examples relate to China’s strict PE market 
regulations and foreign exchange control. It is important to note that, China’s foreign 
exchange control policy seems disconnected with the rhetoric expressed by Chinese 
reform agenda.  Foreign exchange control designed to maintain payment of balance 
strictly. It was recorded that the central authority would take intrusive and disruptive 
measures to insulate Chinese foreign exchange reserve from the demands of the 
market. Such practice created an unpredictable foreign exchange regulatory framework 
for foreign investors. For example, investment community complained that State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) would issue regulations require the bank to 
process transactions involving foreign exchange for trading company only if the buyer 
deposit equivalent amount of RMB to the bank. Or WFOE could not distribute stock 
dividends in foreign exchange because Chinese authority wants to maintain annual 
payment of balance.  
 
The above diagram illustrates domestic firms’ aggressive offshore financing 
practice. The domestic firm would establish an SPV for debt financing. The second step 
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for SPV offshore financing would bring the money back to China, which is commonly 
known as return investment or round-trip investment. Return investment or round-trip 
investment is an important part of the foreign investment, although some would argue 
this is a pseudo foreign investment because the actual investor is not a foreign-born 
citizen. 516This study defined return investment as a domestic investor, Chinese investor 
or domestic Chinese investor registered domestic firms transfer assets, in the form of 
capital or equity, to an oversea entity. Such entity would then engage foreign direct 
investment in China. Another form of return investment refers to reverse merger and 
acquisition between a domestic firm and foreign entity.  Normally return investment 
requires direct control of multiple levels of shell companies with affiliated transactions. 
Through these shell companies (registered in tax haven: BVI, Cayman island), the actual 
owner is normally a Chinese investor.  The most common reason for return investment 
was offshore financing. Another reason for return investment was to obtain the 
privileges and benefits of a foreign investor. Foreign investor enjoys certain preferential 
treatments that a domestic firm cannot have. Private sectors have been discriminated in 
the area of tax, land use fees, and public utility fees. Return investment transformed a 
domestic firm into a foreign firm, which opened a gate to various “privileges” to 
domestic firms. Interestingly, Chinese scholar support to punish return investment for 
the reason of disrupt government plan.  
                                               
516 “The World Bank 2002 studies showed the scale of China’s round tripping investment could 
be as high as a quarter of the total FDI inflows into PRC, Geng Xiao’s study later indicated the 
percentage might be higher with a range of 30%-50%. ”Geng Xiao, People’s Republic of China’s 
Round-Tripping: FDI: Scale, Causes and Implications (Mandaluyong: Asian Development Bank, 
2004), accessed July 31, 2017,  http://hdl.handle.net/11540/3595. 
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  Although some voices in mainland criticized return investment by emphasizing it 
is a dishonest act deceived government, Geng Xiao offered different opinions: first, 
round tripping investment created revenues for investors and jobs for China. Second, 
part of return investment was a reasonable market behavior in reaction to China’s 
inadequate PE market and property right system. 517 This study holds the same position 
with Geng for the following reasons. First, the Chinese government has a legitimate 
interest and constitutional obligation to create investment policy that it sees fit to the 
socio-economic development and China’s reality. To that end, the Chinese government 
can pick and choice preferential policy for one group over another. However, such pick 
and choice is reciprocal, which means the investor has a legitimate interest and financial 
obligation to make the best possible business decision based on the market condition. 
The investors have no obligation to promote political agenda of the central authority.  
Since private sectors are not designated beneficiary of central authority’s policy, there is 
no contractual or legal obligation for them to avoid legally acceptable solutions in 
making a business decision.       
 
One direct consequence of the return investment is the outflow of the capital. 
Thus, strict foreign exchange control has been adopted to curtail the outflow of the 
                                               
517 Lucas Xu, Hannah CL Ha, Timothy J Keeler and Michael A Wallin, Mayer Brown, “China's new 
M&A review rules: a comparison with the US,” THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW, March 1, 
2011,  https://content.next.westlaw.com/6-505-
9049?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&__lrTS=20170503180652541&firstPage
=true&bhcp=1. 
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capital.518 China’s current foreign exchange framework is quite massive and 
complicated. Depends on the target of the regulation, it can be categorized as 
regulation concerning banks, regulations concerning individuals, or regulations 
concerning business entities. According to the Catalogue of Current Effective Foreign 
Exchange Laws and Decrees,519 by the end of December 31, 2016, 209 foreign exchange 
related regulations and rules issued by SAFE were effective. 520 The Administrative 
Measures for Personal Foreign Exchange and its Implementing Rules and Regulations of 
the People's Republic of China were two important administrative regulations 
concerning the purchase and sale of foreign exchange by Chinese individuals. The 2007 
Individual Foreign Exchange Implementing Regulation formerly established the annual 
                                               
518 “China's new restrictions on outbound investments and remittance,” Allen & Overy, 
December 30, 2016, http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Chinas-new-
restrictions-on-outbound-investments-and-remittance.aspx.  
519 “Xianxing youxiao waihui guanli zhuyao fagui mulu,” (现行有效外汇管理主要法规目录) 
[Catalogue of Current Effective Foreign Exchange Laws and Decrees], SAFE, December 31, 2016,  
see 
http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/wcm/connect/97d532004004cf9e848c94bf3842e0e1/%E7%8E%B
0%E8%A1%8C%E6%9C%89%E6%95%88%E5%A4%96%E6%B1%87%E7%AE%A1%E7%90%86%E4
%B8%BB%E8%A6%81%E6%B3%95%E8%A7%84%E7%9B%AE%E5%BD%95%EF%BC%88%E6%88%
AA%E8%87%B32016%E5%B9%B412%E6%9C%8831%E6%97%A5%EF%BC%89.pdf?MOD=AJPERE
S&CACHEID=97d532004004cf9e848c94bf3842e0e1 
520 List of effective Foreign exchange control regulations based on category: 
1. General regulations, 20 
2. Current account (23) 
3. Capital account (76)  
4. Financial Institute and foreign exchange business regulation (40) 
5. RMB Currency and foreign exchange market (19)  
6. Balance-of-Payments statistical declarations (12)  
7. Inspection and rule application (11)  
8. Management and technology (8)   
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individual foreign exchange purchase quota. 521 The article 2 provided that: 
“Administration of the annual total amount shall apply to the settlement of personal 
foreign exchange and domestic purchase of personal foreign exchange. The annual total 
amount is the equivalent of USD50,000 per capita per year. 522The State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange may adjust the annual total amount based on the balance of 
payments.”523 Although China’s Household Income per Capita increased from 1960 
dollars to 4805 dollars in 2013, this quota has never changed since 2007. 524 
 
On January 24, 2005, SAFE adopted Notice of the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange on Relevant Issues on Perfecting Administration of Foreign Exchange Relating 
to Merger and Acquisition with Foreign Funds [hereinafter SAFE No. 11 Notice], which 
formerly blocked the free movement of capital through government oversight on 
overseas M&A. 525 On November 19, 2009, SAFE issued Notice of the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the Administration of the 
Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale [hereinafter 2009 Notice]. 
                                               
521 Geren waihui guanli banfa shishi xize(个人外汇管理办法实施细则) Implementing Rules of 
the Administrative Measures for Personal Foreign Exchange, adopted by SAFE on January 5, 
2007.  
522 Ibid.   
523 Ibid.   
524 See: CEIC, “China Household Income per Capita 1985 - 2013,” accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/china/annual-household-income-per-capita.  
525 Guojia waihui guanliju guanyu wanshan waizi binggou waihui guanli wenti de tongzhi (国家外
汇管理局关于完善外资并购外汇管理有关问题的通知) [Notice of the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange on Relevant Issues on Perfecting Administration of Foreign Exchange Relating 
to Merger and Acquisition with Foreign Funds ] adopted by SAFE on January 24, 2005.   
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526The main purpose of the 2009 Notice was to assist financial institution further 
implement foreign exchange quota control by defining some techniques applied in 
foreign exchange quota evasion. 2009 Notice provided a detailed description on what 
considered as “irregular transaction” triggered the suspicion of foreign exchange quota 
evasion.527 For example:  
1. Same foreign institute or individual transfers foreign exchange to 5 different 
individuals or above in mainland on the same day, every other day or on a 
consecutive day basis. 
2. Five individuals or above purchase foreign exchanges in the mainland at the 
same day, every other day or on a consecutive basis, transfer foreign exchange 
to a same individual or institute.  
3. Individual withdraws the amount of foreign exchange through five different 
times within 7 days from the same bank account in the mainland, and the total 
of the withdraw equal to or close to 10,000 dollars. Alternatively, five or more 
                                               
526 The 2009 Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the 
Administration of the Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale (国家外汇管
理局关于进一步完善个人结售汇业务管理的通知). Available at:  
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:DDX7qaY8GUsJ:rmyh.zunyi.gov.cn/jr
fg/201507/W020150717721146845444.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us 
527 The 2009 Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the 
Administration of the Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale (国家外汇管
理局关于进一步完善个人结售汇业务管理的通知). Available at:  
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:DDX7qaY8GUsJ:rmyh.zunyi.gov.cn/jr
fg/201507/W020150717721146845444.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us 
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individual purchase foreign exchange about 5000 dollars within the same day 
from the same bank.  
4. One individual transfers funds from the bank account to five or more direct 
relatives. Such relatives would then purchase and transfer foreign exchange to 
such individual within the same year.    
 
If the buyer of the foreign exchange or recipient of the foreign exchange meets any of 
the conditions listed above, the bank would require the customer provides details 
documents and papers showing the purpose of foreign exchange.528   
 
Chinese individuals have been prohibited from purchasing investment 
instruments or foreign property, such as real estate, stocks or insurance. A large amount 
of foreign exchange control concerned capital account regulations. The punishments 
normally including a 2-year ban from buying foreign exchange, 30% penalty on the 
amount of foreign exchange involved in the transaction. 529 The market was not 
impressed by these new measures, as one buyer told the news media “any transaction 
below 10 million dollars” would not be substantially prevented by these measures. 
Reasons for individual buyers’ need for foreign exchange includes investment, 
                                               
528 BBC, “Yingmei: renminbi guojihua-dachao huilu,” (英媒：人民币国际化——大潮回落) 
[British media: Yuan Internationalization—the Up and Downs ] BBC Zhongwen, December 12, 
2016, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/press-review-38287689.  
529 Gabriel Wildau, Liu xinyu, Zhangqi, “中国人不在意购汇新规 ,” [Chinese ignoring New 
Foreign Exchange Measures] FT China, January 4, 2017, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001070844.  
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education, and traveling. For example, some individual buyer may wish to purchase 
foreign assets as a form of long-term investment when Chinese market is less profitable. 
530 
    
In order to further managing the negative impact and reduce the risk of the 
inflow and outflow of the foreign exchange, the SAFE issued 2016 Notice of the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the Administration of the 
Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale [hereinafter 2016 Notice] 
with new countermeasures.531 According to the 2016 Notice, individual foreign 
exchange business such as settlement and purchases of foreign exchange must be 
handled through “individual foreign exchange business monitoring system” by the 
qualified banks. 532 Such bank must forward full and accurate transaction information to 
authority promptly.  Any irregular transactions suspected of foreign exchange quota 
evasion would trigger a “watch list” warning.533 The bank would issue a “Risk Reminder 
                                               
530 Ibid.   
531 2016 Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the 
Administration of the Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale (国家外汇管
理局关于进一步完善个人结售汇业务管理的通知), December 31， 2015 adopted by SAFE, 
accessed July 31, 
http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gPZxdnX293
QwN_f0tXA08zR9PgYGd3Yx8fE_2CbEdFAM9sw9Y!/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/conn
ect/safe_web_store/state+administration+of+foreign+exchange/rules+and+regulations/19f518
804b4b7d33b1abf5196274af30 
532 Art.1 2016 Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Improving the 
Administration of the Business of Individual Foreign Exchange Settlement and Sale.  
533 Foreign exchange authorities will issue the Risk Reminder Notification for Individual Foreign 
Exchange Business as a risk reminder to individuals who lend their quota to another individual 
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Notification” as a warning for the first time. When it happened again, the recipient of 
the notice will be placed on a “watch list.”534 The foreign exchange buyer (individual) 
would be required to present identification card and other papers showing the 
legitimate reason for buying foreign exchange for three consecutive years. 535  
 
Figure 10. Forms of foreign exchange quota evasion. 
 
                                               
for the evasion of quota and authenticity management. If this happens again, these individuals 
will be put on a watch list by foreign exchange authorities. See 1 (1) 2016 Notice. 
534Foreign exchange authorities will put individuals who borrow another individual's quota for 
the evasion of quota and authenticity management on a watch list and notify them through the 
Notification on Watch List for Individual Foreign Exchange Business issued by banks. See 1(2) 
2016 Notice.  
535 “The watch period of an individual on a watch list is the year the individual is put on the 
watch list and the two consecutive years that follow. During this period, the individual has to 
present his/her valid ID card and evidencing materials indicating the trading amount to go 
through procedures for settlement and sales of foreign exchange for individuals. Banks shall 
review relevant evidencing materials in strict accordance with the authenticity review 
principles.” See 1 (3) 2016 Notice.   
Conspiracy with relatives and friends 
oWhen one individual's foreign exchange quota used up, the buyer can borrow 
quota from friends or relatives. 
HK bank account 
oChinese buyer opens HK bank account with RMB then obtain foreign exchange 
through HK bank. 
FIE 
oA foreign FIE obtains foreign exchange from overseas, then privately sell sthe 
foreign exchange to Chinese buyer. 
Virtual currency 
o Foreign exchange buyer uses RMB purchase virtual currency, such as Bitcoin. 
Bitcoin will be the intermediary to obtain foreign exchange. 
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The World Bank 2002 studies showed the scale of China’s round tripping investment could be as 
high as a quarter of the total FDI inflows into PRC, Geng Xiao’s study later indicated the 
percentage might be higher with a range of 30%-50%.536 
 
The above chart lists four most common forms of foreign exchange evasions. 
Although an individual is restricted for only $50,000 annual foreign exchange quota, 
such individual can conspire with his or her friends and families by ‘borrowing’ their 
quotas. The HK bank account scheme requires gray financial institute. HK Bank 
regulation restrict the applicant of bank account to HK resident. Thus, a local 
underground Institute would open a bank account in China to accept RMB cash. Such 
Institute would then transfer equivalent dollars to Chinese individual’s mainland bank 
account. The third method involves a FIE selling foreign exchange to the individual. The 
last scheme requires individual to turn one commodity into currency. As many reports 
indicate, the skyrocketing of virtual currency value relates to China’s foreign exchange 
control. 537 
 
Disregard the effectiveness of these measures; it already produced undesired 
negative effects on China’s investment market. The first victim of these actions was 
China’s FDI market and economy. The latest data shows, “foreign direct investment 
                                               
536 "Geng Xiao, People’s Republic of China’s Round-Tripping: FDI: Scale, Causes and Implications 
(Mandaluyong: Asian Development Bank, 2004), accessed July 31, 2017,  
http://hdl.handle.net/11540/3595. 
537 Gabriel Wildau,“Chinese regulators have taken steps to ensure bitcoin is not used to facilitate 
capital flight, even as investors in the cryptocurrency say they doubt it is being used to transfer 
large amounts of cash out of China.” Financial Times, January 10, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/bad16a88-d6fd-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e.  
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(FDI) into the Chinese mainland dropped 1.2 percent year on year in the first seven 
months to 485.42 billion yuan ($72.79 billion), In the first seven months, 17,703 new 
foreign-funded companies were established, up 12 percent year on year.” 538 “ Non-
financial outbound direct investment (ODI) by Chinese companies dropped 44.3 percent 
year on year in the first seven months to $57.2 billion, mainly due to government 
measures to curb irrational investment. Outbound investment in real estate, culture, 
sports, and entertainment sectors saw substantial declines during the period, the 
ministry said.” 539 
 
In fact, China’s countermeasures against capital outflow presented a self-
fulfilling quagmire. The stronger the reaction by the authority, the weaker Chinese 
economy perceived from the outside. These measures have been sending wrong signals 
about the Chinese market, which might defeat investors’ interest and confidence. In 
return, the decline in investors might cause politicians to take more extreme measures. 
Thus, it has become a self-fulfilling nightmare: the market fluctuation causes political 
intervention, the intervention sends a wrong signal about the market, which causes the 
decline of investment. The decline of investment would justify more interventions by 
the government. More importantly, these measures suggest a form of thinking that the 
freedom of contract or freedom of the will belong to a “superior group” in the power 
structure. The superior group must maintain the order and law by restricting the 
                                               
538 Xinhua, “China FDI falls 1.2%, ODI down 44.3%,” August 16, 2017, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2017-08/16/content_30672704.htm.  
539 Ibid.   
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“freedom of the contract “because such freedom cannot produce desired outcomes 
that defined by such group.  
 
Figure 11. The paradox of China’s foreign exchange control.  
  
 
 
Chapter 3 explained Chinese State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) policy paradox: the more 
preferential policy for SOE sector, the poorer the performance. The poor performance 
requires more policy supports, which lead to a self-fulling loop. The same paradox 
applies to China’s foreign exchange control. China’s obsession with the payment of 
balance put great pressure on China’s currency policy. This means China have to rely on 
the value of dollars by anchoring the value of Yuan on dollars. The only solution for 
China’s currency independence requires Yuan’s Internationalization. This means China 
Yuan Independency 
(internationalization)
Free flow of capital
imbalance in payment 
of balance 
foreign exchange 
control 
No Yuan 
Internatioanlization
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needs to promote an open and robust market with free flow of the capitals. The free 
flow of the capitals would result in capital outflow, which led to the beginning of the 
loop that requires payment of balance.  
 
 The short-term solution to foreign exchange control might create more 
problems than solutions in this self-fulfilling quagmire. Although the authority has 
legitimate interest and obligation in maintaining a sustainable and balanced investment 
environment without illegal and unethical transactions, the reactions by the authority to 
the outflow capital created a self-fulfilling prophecy of the unstable economy without 
properly addressing the true motivations caused the capital flight. In response to the 
outflow of capital, the authority enforced stricter rules to pressure the investors and 
banks. For example, in order to prevent outflow of capital, Chinese authority restricted 
China’s outbound investment, offshore financing, and payment of trade by foreign 
investors.540  
                                               
540 For example, “In other words, balance wasn't achieved by increasing exports or investment 
into China, but rather by preventing Chinese from buying from and investing in the rest of the 
world. Some of the government's restrictions on currency-exchange transactions-- such as 
cracking down on fake trade data and overpayments for imports -- were justified and sensible. 
But others were more dubious and have led to significant distortions.”  
“Last week, the government added yet another restriction. It announced that all international 
capital-account transactions of more than $5 million will need to be approved by the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange. This has businesses deeply concerned, given that the 
administration likely doesn't have the manpower for the sheer number of transactions it will 
need to review. And if such restrictions can be placed on the capital account, it seems only a 
matter of time until they're imposed on goods and services transactions.” see Christopher 
Balding, “China Finally Halts Outflows. Now What?” Bloomberg, accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-10/china-finally-stems-capital-outflows-
now-what. 
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The outflow of capital is a sensitive issue for Chinese policymaker due to 
economic and political reasons. A free movement of capital is a sign of modern 
economic power because it shows confident of a robust and healthy investment market. 
China’s uncomfortable position with the outflow of the capital shows the gap between 
China and world-class capital institutions. However, China does have a legitimate 
interest in maintaining a stable and ordered economy. The economic and political 
implication of the outflow of capital makes this task harder than it sounds. There are 
sufficient economic reasons to support China's concern for outflow of capital. This 
negative impact can be explained by the following: when an investor sold his or her 
RMB to the bank in exchange for dollars in cash, the bank would have fewer dollars and 
more RMB in cash. A large wave of outflow would result in a substantial loss of dollars in 
foreign exchange reserve and a large increase in RMB cash. There would be two 
undesired consequences result from this scenario. First, devaluation of RMB and 
revaluation of dollars. This happens because a large loss of dollars and sudden increase 
in RMB cash would force the bank to pay more RMB to purchase dollars to satisfy 
market demands. Second, sudden domestic inflation. Sudden surplus of RMB supply 
would cause inflation in the domestic market, which further destabilizes the market. 
Under the conventional theory, a sudden devaluation of RMB would be beneficial to 
China’s export-oriented economy. However, this theory has its limits. The power of 
export industry reached to its limits since China became the world factory. The benefit 
of a sudden RMB devaluation is marginal to China’s export and national economy. In 
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addition, the increase in foreign trade could not mitigate the loss results from increasing 
domestic production cost.  On the contrary, a sudden RMB devaluation has an adverse 
effect on the internationalization of Chinese currency. Also, it produces negative 
publicity for Chinese investment market.  
 
Chinese authority concerned the political implication of the outflow of the 
capital. Although the outflow of capital can be explained by profit-seeking behavior 
under most market economy without strong reactions by the authorities, Chinese 
authority has always been extremely sensitive to market fluctuation. Political rhetoric 
normally portraits financial fluctuations as war, crisis or enemy. On the one hand, 
investment and economy are about people, about creating the best possible conditions 
for prosperity and greater goods. The authority has a legitimate interest in maintaining 
an ordered economy. Since the Reform and Open up, the principle of economic growth 
and modernization had been contextualized by the Party and the State Constitution. 
Economic data, such as the inflow and outflow of the investment are the benchmark to 
evaluate the career path of a politician, and a basis for a new policy to policy makers. 
The outflow of the capital paints a bad image of Chinese economy . It signified a weak 
and declined economy, which raised concerns by many savvy politicians. Thus, a 
politician not only has an ideological interest in preventing outflow of capital but also a 
personal interest in preventing outflow of the capital. 
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The outflow of the capital also produces another legal and ethical issue for 
Chinese policy makers. It is interesting that China’s sudden restrictions over foreign 
exchange regulation aligned with the launch of China’s Anti-Corruption campaign and 
expansion of outflow of the capital.541 In fact, money laundry or transfer of illegal funds 
by corrupt officials might also contribute to China’s sudden outflow of the capital. For 
example, 200 million RMB, the equivalent of 31 million dollars, in cash was discovered 
by prosecutors from one of the residents of “Wei Pengyuan, a former deputy director of 
the coal department at the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s 
economic planning agency.”542 The news report suggested that “anti-corruption 
campaign may also be spurring a growing number of wealthy Chinese to send their 
money out of the country – accelerating capital outflows at a time when concerns about 
weaker growth are also making the Chinese currency less attractive.”543 
                                               
541 It is formally understood by the outsider that China’s anti-corruption campaign started since 
the 18th National Congress of CPC in 2012. The most high profile case was the case of Bo xilai, 
the former Chongqing Party Chief. Buckley, Chris, "China’s Antigraft Push Snares an Ex-General". 
The New York Times, June 30, 2014, accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/world/asia/china-moves-against-one-of-its-top-
leaders.html.  
542 “The money is the largest amount prosecutors have retrieved in cash from a corrupt official 
in a single operation since the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, state media 
reported.” Henny Sender, “China’s anti-corruption push may drive wealthy overseass,” Financial 
Times, November 11, 2014, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/cb9308f2-
6983-11e4-8f4f-00144feabdc0. Also see , “Xi Jingping's Power-play Leaves Chinese economy  
Exposed,” Forbes, January 17, 2015, accessed July 22, 2017, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellingenheld/2015/02/17/xi-jingpings-power-pla.   
543 For example: “Today, private bankers in Hong Kong are offering mainland clients a panoply of 
investment choices abroad that have the added attraction of qualifying the buyer for a foreign 
passport. Henny Sender One prominent lawyer who used to specialize in corporate mergers and 
acquisitions now helps groups of wealthy Chinese acquire real estate in the US. Such 
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b. Corruption  
 
“China’s ranking on Transparency International’s (TI) 2016 Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) continues to improve, moving up four places to 79.”544 “The CPI was initially 
introduced in 1995 as a composite indicator used to measure perceptions of corruption 
in the public sector in countries around the world. Since then, it has been used as an 
important gauge of companies in managing corruption risks when conducting 
businesses in foreign countries.”545 “Scholars and experts stressed that, the anti-
corruption measures should be founded on the basis of respecting human nature and 
protecting human rights, correcting the traditional anti-corruption views that 
"emphasize attacks and ignore protection" and "emphasize punishing decadent acts and 
ignore human rights protection", and correcting acts that are carried out under the 
influence of the traditional views.”546 According to findings of a survey conducted by the 
Central Discipline Inspection Commission, “people were least satisfied with the anti-
corruption work in 1996, with only 32.8 per cent of the interviewees saying they were 
                                               
transactions do not attract as much scrutiny and often come with residency rights for the buyers 
and their families.” Ibid.    
544 Mini vandePol, Simon Hui and Vivian Wu, “China Climbs Four Places in Transparency 
International’s 2016 Corruption Perception Index,” January 27, 2017, accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://globalcompliancenews.com/ti-2016-corruption-perception-index-20170127/.  
545 Ibid.   
546 Jen Hui, “Hong Kong paper views China's new anti-corruption measures,” BBC Monitoring 
Asia Pacific  February 15, 2006, https://search-proquest-
com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/docview/460660636/fulltext/F3BC85B4E9384327PQ/1?accounti
d=13158.   
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satisfied. The rate only reached beyond 50 percent for the first time in 2003 when 51.9 
per cent of the interviewees expressed satisfaction.” 547 
 
More critically, Chinese state-owned business sector creates a risk of corruption 
by blurring the line between official corruption and business corruption. Senior 
managers in SOE are also appointed government officials. These officials move back and 
forth between the government and SOE sector with both business and political 
positions. Thus, the conflict of interest became quite prevalent in China’s commercial 
system.  Critics of China, for example, Pan Wei asserted that “there is rampant 
corruption in China that stems from the ‘the contradiction between China’s newly 
installed market system and the Party-State's unchecked power...decentralization has 
led to the feudalization of administrative power, and power monopoly of the Party has 
become the personal power monopoly of each chief administrators... 548 
 
The issue of corruption is nothing new during the recent years, in fact, it already 
widespread at the beginning of the 21st century. Various forms of bribes by FIEs:549 
1. Direct bribe in the form of refunds, rebates, or inflated “referral fees,” 
“commissions.”  
                                               
547 Ibid.    
548 John Garrick, “Theorizing China’s Legal Reform," in Law, Wealth and Power in China: 
Commercial Law Reforms in Context (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010),6.   
549 Andrew Wedeman,“The Dark Side of Business with Chinese Characteristics,” Social Research 
80, No. 4 (2013):1225, 1213-1236, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24385657.  
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2. Bribery through Intermediaries  
3. An inducement in the form of pre-sale/ post-sale traveling expenses and cash 
allowance.   
The main purpose of the bribes:  
1. Bending the rules or obtaining special treatments by the administrators  
2. Obtain administration’s supports for statutory rights guaranteed by laws 
3. Winning government contract with an inflated price 
4. Conspired with government official to push competitor out of business  
 
For example, one corporate executive from a U.S. WFOE explained in a 2002 
interview that because the main business for his company is to sell products to SOEs or 
government through government procurement, he needed to maintain “close 
relationship” with staffs and procurement officers. The WFOE would devise special 
training sessions to display technics of building a relationship with local officials. 
Normally, such relationship involved conferring monetary interest or gift to those 
officials. Clearly, since the increasing exposure of corruption and criminal prosecution, 
later FIEs already abandoned that early practice by hiring PR firms to manage such 
relationships. 550  One corporate executive explained that senior officials, as well as his 
subordinates and staff members in the target department, needed to be taken care of in 
                                               
550 Shen Yaxin, “ Zenyang yu guojia gongwuyuan goutong waiqi zongjian tan xinghui jiqiao,”  (怎
样与国家公务员“沟通”——外企总监谈行贿技巧) [ How to Communicate with the 
government employee--FIE executive gave about bribe tips],” September 13, 2002, see 
http://www.southcn.com/news/china/zgkx/200209130153.htm.  
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the process. When each offeror provided special private financial incentives to the 
targeted official and his staff members, you have to go after such official’s superior or 
family members of an influential politician to pressure the target.551  
Foreign investment verification and approval process have been one of the most 
criticized areas for lacking transparency and accountability. Foreign investors, while 
attracted to China's booming economy and huge consumer market, “have found it 
difficult to seal deals, in part because of government intervention.”552For example, The 
process of establishing FIEs, M&A, Shareholding investment must be approved by MOC, 
particularly reviewed by Department of Foreign Investment and Department of Treaty 
and Law. This process also triggers other compliance requirement involved with SAFE, 
                                               
551 For example, “in addition to direct bribes, some foreign companies relied on an indirect 
technique wherein they bribed engineers and planners to draw up plans that would ensure the 
purchase of the company's products. Beginning in 2003, for example, Rockwell Automation 
Power Systems (Shanghai), a subsidiary of Rockwell Automation, a Milwaukee-based maker of 
industrial automation products used in coal mines, gave $615,000 (¥3.03 million) to employees 
of state-owned design institutes and paid $450,000 (¥3.60 million) for sightseeing trips During 
2002-5, employees of Avery China, a subsidiary of California-based Avery Dennison, hired a 
former employee of the Wuxi-based Traffic Management Research Institute whose wife still 
worked for the institute. They conspired to award Avery China a contract worth $677,494 (¥5.43 
million) to provide reflective materi als for 15,000 police cars. The contract, from which Avery 
would have earned profits of over $360,000 (¥2.88 million), included a 3 percent margin of 
$41,000 (¥328,000) that Avery China would kick back in the form of a "consulting fee."  
Sometime, these companies offered "inducements in the form of tourist junkets. UTStarcom, a 
California-based telecommunications manufacturer, spent $7 million (¥56 million) on trips to 
the United States for 235 employees of firms that bought its equipment. UTStarcom not only 
paid for the trips, which included stops in popular tourist destinations, but also gave travelers an 
$800 to $3,000 (¥6,400 and ¥24,000) cash allowance (US SEC 2009c).” Ibid.  Also see Andrew 
Wedeman,“The Dark Side of Business with Chinese Characteristics,” Social Research 80, No. 4 
(2013):1225, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24385657. 
552 George Chen, “China probe may curb foreign deals: sources,” Reuters October 31, 2008, 
accessed July 31, 2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-foreigninvestment-approvals-
idUSTRE49U3I120081031.  
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CSRC, National Development, and Reform Commission (NDRC), State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). This time-consuming process 
would create rent-seeking behavior, such as a bribe.  
 
“Guo Jingyi, a former high-ranking inspector of the treaty and law department of 
the Ministry of Commerce, was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve for 
accepting 8.45 million yuan ($1.24 million) in bribes.”553 According to the procuratorate, 
“from 2004 to 2007 Guo accepted bribes twice, totaling 1.1 million yuan, from home 
appliance giant Gome Group to help it transfer equity and pass an anti-monopoly 
inspection.”554 Huang Guangyu, former chairman of Gome Group and once China's 
richest man, was sentenced to 14 years in jail for illegal business dealings, insider 
trading, and corporate bribery. 
 
In Guo’s case, he was the “director-general of the treaty and law department at 
the commerce ministry is responsible for interpreting China's foreign investment rules, 
making his role particularly important when a deal is considered sensitive to China. 
Deng, deputy head of the foreign investment division at the ministry, is responsible for 
                                               
553 August:  MOC official Guo jingyi was under Shuanggui investigation, and attorney Zhang 
yudong and Liu Yang  was under criminal investigation, September:  MOC Official Deng zhan was 
under investigation, October: MOC Official Du baozhong was under arrest, and SAIC official Liu 
wei was under arrest. See, Wang Jingqiong, “High-ranking inspector convicted,” China Daily, 
May 21, 2010, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
05/21/content_9875015.htm.   
554 Ibid.    
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issuing approvals and licenses to foreign investors and often works with Guo to review 
deals. Foreign investors must seek approval from the commerce ministry for any deal 
valued at over $50 million when it involves investment in a sector that Beijing defines as 
a restricted industry.555 “For a deal valued at more than $100 million in an area where 
the government encourages foreign investment, commerce ministry approval is also 
required. The case has attracted growing concern among China-focused foreign 
investors, including big multinational corporations and global private equity firms fearful 
that the probe will lead to a crackdown on planned deals.” 556 Guo, Zhang, Du, and Deng 
conspired together to pressure foreign investors provide special interests to them.557 In 
Guo Jingyi’s case, FIE would hire lawyers from a law firm run by Guo’s co-conspirator, 
Zhang, to lobby Guo’s office. The law firm would serve as an intermediary to 
communicate with Guo and foreign investors. Through such intermediary, FIEs would 
pay inflated “consulting fee” to the targeted official. In this case, Guo conspired with 
Deng and Du by taking advantage of their authority and position to make sure FIE’s 
application would pass the administrative screening process. Guo’s experience in 
                                               
555 George Chen, “China probe may curb foreign deals: sources,” Reuters October 31, 2008, 
accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-foreigninvestment-approvals-
idUSTRE49U3I120081031.  
556 George Chen, “China probe may curb foreign deals: sources,” Reuters October 31, 2008, 
accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-foreigninvestment-approvals-
idUSTRE49U3I120081031.  
557 See: Caijing, “Chai jie waishang touzi shenpi xunzulian,” (Deconstruct the rent seeking wring 
behing FDI administration) Caijing, November 9, 2008, see, 
http://misc.caijing.com.cn/chargeFullNews.jsp?id=110064675&time=2008-11-09&cl=106  
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legislation, policymaking, and rule interpretation helped him taking advantages of the 
loophole in the existed rules and regulations.  
 
Figure 12. Guo Jingyi Corruption ring explained.   
 
Corruption wing  
● Guo Jingyi: Inspector of MOC Department of Treaty and Law  
● Zhang Yudong and Liu Yang: lawyers work for FIEs  
● Deng Zhan: Deputy Director-General of MOC Department of Foreign Investment  
● Du Baozhong: Director of the Administrative Law Office of MOC Department of Treaty 
and Law.  
● Liu Wei: Deputy Director of Foreign Investment Registration of SAIC   
 
Caijing news commented that the case of Guo suggested a pattern of regulatory 
prejudice and twist: the enforcement of law alienated from the central authority's policy 
of promoting law and order to attract high-quality FDI. By arbitrarily blank ban on all 
forms of investment with strict rules in hope to protect domestic industry, the 
MOC Department 
of Treaty and Law
MOC Department 
of Foreign 
Investment
Bureau for 
Registration of 
Foreign-Invested 
Enterprises
Law firms 
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administration of the law created a strong demand for rent-seeking. The fact that 
officials selectively lift the “ban” in exchange for personal favor reminiscent to the time 
when black foreign exchange market supplement the market demands during the 1980s 
and early 1990s.  
 
The booming of offshore financing has produced tremendous pressure on 
China’s policymakers due to its undesired political implication. First, it facilitates a 
narrative of the undesired domestic investment market, an aversion to modernization 
and political commitment to fostering economic growth. To further legitimize those 
investment restrictions or defend those limitations, Chinese investors need to be 
perceived as a destructive force of the market, which is the classic thinking reminiscent 
China’s central command era. The problem of China’s offshore financing presents a 
perfect case for China’s financial market reform. Most importantly it presents an 
imminent question, whether the past three decades reform designed to build “a society 
based on economic power and rights or societies developed on politico-social relations 
with economic power reinforce institutions expand their control and favor development 
advance their power and rights.558”  
 
Second, China’s foreign exchange control for the past few years seems anti 
thematic. On the one hand, the 2004 Constitution Amendment and Three 
                                               
558 Benedict Sheehy, “Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law 26,” Northwestern J. of 
Int’ Law & Bus’  no. 225 (2006): 235.   
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Representative Theory suggested bourgeois’ interest will be represented by CPC. On the 
other hands, recent counter capital outflow measures seem to part away from the 
interest of those savvy investors and business person. The new economic policy appears 
to facilitate a narrower scope of real economy excluding significant capital player. In 
addition, these restrictions increase the risk of corruption by forcing the market to seek 
politicians for favors.  
 
When political rhetoric paints China as a new super star on the world stage with 
glorified economic data, these regulations and rules are the sober reminders of China's 
challenges and potential. These regulations suggest Chinese authority’s frustration with 
the globalization, more importantly, they indicate a lack of confidence in the global 
market in providing a stable long-term growth through a mechanism controlled or 
managed by the central authority. Also, these regulations illustrate the incompatibility 
between China's economic power and inadequate market mechanism.  
 
Third, globalization is the winner for the past decade's development in China. 
These “walls” created by Chinese authority not only failed to protect and facilitate 
meaningful SOE development as they were intended to but also alienated Chinese 
investors from the domestic PE (private equity) market in an unexpected manner. As a 
consequence, the mechanism designed to protect China’s SOE through the 
discriminatory regulations and policies dominated by protective thinking ultimately 
created an undesired domestic environment that pushes creative investors into the arm 
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of offshore financing market. This issue mirrored to China’s two-track foreign exchange 
policy in the 1980s. As a result, it created more problem than it resolved.   
 
5. Opportunity of the FDI framework  
With the growing popularity of corporate pyramid scheme, offshore corporate 
vehicle, gray banking and fraudulent trade invoice scheme, traditional mechanism of 
anti-corruptions, anti-money laundry and anti-tax evasion by the sovereign state 
suffered from challenges induced by creative minds to conceal their identity and assets 
in a decentralized global economy. However, there are also exciting new opportunities 
for the regulatory authority when the decentralized economy itself offering new 
perspective and approaches to the regulatory issue by creating new conceptual and 
implementing framework that could be applied for the public good.  
 
 This part of the discussions exclusively focuses on mechanisms adopted by 
foreign jurisdictions and Chinese authority in fighting against illegal financial activities 
for a transparent and robust investment environment. In addition, it considers China’s 
“wechat economy,” which provides a new and smart approach to China’s FDI regulatory 
challenges. First, the section would outline the public disclosure mechanism adopted by 
sovereign state and international law. Then it will provide an in-depth analysis of China’s 
new wechat economy to illustrate the future of soft regulation.  
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a. New international legal framework on public disclosure  
i. OECD Beneficial Owner 
In November 2014, G20 Summit in Brisbane adopted “High-Level Principles on 
Beneficial Ownership and Transparency.” 559 The Principales, which builds on existing 
international instruments and standards, encourage countries  
(1) to have a definition of “beneficial owner” that captures the natural person(s) 
who ultimately owns or controls the legal person or legal arrangement,  
(2) to ensure that beneficial ownership and control information is adequate, 
accurate, current and accessible, and  
(3) to have a legal framework that enables national authorities (including law 
enforcement and prosecutorial authorities, supervisory authorities, tax 
authorities and financial intelligence units) to participate in information 
exchange on beneficial ownership both domestically and internationally.560   
 
“High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership and Transparency” is only the 
first step of establishing next generation of a global regulatory framework designed to 
enhance the transparency and reduce the market risk and illegal activities for cross-
broader investment. OECD defined beneficial owner as, “a natural person who is 
ultimately entitled to the benefits accruing from the beneficial ownership of the 
securities, and/or has power to exercise controlling influence over the voting rights 
                                               
559 Erik Vermeulen, Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control in Listed Companies in Asia, 
OECD, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Disclosure-Beneficial-
Ownership.pdf.  
560 Ibid.   
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attached to the shares (even if another person holds the legal title) of an entity, or as 
the ultimate beneficial owner of an organization.” 561 
 
As OECD research shows, each jurisdiction has different regulations. HK law 
adopted the concept of the substantial shareholder, which is also a BO under OECD 
definition, is required to notify the company of his interests and subsequently any 
change in his interests. The Chinese law referred BO as “actual controller.” Under 
Chinese law, “persons who have an interest in 5% or more of the voting shares of a 
listed company; and directors and chief executives who have an interest in any shares of 
a listed company are required to comply with public disclosure. 562  Offshore corporate 
vehicles and pyramid structures are common methods for investors who intend to 
conceal the identity. 563 Chinese law requires disclosure of the ultimate layer for the BO. 
However, the regulatory framework is not equipped well to prevent these activities.564 
                                               
561 “Although it is usually argued that a beneficial owner is always a natural person, it must be 
noted that a legal person can also be the ultimate owner if the ultimate beneficial owner is the 
State or a state-owned entity.” See Erik Vermeulen, Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and 
Control in Listed Companies in Asia, OECD, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Disclosure-Beneficial-Ownership.pdf.  
562 China require disclosure of ultimate BO See, Ibid. 
563 For example, “The natural person, the state-owned asset management department, or the 
other institution that could be considered as the ultimate controlling shareholder must be 
disclosed. If the ultimate controlling shareholder(s) cannot be determined, the ultimate 
beneficial owners who own more than 5% must be disclosed.” Ibid.  
564 For example, “Most jurisdictions distinguish between “de jure” and “de facto” beneficial 
ownership. 
Because it is the rule rather than the exception to look at de facto beneficial ownership in 
addition to de jure beneficial ownership, a pertinent issue is the content of such de facto 
ownership. In general language, applying such a concept will result in shares held under 
the name of third parties also being counted under the control of the beneficial owner.” Ibid.  
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Table 9. Disclosure requirement for investors under different jurisdictions.  
 China  HK Malaysia 
Disclosure 
requirement  
disclosure is required 
from persons who 
have 
an interest in 5% or 
more of the voting 
shares of a listed 
company; and 
directors and chief 
executives who have 
an interest in any 
shares of a listed 
company. 
No express 
requirement for 
update info unless 
substantial 
shareholder  
No express requirement 
for update info unless 
substantial shareholder  
BO definition  NA Proposed for 
amendment  
ultimate owner and is 
entitled to all 
rights, benefits, powers 
and privileges and 
subject to all liabilities, 
duties, and obligations 
, and does not include a 
nominee of 
any description.  
Substantial 
shareholder  
10% threshold of 
entire equity securities 
of an issuer 
10% threshold  10% threshold  
 
Source of information and data: see OECD Report on Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership 
and Control in Listed Companies in Asia565  
 
                                               
565 Erik Vermeulen, Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control in Listed Companies in Asia, 
OECD, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Disclosure-Beneficial-
Ownership.pdf. 
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ii. UK Practice and US Practice   
The United Kingdom adopted a similar mechanism of requiring public disclosure 
for “Person of Significant Control” (PSC) through the 2015 amendment to Company 
Act.566  Under this new amendment, PSC must make information available to the public 
by April 6, 2016. Failure of disclosure would result in a criminal offense, which may 
result in fines or imprisonment. In addition, the relevant transaction would be void 
under this new mechanism.567 Two types of business entities are excluded from 
disclosure. First, this new public disclosure ruled out companies that subject to Chapter 
5 of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules ("DTR 5"), 
which reserved for public traded companies. 568 Second, limited partnership is excluded 
from disclosure because it does not have a separate legal personality “Individuals who 
are limited partners will not be registrable themselves under any of the first three PSC 
                                               
566 For example, “Changes to the Companies Act 2006 as a result of the Small Business, 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 are intended to increase transparency over the ownership 
and control of UK companies and LLPs from 6 April 2016. They see the UK lead the way on 
implementation of the EU Fourth Money Laundering Directive.” See, Marcus Booth, Veronica 
Carson, “People with Significant Control: Implications of New Regime for Corporates,” March 14, 
2016, accessed July 30, 2017, https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/people-
significant-control-implications-new-regime-corporates.  
567 “Companies and directors who fail to comply will commit an offence (punishable by 
imprisonment or fine). If a registrable person fails to comply with the disclosure obligations, the 
company can serve a warning notice that it intends to follow-up with a restrictions notice. A 
restrictions notice can be served one month later if the original notice has still not been 
complied with. This means that any transfers of those shares are void, no rights may be 
exercised in respect of them and the company may not pay any sums due on them except in a 
liquidation.” See White & Case LLP, “PSC Regime: Register of People with Significant Control for 
Sponsor controlled companies,” LEXOLOGY March 14, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d39a971e-ed86-4f92-bb8a-bd235fa87d58. 
568 Shepherd and Wedderburn LLP “Are you ready for changes to the PSC regime?” LEXOLOGY 
June 16, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=78d3b2d4-278a-4bf4-8fe9-c320f9a08627.  
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conditions solely by virtue of being a limited partner in a limited partnership with an 
interest in a company, as long as they do not participate in management of the 
partnership business and there is no separate basis of SIOC.”569The amendment defined 
the SPC as any individual, legal entity or government or government departments meet 
any of these conditions: 
1. holding, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the shares in the company; 
2. holding, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the voting rights; 
3. holding the right, directly or indirectly, to appoint or remove a majority of the 
board; 
4. having the right to exercise, or actually exercising, significant influence or control 
over the company ("SIOC"); 
5. being an individual, which has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, SIOC 
over a trust or firm which itself satisfies at least one of the above conditions.570 
The required disclosure includes information such as name, country of residence, 
nationality, and date of birth for an individual. For legal entities, it contains information 
                                               
569 “However, the general partner will usually be a PSC and, depending on the legal form and 
structure, either the general partner and/or individuals or RLEs behind the general partner who 
are PSCs will usually be registrable.” White & Case LLP, “PSC Regime: Register of People with 
Significant Control for Sponsor controlled companies,” LEXOLOGY March 14, 2016, accessed July 
31, 2017, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d39a971e-ed86-4f92-bb8a-
bd235fa87d58. 
570 Shepherd and Wedderburn LLP “Are you ready for changes to the PSC regime?” LEXOLOGY 
June 16, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=78d3b2d4-278a-4bf4-8fe9-c320f9a08627.  
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such as the name of the entity, registered office, legal form and law under which it was 
formed. 571 
 
Align with the SPC mechanism; the amendment also proposed the concept 
"significant influence or control" (SIOC). The purpose of the SIOC was to create catch-all 
conditions that designed to prevent some creative ways to circumvent SPC regulation. 
For example, this included:  
● “such as adopting or amending the business plan, changing the nature of the 
business or making additional borrowing from lenders.  
● However, veto rights for the purpose of protecting a minority interest are 
unlikely alone to be so. "Absolute" for this purpose means a person has the 
ability to make or veto a decision without referring to or collaborating with 
anyone else.” 572 
It is noted that the determination of SIOC would be a case by case situation based on 
many factors.573  
                                               
571 White & Case LLP, “PSC Regime: Register of People with Significant Control for Sponsor 
controlled companies,” LEXOLOGY March 14, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d39a971e-ed86-4f92-bb8a-bd235fa87d58.  
572 Ibid. 
573 White & Case LLP, “PSC Regime: Register of People with Significant Control for Sponsor 
controlled companies,” LEXOLOGY March 14, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d39a971e-ed86-4f92-bb8a-bd235fa87d58. 
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The U.S. security regulation adopted a different definition on BO, under CFR Title 17 
Commodity and Securities Exchanges Determination of Beneficial Owner, the BO was 
defined as: 574 
(a) For the purposes of sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Act a beneficial owner of a 
security includes any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, 
arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares: 
(1) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the voting of, 
such security; and/or, 
(2) Investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct the 
disposition of, such security. 
(b) Any person who, directly or indirectly, creates or uses a trust, proxy, power of 
attorney, pooling arrangement or any other contract, arrangement, or device 
with the purpose or effect of divesting such person of beneficial ownership of a 
security or preventing the vesting of such beneficial ownership as part of a plan 
or scheme to evade the reporting requirements of section 13(d) or (g) of the Act 
shall be deemed for purposes of such sections to be the beneficial owner of such 
security. 
(c) All securities of the same class beneficially owned by a person, regardless of 
                                               
574 17 CFR 240.13d-3, accessed July 30, 2017, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.13d-
3.   
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the form which such beneficial ownership takes, shall be aggregated in 
calculating the number of shares beneficially owned by such person.575 
 
iii. HK FSTB Proposal  
 
           Recently Hong Kong’s Financial Services and Treasury Bureau (FSTB) issued a 
consultation document on amending the Companies Ordinance law, which concerning 
the disclosure of BO with Hong Kong Companies Registrars. 576 Unlike the UK Company 
Law 2016 amendment excluded limited partnership, this proposal included those 
limited by shares, by guarantee, and unlimited companies. 577 The proposal adopted a 
similar definition of BO as other western jurisdiction.578 It provided that:  
                                               
575 17 CFR 240.13d-3, accessed July 30, 2017, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.13d-
3.   
576 Dezan Shira, “Hong Kong Announces Changes to Beneficial Ownership Regime, “ China 
Briefing, March 22, 2017, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.china-
briefing.com/news/2017/03/22/hong-kong-announces-change-beneficial-ownership-
regime.html.   
577 Ibid. 
578 “The FSTB adopts a similar definition of “beneficial owner” as that proposed by Financial 
Action Task Force, an inter-government body developing and promoting policies to combat 
money laundering and terrorist financing, and that adopted by the UK, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and 
Switzerland. Under the proposed amendments, a beneficial owner in relation to a company is an 
individual who meets one or more of the following specified conditions” “Hong Kong Announces 
Changes to Beneficial Ownership Regime, “ Also “Hong Kong has been a member of the FATF 
since 1991. As the international community strengthens regulation in accordance with the FATF 
recommendations, Hong Kong is obliged to implement a credible regime to enhance 
transparency of beneficial ownership, so as to safeguard the integrity of our financial markets, 
and to ensure that our reputation as an international financial center is reinforced by an open, 
trusted and competitive business environment.” See, “Enhancing Anti-Money Laundering 
Regulation of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions,” HK Financial Services and 
the Treasury Bureau, http://www.cr.gov.hk/en/publications/docs/consult_eaml-e.pdf.  
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● Directly or indirectly holding more than 25 percent of the shares; 
● Directly or indirectly holding more than 25 percent of the voting rights; 
● Directly or indirectly holding the right to appoint or remove a majority of 
directors; 
● Otherwise having the right to exercise, or actually exercising, significant 
influence or control; 
● Having the right to exercise, or actually exercising, significant influence or control 
over the activities of a trust or a firm that is not a legal person, but whose 
trustees alternatively, members satisfy any of the first four conditions (in their 
capacity as such) in relation to the company, or would do so if they were 
individuals.579 
Scholars and legal experts commented that with Hong Kong’s reputation for promoting 
world-class financial institution, this new proposal would revolutionize the HK’s 
regulatory framework. More importantly, HK’s geographic proximity to Mainland 
attracted many offshore shell corporation schemes. This new proposal might be able to 
contain a certain level of illegal and unethical investment that abuse HK’s investment 
environment.  
 
 
                                               
579 Dezan Shira, “Hong Kong Announces Changes to Beneficial Ownership Regime, “ China 
Briefing, March 22, 2017, accessed July 31, 2017, http://www.china-
briefing.com/news/2017/03/22/hong-kong-announces-change-beneficial-ownership-
regime.html.   
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iv. China Practice  
On December 16, 2015, China became the 77th signature states of OECD 
Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, MCAA, which support the Common 
Reporting Standard, CRS.580 The MCAA mechanism is an international legal framework 
designed to curtail global tax invasion and money laundry by enhancing transparency 
and the rule of law through public disclosure. The advantage of MCAA is to have 
information sharing between tax authorities. The shortcoming of the MCAA framework 
linked to its limited information sharing between tax authorities. The new developed BO 
information sharing framework would make information available for anti-money 
laundry, anti-terrorist, and even anti-corruption operations.    
China’s CRS legislation adopted the popular concept of the “actual controller” from the 
foreign market. The article 13 provided that:  
(1) An individual who, directly or indirectly, holds over 25% of the company's 
equities or voting rights; 
                                               
580 People’s Republic of China became the 77th jurisdiction to sign the Multilateral Competent 
Authority Agreement (MCAA), which allows it to move forward with plans to activate automatic 
exchange of financial account information in tax matters and commence exchanges with other 
countries in 2018. The G20 Leaders have repeatedly stressed their commitment to automatic 
exchange of information, most recently at their November meeting in Antalya, Turkey. See, 
OECD, “China takes important step to boost international co-operation against tax evasion,” 
accessed July 31, 2017, 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/chinatakesimportantsteptoboostinternationalco-
operationagainsttaxevasion.htm.  
Also see, OECD, “What is the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement,” accessed July 31, 
2017,  https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/technical-
assistance/aeoi/whatisthemultilateralcompetentauthorityagreement.htm.  
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(2) An individual who controls the company via personal or financial arrangements 
or other means; or 
(3) A senior management person of the company.The controller of a partnership 
enterprise shall refer to an individual who owns over 25% of the rights and 
interests in the partnership. The controller of a trust shall refer to the settlor, 
trustee or beneficiary of the trust or any other individual who exercises ultimate 
and efficient control of the trust. The controller of a fund shall refer to a person 
who owns over 25% of the equity units of the fund or any other individual who 
controls the fund.581 
 
The actual controller framework could be found in the PRC Company Law, SSE 
Regulations on Public Listed Shares, SZSE Regulations on Public Listed Share, Measures 
for the Administration on Acquisition of Listed Companies. These laws formed the 
framework of China’s actual control regulations. It is important to note that the SSE 
Regulation does not mention the situation where the person has a substantial impact on 
shareholder meeting, In addition, it takes a different approach by recognizing the actual 
controller, which is defined as the largest shareholder in the register.  Below is the 
                                               
581 Fei jumin jingrong zhanghu sheshui xinxi jinzhi diaocha guanli banfa (非居民金融账户涉税信
息尽职调查管理办法)Administrative Measures for the Due Diligence Investigation of the Tax-
related Information of Non-resident Financial Accounts, adopted by SAT, MOF, CSRC, CIC and 
POB on May 9, 2017. 
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detailed description of the statutory language under these rules. 582 Art. 216 of PRC 
Company Law provided that: 
  
(3) "actual controller" shall refer to a person who is not a shareholder of a company but 
who is able to actually control the acts of the company through investment relations, 
agreements or other arrangements; and 
(4) "affiliation" shall refer to the relationship between a controlling shareholder, actual 
controller, director, supervisor or senior management person of a company with an 
enterprise under the direct or indirect control thereof, or any other relationship that 
may lead to the transfer of the interests of the company, provided that the enterprises 
in which the State is the controlling shareholder are not necessarily affiliated with each 
other solely on the ground that the State controls the shares thereof.583 
 
The actual controller does not need to be a shareholder of a company, but it has 
to be someone who is able to actually control the acts of the company through 
investment relations, agreements or other arrangements.584  The control means the 
                                               
582 Fei jumin jingrong zhanghu sheshui xinxi jinzhi diaocha guanli banfa (非居民金融账户涉税信
息尽职调查管理办法)Administrative Measures for the Due Diligence Investigation of the Tax-
related Information of Non-resident Financial Accounts, adopted by SAT, MOF, CSRC, CIC and 
POB on May 9, 2017. 
583 PRC Company Law 2014. Art. 216 (3) ,(4).  
584 China Opens Up The Securities Investment Fund Management,  
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-opens-up-the-securities-58290/ (accessed August 21, 
2017).  
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capacity to determine the financial and operational decision for the company for-profit. 
Control would be found when at least one of the following conditions are met:  
1. The largest shareholder in the register of shareholders,  
2. Can direct or indirectly invoke voting rights as the largest shareholder in the 
register of the shareholders,  
3. The voting rights can determine more than half of the board of the director 
member, 
4. Other conditions recognized by CSRC.585  
 
Under Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) Regulation on Public listed shares, The 
actual control means person able to actually control the acts of the company through 
investment relations, agreements or other arrangements.  The control means the 
capacity to determine the financial and operational decision for the company for-profit. 
Control would be found when at least one of the following conditions are met:  
1. Hold more than 50% of shares of a public traded company, 
2. Actual control more than 30% of the voting rights of a public trade company, 
3. The voting rights can determine more than half of the board of the director 
member, 
4. Voting rights can have substantial impact on shareholder meeting,  
                                               
585 SH Stock Exchange (SSE) Regulation on Public listed Shares, art. 18.1 
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5. Other conditions recognized by CSRC. 586 
 
Under CSRC Measures for the Administration on Acquisition of Listed 
Companies, Control existed when it met at least one of the following conditions:  
1. Hold more than 50% of shares of a public traded company, 
2. Actual control more than 30% of the voting rights of a public trade company, 
3. The voting rights can determine more than half of the board of the director 
member, 
4. Voting rights can have substantial impact on shareholder meeting,  
5. Other conditions recognized by CSRC. 587 
 
As the above discussion indicates, China’s actual owner regulatory framework is formed 
by the PRC Company Law, stock exchanges rules, and stock commissions’ regulations. 
This framework is fairly new, which subjects to future adjustment. More importantly, it 
established a foundation for China’s investment market by promoting the “public 
disclosure” mechanism. Also, the fact that China entered into OECD CSR agreement 
                                               
586 Shenzhen zhengquan jiaoyi suo gupiao shangshi guize (深圳证券交易所股票上市规
则)Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) Regulation on Public listed shares, adopted by SESZ in 2014.  
587 Zhongguo zhengjianhui shangshi gongsi shougou guanli banfa (中国证监会上市公司收购管
理办法)Measures for the Administration on Acquisition of Listed Companies, adopted by CSRC 
in 2014.  
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suggested China’s interest in continuing reforming China’s regulatory framework and 
promoting principles compatible with the global standard.588  
 
 
b. The future: Wechat Economy  
In fact, China’s new economy cultural and transaction pattern has already 
emerged and integrated with the globalization: free and open-access without “walls” 
created by sovereign states, although not fully displaying its potential yet. This 
government-less and self-regulating commerce cultural have been cultivated by the 
robust growth of E-commerce economy. A true freedom of contract can be liberated by 
this new phenomenon. More importantly, this new structure should be read as a good 
sign because it is offering new and creative approaches to China’s regulatory issue. This 
can be exemplified by wechat economy. This new structure has the following features:  
● Cashless  
● Web-based virtual transaction 
● Government-less   
 
Wechat is a web-based message application on your cell phone, tablet, and 
computer. The power of wechat comes from its add-on social media function and virtual 
                                               
588 “Chinese financial institutions have started carrying out due diligence on customer’s tax 
residency.” See “Time to comply: China implements OECD's financial info exchange” 
International Financial Law Review, accessed July 31, 2017, 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3744696/Time-to-comply-China-implements-OECDs-financial-info-
exchange.html.  
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money transfer function (wechat pay). The social media function creates a member-
based social media platform.589 Users can display their products or service to the public, 
but only “friends” can make transaction or transfer of funds (through wechat pay). Any 
interested user can contact the seller directly through wechat and finish the transaction 
through money transfer function. This modern transaction model demonstrated three 
features: 1. Cashless. 2. The virtual transaction, 3. Government-less. First, Under this 
model, the transaction of funds are tied up in the bank accounts of the user, which is 
regulated by the contract between bank and user, and the contract between bank and 
operator of the wechat, and Chinese bank regulations. With the development of e-
commerce, China’s cashless transaction increased dramatically.590 Under such 
decentralized business structure, users do not need to worry about any regulations or 
risk involved with the cash. Business savvy investors would not ignore this, just this 
month, Caesars Palace became the first casino in Las Vegas to accept wechat pay.591  
                                               
589 “WeChat Pay is part of WeChat, a Chinese social media giant that also offers a popular 
messaging service similar to Facebook’s Whatsapp and e-commerce. WeChat has 938 million 
monthly active user accounts globally while WeChat Pay has 600 million active users.” Todd 
Prince, “Caesars launches WeChat Pay for Chinese visitors,” Las Vegas Review,August 8, 2017, 
available at:https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/tourism/caesars-launches-wechat-pay-
for-chinese-visitors/.   
590 “In the first quarter alone, smartphone-originated QR code-based payments saw transaction 
growth of a staggering 113 percent according to the consulting firm iResearch. That increase 
carries a dollar value of about $337 million, and it was split nearly entirely by Alibaba’s Alipay 
and WeChat Pay, as the two firms collectively represent 94 percent of the QR code payments 
market.” see PYMNTS, “UnionPay’s Cashless Headache,” August 9, 2017, available 
at:http://www.pymnts.com/ecosystems/2017/unionpays-payments-market-battle-in-china/ .  
591 Caesars Entertainment Corp. this week become the first Strip operator to allow tourists from 
the world’s most populous country to pay for goods and services using one of their nation’s 
leading mobile payment apps. Todd Prince, “Caesars launches WeChat Pay for Chinese visitors,” 
Las Vegas Review,August 8, 2017, available 
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Second, the cost of investing a virtual store or displaying of the commodities is 
basically free. The investor does not need to pay for storage space or wechat because 
wechat can profit from advertising or data mining. Unlike traditional market, the 
investor needs to ensure the inflow of customer to the established business, wechat is a 
semi-private social media platform, which means transactions can only occur between 
users identify as the circle of “friends.” This inner circle design ensures both the buyer 
and seller that transaction occurs at a less casual buy-sale relationship. In addition, it is 
beneficial to the investor because the business owner can directly contact with the user 
in a more intimate manner.  
 
Third, the wechat transaction model promoted a government-less and self-
regulatory commerce structure. In fact, the wechat transaction was the true 
embodiment of the globalization: free and open-access without “walls” created by 
sovereign government. It revolutionized the foreign investment and trade. A French 
vineyard in southern France can open a public account on wechat display fine wine on 
such account. Users can either order wine directly through wechat or through an agent 
appointed by the vineyard. The cost related to conventional sale network and overseas 
branch office could be saved by this new transaction structure.  
 
                                               
at:https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/tourism/caesars-launches-wechat-pay-for-chinese-
visitors/.   
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In fact, the beauty of the new economic model is the pattern of decentralized 
business transaction structure without intrusive government involvement. Without a 
physical store, there is no need to pay any cost associated with space or business license 
or even an accountant for a smaller business. Without a business license, it is harder for 
the government to enforce soft regulation through loan qualification or tax incentive. 
More importantly, this lucky French vineyard from the above example can enjoy unique 
privileges that any foreign investor could ever dream of in the 1980s: there is no foreign 
exchange control because the cashless payment will be conducted on Chinese banks 
and foreign banks through cashless wechat pay channel. There is no import license or 
import quota, or royalty restrictions because the French vineyard is not “officially” 
presence in China. The only investment for this French vineyard, maybe a small 
“contribution” to China’s e-commerce in the form of agency fees. This truly 
revolutionizes the way conduct business for smaller foreign investors. 
 
In addition, this new economic model is self-regulatory in nature. A “friend” 
based virtual transaction demonstrated the feature of self-regulation. Since a “friend” 
based virtual transaction business relies more on the user experience and customer 
satisfaction, it reduced the incentive for an investor or business owner to engage short-
term profiting behavior. For example, a florist can easily lose business under this model 
by selling inferior quality products  to the customer because “friends” based customers 
can spread the words and “block” the seller faster and cheaper than a conventional 
business model does.  
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Wechat economy liberates freedom of contract for investors and marketplace 
participants. The essence of this wechat economy is the new free and open access to 
the marketplace. Under the conventional economic structure, the government asserted 
regulatory power through physical presence in the marketplace in the form of tax, loan, 
ordinance, court and economic policy to manage the relationship between the 
participants of the marketplace. Freedom of contract is restrained, maintained and 
regulated by the government with different political agenda. Occasionally, political 
power can be corrupted and commoditized to satisfy the needs and demands of the 
market.  
 
Under this new commerce structure, the business transaction occurred on a 
virtual platform. E-commerce provider creates a framework to manage the relationship 
between the buyers and sellers in the form of meditation and public disclosure. This 
structure established new conceptual and practical framework for us to approach the 
idea of “regulation.” The transition from public regulation in the form of legislation and 
policy guidance transformed into the private regulation through the vehicle of 
“contract.” “Freedom of contract,” the most conventional and basic structure, yet most 
powerful tools that managing human relations was given new meaning to China’s new 
economic reality.   
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 In fact, the freedom of contract is the most democratic and powerful tools that 
empower each individual consumer as the guardian of law and order. Unlike individuals 
passively accept orders from the centralized authority under a central planning 
economy to enforce rules censor behaviors that the leaders dislike, freedom of contract 
and “wechat economy” empower each consumer to enforce the basic values and ethics 
that promoted by the authority through guidance and inspiration. With proper guidance 
and education, the consumer can engage the behavior of self-monitoring and self-
regulating. Chinese consumer protest Korean pop-star or Chinese consumer pressure 
Apple or KFC are the perfect examples to illustrating this idea.592  
 
 In addition, “We chat economy” is not a substitute but a useful supplementary to 
China’s regulatory framework. As a Chinese company, Wechat has an obligation to obey 
Chinese law and regulations. Although the physical location of Wechat’s users may be 
outside China’s jurisdiction, the digital virtual presence of these users and their 
behaviors are located in the server of Wechat, which subject to the jurisdiction of 
Chinese law. With the free flow of information, wechat not only invite more integrated 
communication and business transactions, but also invite Chinese law and regulations 
into the global space without Chinese authority to invest a great deal of political and 
                                               
592 Eva Fu, “K-Pop Stars Become Scapegoats in China’s Protests Against Anti-Missile 
Deployment,” The EPOCH TIMES August 7, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017,  
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/2133809-k-pop-stars-become-scapegoats-in-chinas-
protests-against-anti-missile-deployment/. Also see: “Why KFC and Apple feel consumers' anger 
in China,” AP July 20, 2016, accessed July 31, 2017,  https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-kfc-
and-apple-feel-consumers-anger-in-china/.  
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diplomatic transaction. Although globalization creates challenges for Chinese regulators, 
wechat presents a new venue for the modernization of Chinese regulatory framework.  
 
Thus, Wechat transaction structure offered alternative channels for China’s next 
generation of foreign investment regime in the context of Yuan Internationalization and 
One Belt One Road. A decentralized transaction pattern not only fits into the narrative 
of China’s “go out” policy in the context of socialist modernization but also compatible 
with the globalization. The popularity of wechat transaction is not “directed” by the 
government or “promoted” by the government, but decided by the collective consumer 
power of the Chinese people through the market decisions. It is the triumph of the 
“freedom of contract,” an important vehicle to truly realized the core of Deng Xiaoping’s 
political legacy: to improve the welfare of the people, to improve the living standard of 
the people. Wechat structure represents a new thinking that restored the freedom of 
contract by giving the power back to the individual, investor, and the market.   
 
c. New approach to Rule of Law under public disclosure scheme and wechat 
economy  
 
As an abstract concept or meaning referring to a form of human activity and 
phenomenon, the law has a peculiar relationship with power. Although fallen out of 
favor by modern thinkers, the traditionalist natural law view developed since the early 
Roman Empire of Cicero day asserted law in society as “part of eternal nature of the 
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universe as organized by the divine.”593 Such view later intrinsically linked to another 
source of power, institutionalized Christian religion in the western society. The founding 
father of the United States designed a new principle of “separation of church and state” 
manifested the need to decouple the link between the law and power that vested 
within institutionalized religion in order to form the New Republic without disturbance 
and complication from multiple sources of power in the early 19th centuries594. 
 
Discourses about Chinese feudal times indicating the naturalist view of the law in 
Chinese culture. The source of law is divine power, which vested within institutionalized 
empire political system. The empire, a sign or intermediary connect law and order on 
earth with the divine power in heaven. Functionally, the law is taken as a tool to manage 
and regulate the subject of the state, which refers to as “rule by law.” Apparently, 
comparing with the modern conception of “Rule of Law,” the law in China’s feudal time 
manifest the expression of supreme order due to its lack of transparency, clarity, 
fairness, and predictability.  
 
                                               
593  Benedict Sheehy, “Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law 26,” Northwestern J. 
of Int’ Law & Bus’  no. 225 (2006): 239.     
594 Church of England has had considerable power for several centuries in most Anglo 
Jurisdictions except the United States… Anglo governments have traditionally been keen to 
nicate their separation from religion and the church. See Benedict Sheehy, “Fundamentally 
Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law 26,” Northwestern J. of Int’ Law & Bus’  no. 225 (2006):232.   
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Confucian view of Law has been a hot topic for the academics, Confucian school 
craft a philosophical view on the relationship between enforcement of rule or law and 
self-regulation motivated by shame, as he provided that: 
The Master said if the people be led by fa (rule/ order/ law), and uniformity 
sought to be given them by punishment, they will try to avoid the punishment 
but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue (li), and uniformity sought to 
be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and 
moreover will become good. 595 
 
Confucius’ argument provides us a fresh perspective over Rule of Law in a postmodern, 
globalized world. It is preferable to have rule or law enforced willingly by an individual 
that motivated by their own interest for the utility of virtue than to have rule or law 
enforced by an external party. 596 The development of modern legal mechanism such 
“disclosure” by business and government entity, the UN Business and Human Rights 
Accord, Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund model and China’s social credit initiative all 
illustrate new approaches to the meaning of law and justice in regulating rights and 
obligations in different forms of human interactions. A traditional approach would 
consider divine power, religious institution, or political institution as a source of law, 
which requires a mechanism of external enforcement. However, a thousand years ago, 
                                               
595 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Confucius, see 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confucius/  
596 Christopher Panza, “Confucius, Virtue Ethics and Guilt,” September 12, 2007. Accessed July 
31, 2017, https://oolongiv.wordpress.com/2007/09/12/confucius-virtue-ethics-and-guilt/.  
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Confucius would point out that the source of law comes from ourselves,  designed by 
our nature, our society, the pattern of communication, enforced naturally by our 
desires. This law, as he considers as “li” is far superior because it is truly universal and 
intricately connected with anyone. In other words, everyone is equal before li, and li is 
above everyone.  
 
The superiority of “li” lies on the part of “self-regulation,” which is a powerful 
element create a sustainable legitimacy for the rule. An inadequately developed law not 
only being perceived as a command that hurting the interest of the subject but also self-
defeating because the legitimacy of the law is unsustainable. By modern design, the law 
is not command; the law provides a forum of fairness, openness, and reasonableness 
when conventional “li” fails or inadequate to function in a given context. There has been 
a strong opinion that Chinese prefer informal and unconventional ‘li’ over law and such 
preference might be the basis for China’s lawless society or even lack of interest for the 
rule of law. This legal “orientalism” just as its predecessor, “cultural orientalism” 
romanized a vision of China and West that may or may not mirror the reality. The 
development of the wechat transaction pattern provided one great example of future 
generation of the rule of law development in promoting a fair, open and efficient 
investment environment.  
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Summary: The Evolution of FDI Policy and Law in the Context of China’s 
Rule of Law Development   
 
A centralized command economy in its pure condition is naturally accompanied 
by a society that lacks basic legal infrastructure, as there is no need for “law” to 
adjudicate the dispute; or, one may argue that the “law” was understood differently 
under such a system. Theoretically, when all meaningful decisions concerning social 
production are made by the central command and its branch offices, it excludes private 
entities from engaging in economic activities, which lowers the possibilities of private 
disputes involving social production. Essentially, the whole society is incorporated into a 
central command system, and the central authority would develop goals and plans for 
the whole nation. A complicated and layered bureaucratic system affiliated with 
enterprises and trading companies would be installed to enforce, monitor and control 
the process of production and transaction. Factories, trade companies, banks, farmers, 
and any other economic units are merely the tools to implement central or regional 
commands. There is no labor market everyone is assigned to a job based on the plan, 
not based on his or her merit or talent. There is no need or incentive for individuals to 
create anything since everything is planned. Thus, under a centralized command 
economic system, the concept of private disappears when the individual or other entity 
is “merged” into a centralized unit. The purpose of the individual is constructed as an 
enforcer of the centralized plan.  
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In addition, the concept of “law” may also disappear under the centralized 
command structure. One of the functions of law is to adjudicate conflict of private 
actions based on individual’s freedom of choice. When everything is controlled, 
monitored and planned by the authority, there is no space for freedom of choice 
because there is no private will. Thus, failure to implement a plan or violation of a plan 
by any unit can be easily fixed through plan readjustment.  
 
Essentially, the structure of the command system extended a logic that free will 
is inefficient and prone to abuse. The freedom of contract “belongs” to a certain group 
in the power structure. The private market “takes” the power from the authority, 
disturbs the order and causes trouble. However, the reality is opposite. Although a 
central authority can plan the price, the distribution and supply of the resource, and 
output, it cannot control and manage the natural needs of the people. The free will of 
production can be socialized, but the free will of consumption is harder to control. If we 
consider a perfectly functioning central plan as a modern computer, then we would 
understand no computer can satisfy a user’s changing demands. Thus, no central plan 
system is humanly possible to adapt to the unpredictable free will of demands. The 
inherited issue with the planned system was that the central authority’s political agenda 
is incoherent and incompatible with the economic needs of the people. 
 
 The central authority can manipulate the process of production and sale to 
facilitate certain political goals, but it cannot control basic needs for individuals. 
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Essentially, the centralized command system is unsustainable because one cannot 
socialize the private will of consumption. People’s role as a consumer is incompatible 
with people’s role and function as the operator of the planned system.  
 
In a planned system, there is no sufficient institutional capacity to know or an 
incentive to know the needs of the people because people are the element to enable 
and operate goals set up by the authority, an authority without sensibility to promptly 
and efficiently respond to people’s demands. When resources are allocated for central 
planning that disregarded the needs and demands of people, shortage occurred. The 
chronic shortage under the central command economy system illustrated the failure of 
the plan, which triggered more dated plan adjustments.  
 
However, such practices all started to change when China started Reform and 
Open up, although much of the FDI regulatory framework in our discussion 
demonstrated the strong tendency of central planning. During the 1980s, Chinese EJV 
regulatory framework introduced a concept “jingji zhixu” (economic order). Economic 
order is the element built on the need for law and order because, for the first time in 
the mainland China, there would be free will by the foreign investors to compete with 
the state plan. As foreign investors cannot be “commanded” to act as a Chinese entity, 
the government needed “law” to regulate and manage the action of free will. 
Interestingly, the nature of “economic order” is more complex than it appeared to be. 
On the one hand, economic order is a legal concept derived from the needs of the 
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government to manage and control the free will of the foreign investors. Violation of the 
“economic order” would result in punishments and compensations. On the other hand, 
“economic order” is not a conventional legal concept because there is no clear 
definition of the essence of “economic order.” The central authority and regional 
authority may adopt conflicting plans, or the central authority may change its mind on 
certain plans. Thus, there is no consistency, predictability, and coherence of the 
“economic order.”   
 
In a market-based system, the market will be the source to reflect the needs and 
demands of people, which allows individual actors to make independent decisions in the 
transaction. Due to that fact that the consumer has almost no restricted freedom of 
contract besides his or her financial capacity under the market system, it requires a 
highly sophisticated and independent entity to optimize and resolve issues within 
transactions activities. A highly developed legal system and a professional legal service 
market both serve and regulate the freedom of contract under a market system. 
Without political obligation to a system, people’s freedom of contract can be only 
regulated and restricted by its financial capacity and social, legal norms and values.  
 
The evolution of China’s FDI policy and law in the context of the rule of law 
perfectly demonstrated a struggle between government legitimate regulatory interest 
for the public good, which is expressed by the central authority’s intent of maintaining 
stable, balanced, and long-term economic growth as it planned, and the interest of the 
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freedom of contract in promoting efficiency and prosperity, as expressed by 
transparent, unified market access, and fair regulatory treatment. Such struggle 
facilitates a strange narrative of “China’s exceptionalism” in defending or criticizing 
China’s FDI regulatory framework. There are two types of arguments developed during 
the past decades within the academics and investment communities.  As the second 
chapter discussed, the first type, which was popular at the beginning of the 1980s but 
now faces more questions, attributed Chinese attitude on the rule of law to Chinese 
culture, and the concept of Guanxi. The second type argues that Chinese political and 
constitutional system is incompatible with the rule of law. The “cultural argument,” 
unfortunately was a form of “cultural prejudice,” as it simplifies a problem by confusing 
the symptom and cause of the issue.  The evolution of Chinese FDI policy, and law and 
the complexity and legal creativity involved in China’s return investment are the best 
example showing that the lack of a sophisticated market economy for the past decades 
is the real reason that Chinese consumers and investors cannot fully enjoy the benefits 
of the rule of law. The development of China’s ODI and China’s Wechat economy are the 
best examples showing Chinese culture does not necessarily reject the rule of law.  
 
The second type of the argument relates to a more complex issue with the 
meaning of the rule of law. In fact, the evolution of FDI framework implied that China 
could not develop a robust foreign investment environment without the rule of law. The 
traditional pattern of Chinese FDI policy has three features: first, the centralized 
planning system produces a preferential policy for foreign investors targeting labor- 
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intensive exportation sectors. Second, a dualist legal and regulatory framework that 
insulates SOE from the competition of the market. Third, a strong and powerful central 
authority changes the market rule as it sees fit without external restriction. Under 
traditional FDI policy and law, the framework is ambiguous, unpredictable and 
unaccountable. However as the last chapter indicated, the traditional pattern has 
reached its limits.  
 
The core of the problem as the previous chapters and last chapter discussed is 
not Chinese culture, but the difficulty in understanding the relationship between 
freedom of contract and the public good. The traditional centralized planning, in 
essence, is a form of economic censorship: it curated a vision of an economic system 
that pleased the central authority by filtering and censoring any elements that the 
central authority sees unfit. The quality and effect of economic censorship are 
questionable because it cannot coordinate everyone’s desire for different things; it is 
unsustainable. Foreign investment introduces a new element to China’s economic 
censorship, as it showcased the possibility of an alternative approach to protect the 
public good. The rule of law is compatible with the desire and interests of Chinese 
people. The new economic structure in China and the new international legal 
framework produce challenges to the traditional pattern of FDI framework, but they 
also facilitate opportunities for a more sustainable, effective and less intrusive and 
disruptive regulatory system in the future.  
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Appendix  
Here is the list chronologically list foreign investment related law, policies, government 
rules, order from 1978-216:  
 
 
1978 3rd Plenary Session of 11th Central CPC   
1979 Standing Committee of NPC, Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise Law  
EJV Law  
 
Measures for the Import and Export Goods by Enterprises Doing Processing, 
Assembling and Small & Medium- Scaled Compensation Trade 
1980 State Council, Interim Regulation on Foreign Exchange Control, repealed and 
replaced by 1996 Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control  
 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Interim Regulation for certain 
questions in Implementing Measures for the Import and Export Goods by 
Enterprises Doing Processing, Assembling and Small & Medium- Scaled 
Compensation Trade, repealed in 1993 [Interim Regulation in implementing 
Measures for Compensation Trade] 
 
NPC, Income Tax Law of Sino EJV  
 
State Council, Provisions on Labour Management in Sino-Foreign EJV, repealed and 
revised by 1994 PRC Labor Law, 2001  
 
State Council, Measures on Administration of Sino-Foreign EJV Registration, 
repealed by Regulations on the Administration of Enterprise Legal Person 
Registration 
 
Standing Committee of NPC, Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress Approving the Regulations on Special Economic Zones in 
Guangdong Province 
 
Measures for Providing Short-Term Loans in Foreign Currency by the Bank of China, 
revised and repealed by 1995 Law on PRC Bank, Law on PRC Commercial Bank  
 
Interim Provisions of the State Council on the Administration of Foreign Enterprises' 
Permanent Representative Organizations 
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Rules for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law 
 
Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control 
 
1981 BOC Interim Measures on processing loan application for Sino-Foreign EJV repealed 
by 1987 BOC Measures on loan application for Foreign Invested Enterprise.   
 
General Bureau of Industry and Commerce Notice on Implementing Sino-Foreign 
EJV Registration Approval Procedure.  
 
Interim Measures on BOC Processing Loan Application by Sino-Joint EJV repealed by 
BOC FDI Loan Rules 
 
Central CPC, State Council Notice on Circulating Memorandum on Guangzhou and 
Fujian Province Special Economic Zone Working Meeting.   
 
State Council Interim Provisions on Implementing Responsibility System on 
Industrial Production, repealed in 1993 by Interim Provisions on Contractual 
Operation Responsibility System of the Enterprises Owned by Whole People  
 
 
Ministry of Finance, MOF Opinions concerning certain financial issues in Chinese 
investors’ contribution in Sino-Foreign EJV.  
 
NPC, PRC Economic Contract Law 
 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Rules for the Implementation Foreign 
Exchange Control Relating to Individuals, (repealed in 1996 by Regulation of Foreign 
Exchange Control) 
 
Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of Applications by 
Individuals for Foreign Exchange (repealed in 1996) 
1982 General Bureau of Industry and Commerce, Interim Provisions on Registration Fee 
Standard for Sino-Foreign EJV.  
 
Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of 
China for Foreign Enterprises 
  
State Council Interim Provisions on Nationwide Specialized Company  
1983 Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Ministry of Finance, China People’s Bank 
Provisions on Sino-Foreign EJV Payment of Tax and other business Transaction with 
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Enterprise or individual through cash.  
 
Report on Further Improve the FDI  
 
Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Regulations Relating to 
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Foreign-Capital Enterprises and Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
 
Implementing Regulations for the "Sino-Foreign EJV Law  
 
Interim Measures for Administration of Plan that Making Use of Foreign Investment 
 
1984 Interim Regulations on the Licensing System for Import Commodities 
 
Ministry of Labor and Personnel, Implementing Measures for the Provisions on 
Labor Management in Sino-Foreign in EJV  
 
Provisions of the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental 
Protection Concerning the Administration of Private Houses Owned by Foreigners 
Supervision and Reduced Tax for Import and Export Goods by Sino-Joint EJV  
 
Circulation of State Council Memorandum on Certain Coast Cities Meeting 
 
Shanghai Municipality Implement Measures on Approval Process for Sino-Foreign 
EJV and FDI  
 
Interim Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Reduction of and Exemption 
from Enterprise Income Tax and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax in the 
Special Economic Zones and the Fourteen Coastal Port Cities, REPEALED BY  
 
Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Enterprises 
 
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding 
the Application of Provisional Regulations on Such Taxes as Value-added Tax, 
Consumption Tax and Business Tax to Enterprises with Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Enterprises 
 
Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of 
China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises 
 
Circular of the State Council on Relevant Issues Concerning Adjusting the Taxation 
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Policy for Financial and Insurance Industries 
1985 Standing Committee of NPC, Law of the People's Republic of China on Economic 
Contracts Involving Foreign Interest 
 
 
Regulations of the People's Republic of China for the Administration of the Foreign 
Banks and Chinese-Foreign Joint Banks in the Special Economic Zones 
 
Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of Applications by 
Individuals for Foreign Exchange 
 
Implementing Rules on Punishment of Violation of Foreign Exchange Control 
 
Regulations on Administration of Contracts Introducing Technology， repealed by 
2001 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration over 
Technology Import and Export 
 
Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation Reply on Whether jointly 
managed entities financed by foreign capital provided by International Trust can be 
treated as Sino-Joint Venture Enterprise  
 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce Notice on Certain Issues Relate to 
Review Registration Application by Foreign Invested Enterprises.  
 
State Council Regulations on Border Control within Shen Zhen and Zhu Hai 
Economic Zone   
 
Notice on the Issues relate to the paid-in investment percentage of registered 
capital for Sino-Foreign EJV, repealed by 1988 Supplementary Provisions for the 
"Certain Provisions on Capital Contribution of the Parties to a Sino-Foreign Equity 
Joint Venture Enterprises" 
 
Interim Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 
Preferences for the Construction of Ports and Piers with Chinese and Foreign Joint 
Investment, repealed by 2001 Sino-Joint EJV  
 
Report on Further Promote Foreign Investment Work  
1986 Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Issue of Balance of Income and 
Expenditure in Foreign Exchange of Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
 
State Council Notice on Circulating Memorandum on Guangzhou and Fujian 
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Province Special Economic Zone Working Meeting. (1981,1986, 1990) 
 
MOF State Tax Administration Notice on Regulations on certain issues relate to 
Income Tax for Sino-Joint EJV, CJV, and WFOE.  
 
Economic and Technological Development Zone Procedure on applying and 
approving Sino-Joint EJV.  
 
State Council Notice on Further Improve the Operation Condition for FDI 
 
Regulation on WOFE, Sino-Foreign Joint Venture and CJV Application and Review  
 
Circular of Exemption from Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for export 
goods Produced by Sino-Foreign EJV and WOFE.  
 
The People's Republic of China on the Financial Administration of Foreign 
Investment Enterprises 
 
Provisions of the State Council for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment 
 
Supplementary Notice on Circular of Exemption from Consolidated Industrial and 
Commercial Tax for export goods Produced by Sino-Foreign EJV and WOFE 
 
Notice on How to Collect Tax for New Entity merged between Sino-Foreign EJV and 
Domestic Enterprises  
 
Administrative Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Land Use by Foreign-Invested 
Enterprises 
 
Official Reply on the Issue “Whether a branch of Hong Kong and Macau registered 
Bank by private Chinese individuals in SEZ can enjoy the priority of compensation   
 
1987 Reply on General Office of State Council Special Economic Zone’s Request on 
Simplify Chinese Personnel of Sino-Foreign EJV’s Application Procedure for Exit and 
Entering Chinese Border.  
 
PRC Custom Law  
 
Measures of the Bank of China Concerning the Granting of Loans to Enterprises 
with Foreign Investment 
PRC Commercial Bank Law, Guarantee Law, Contract Law,  
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State Council’s Decision on BOC Measures on Loans from Foreign Invested 
Enterprise  
 
Department of Economy and Trade, Interim Measures on Distribution of Profit for 
Chinese Investor in Sino-Foreign EJV  
 
Law on Technology Contracts, Repealed by 1999 Contract Law  
 
Administrative Measures on Chinese personnel in Sino-Foreign EJV.  
 
Notice on Strictly Review Chinese Investor’s Legal Person qualification for setting up 
Sino-Foreign EJV.  
 
Measures Concerning the Substitution of Products Manufactured by Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures and Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures for 
Similar Imported Products 
 
Supreme Court Interpretation on Application of Economic Contracts Involving 
Foreign Interest 
 
Notice on Supplement Explanation Rule for Sino-Foreign EJV Annual Finance Report  
 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Notice on Certain Issues Relate 
to Sino-Foreign EJV  
 
Notice on Certain Issues relate to Foreign Exchange rate in Sino-Foreign EJV.  
 
SH Standing Committee of NPC, Regulations of the Shanghai Municipality on Labor 
and Personnel Management in Chinese-foreign Joint Ventures 
1988 Certain Provisions on Capital Contribution of the Parties to a Sino-Foreign Equity 
Joint Venture Enterprise 
 
 Rules for the Implementation of the Regulation of the People's Republic of China 
on Administration of Technology-Introduction Contracts 
 
Interim Provision on Industry Enterprise Owned by Whole People’s Contractual 
Operation Responsibility System  
 
Resolution of the National People's Congress on the Establishment of the Hainan 
Special Economic Zone 
 
Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Enterprise Law 
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CJV Law  
  
Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the Approval and Transmission 
of the Proposals Submitted by the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Personnel 
Concerning Further Implementation of the Policy of Granting Decision-Making 
Power to Enterprises with Foreign Investment for the Employment of Working 
Personnel 
 
Circular of the State Council Concerning the Extension of the Limits of Power Vested 
with the Inland Provinces, Autonomous Regions, Municipalities Separately Listed in 
the State Plan and the Departments under the State Council Concerned with 
Examining and Approving Foreign Investment Absorption 
[Extension of Examining and Approving Power for Foreign Investment vested in 
certain entities] 
 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Notice on circulating State 
Council Extension of Power 
 
State Council Response and Comments on Percentage of Foreign Exchange Reserve 
in Special Economic Zone and Three Trial Industry.  
1989 Decision of the National People's Congress Regarding the Proposal Submitted for 
Deliberation by the State Council on Authorizing the Municipality of Shenzhen to 
Formulate Regulations and Rules for the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
 
Supplementary Notice on Issues Relate to Foreign Invested Enterprises self use for 
exported equipment and goods.  
 
Regulations on Certain Issues Relate to Processing and Assembling for Export 
Production 
Registration Issues for Company invested by WOFE, Sino-Joint EJV 
 
Regulations on Governing Trade Unions in Chinese-foreign Joint Ventures in 
Shanghai Municipality 
1990 State Administration of Foreign Exchange Replies to questions concerning 
Supplementary Rules on Chinese investors’’ profit retention in Sino-Foreign Joint 
Venture.   
 
Interim Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment in and Development of 
Plots of Land 
 
State Council 1990 Special Economic Zone Working Meeting Memorandum  
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Provisions Concerning Reduction of an Exemption from Enterprises Income Tax 
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for the Encouragement of Foreign 
Businessmen to Invest in the Shanghai Pudong New Zone,  
Replaced by Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with 
Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises 
 
Procedures of the Customs of the People's Republic of China for the Control over 
the Goods, Means of Transport and Personal Articles Entering or Leaving the 
Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone of the Shanghai Municipality 
 
Measures for the Administration of Foreign-Capital Financial Institutions and 
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Financial Institutions in the Shanghai Municipality 
 
Provisions of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce on Contracting Operations of Sino-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
 
Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Foreign-capital Enterprises 
 
Interim Provisions on the Duration of Operation of A Sino-Foreign Equity Joint 
Venture Enterprise 
 
Beijing Municipality Regulations  on Trade Unions in Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint 
Ventures Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade,  Rules for the 
Implementation of the Foreign Owned Enterprises Law, revised in (2001, 2014) 
 
1991 Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises 
 Rules Implement Income Tax Law, repealed by 2007 Enterprise Income Tax  
 
Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on Issues 
Concerning Implementation of the "Interim Provisions on the Duration of Operation 
of A Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise"  
 
Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Enterprises  
 
Measures for Implementing the Administration of Enterprise Name Registration 
 
State Council General Office, Notice on the Control of the number of Inland persons 
Travel to Hainan Special Economic Zone without proper purpose.  
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Interim Measures on RMB Denominated Special Shares Open Account  
 
Measures for the Control of Renminbi-Deno Minated Special Shares in the Shanghai 
Municipality 
 
Shen Zhen Municipality Interim Measures on RMB Denominated Special Shares 
held by Foreign Capital, Repealed by 1995 Provisions on Joint Stock Companies' 
Listing Foreign-Invested Shares in China 
Shen Zhen Rules Implement the Administration of Special Shares   
1992 Interim Measures for the Control of Renminbi-Denominated Special Shares in the 
Shenzhen, repealed by in 1995 Provisions on Joint Stock Companies' Listing Foreign-
Invested Shares in China 
 
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 
Authorizing the People's Congress of Shenzhen City and Its Standing Committee and 
the People's Government of Shenzhen City to Formulate Regulations and Rules 
Respectively for Implementation in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
 
Measures Implement Administration of Enterprise Registration  
 
Interim Measures on Administration of Export Goods. Repealed by 2001 PRC 
Regulations on the Administration over Export and Import of Goods.  
1993 Notice of Foreign Economic Relation and Trade on Review and Approve Foreign 
Invested Enterprise Contract and Article of Association in accordance with the State 
Law and Rules 
 
FERT, GBIC Letters regarding authorize local administration the power of approving 
non-manufacturing EJV project Contract and Article of Association  
 
State Council Special Economic Zone Office Provisions on Simplify the Approval 
Procedure for Chinese personnel of Foreign Invested Enterprises exit and entry the 
Border  
 
Measures for Granting Administration Authority over Registration of Foreign-
Invested Enterprises 
 
Measures for Implementing the Administration of Enterprise Name Registration 
 
Economic Contract Law 
 
Notice on WOFE, Sino-Joint EJV Certificate  
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Implementing Regulations for the "Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise Law 
 
Shen Zhen Municipality Interim Provision on RMB Special Shares Account  
 
State Council Notice on Further Improve FDI Administration  
 
Supplement Provision on FDI enforce New Accounting Rules  
 
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding 
the Application of Provisional Regulations on Such Taxes as Value-added Tax, 
Consumption Tax and Business Tax to Enterprises with Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Enterprises 
 
Interim Measures for the Administration of the Import Quota for General Goods 
1994 Implementation Rules on PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law 
 
Regulations on Administration of Financial Institutions with Foreign Capital 
 
Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots 
 
PRC Foreign Trade Law  
 
State Planning Committee, State Foreign Exchange Administration Notice on 
Certain Issues Relate to FDI Financing Guaranteed by Chinese Entities  
 
Supreme People’s Court Reply to Issues on Chinese investor’s  Plaintiff status when 
the controlling shareholder of a Sino-Joint EJV is a foreign investor who has special 
interest with the defendant in the outcome of a litigation     
1995 Interim Provisions on Certain Issues Concerning the Establishment of Foreign-
Invested Joint Stock Companies 
 
Circular of the MOFERT Concerning Foreign Investment Absorption with BOT  
 
MOF, Bureau of State Land Administration, Circular Concerning Payment of Land 
Use Fee by Foreign Invested Enterprises    
 
MOFERT Interim Provisions on the Establishment of Investment Companies by 
Foreign Investors  
  
Opinions on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of Regulation on Corporation 
Registration on Foreign Invested Enterprises 
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Interim Measures for the Administration of the Operation of Import Goods 
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint 
Venture Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China 
 
Circular of General Office of the State Council on Review and Approval of Foreign 
Invested Enterprises  
 
Standing Committee of NPC Explanation on the Jurisdiction of SEZ Regulation   
 
Provisions on Joint Stock Companies' Listing Foreign-Invested Shares in China 
1996 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Control 
 
MOFERT Explanations on certain Issues under Interim Provisions on the 
Establishment of Investment Companies by Foreign Investors  
 
Implementing Details of the Provisions on Domestically-Listed Shares of 
Shareholding Companies Owned by Foreign Investors 
 
Implementing Details of the Examination and Approval over Establishing Foreign-
Invested Enterprises  
 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Measures for Liquidation of 
Foreign-Invested Enterprises 
 
Regulations of Shanghai Municipality on the Examination and Approval over 
Foreign-Invested Enterprises, Decision of the Standing Committee of the Shanghai 
Municipal People's Congress on Temporarily Adjusting the Application of Relevant 
Local Regulations of Shanghai Municipality in the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone 
 
Explanations of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on the 
Application of Several Provisions of the Detailed Rules of Implementation of the 
Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 
 
Principles and Procedures for Review and Approval of Foreign Invested Enterprises 
in Certain Industry  
1997 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Control 
 
Reply on Issues Concerning the Appropriate Authority in Approving FDI Project  
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Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy 
 
Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Immediate Cease Approval of 
Foreign-Invested Commercial Enterprises by local authority  
 
Clearing Up and Rectifying Cases Involving Non-pilot Foreign-invested Commercial 
Enterprises 
 
Certain Provisions on Change of the Equity Interests of the Investors of A Foreign-
Invested Enterprise 
 
Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Clearing Up and Rectifying 
Cases Involving Non-pilot Foreign-invested Commercial Enterprises 
 
Supplementary Provisions for the "Certain Provisions on Capital Contribution of the 
Parties to a Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Enterprise" 
1998 SPC Official Reply on Liquidation Issues in adjudicating Sino-Foreign EJV Contract 
Dispute  
 
Notice on implement Assembling and Processing Export Trade Certification 
 
Notice on Rescind Authority of approving EJV.   
 
Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Clearing Up and Rectifying 
Cases Involving Non-pilot Foreign-invested Commercial Enterprises 
Notice on Certain Issues Concerning Sino-Foreign EJV  Tax Refund Rates for Exports  
 
Interim Provisions on  the Asset Restructuring of State-Owned Enterprises Utilizing 
Foreign Investment 
 
Official Reply on Registration Issue for Entity of the Chinese Enterprise's contractual 
operation of a EJV 
1999 Administrative Measures on Assembling and Processing Export Trade, 
 
Interim Measures on Administration of Examination and Approval of Domestic Sale 
Regarding Imported Materials and Parts in Bond Under Processing Trade 
 
Measures on the Pilot Project for Foreign-invested Commercial Enterprises the 
Asset Restructuring of State-Owned Enterprises Utilizing Foreign Investment 
  
Opinion on Further Promote Foreign Investment  
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MOF Supplementary Provisions on the Establishment of Investment Companies by 
Foreign Investors  
 
Rules Regarding Foreign Invested Enterprises change into a domestic enterprises 
and Domestic Enterprises Change into a Foreign Invested Enterprises.  
 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the State Administration 
for Industry and Commerce， Rules on Merger and Division of Foreign Invested 
Enterprises 
 
Measures for Implementing the Administration of Enterprise Name Registration 
2000 Zhejiang Province Circular Opinion on Utilizing Foreign Investment  
2001 Notice of the State Economic and Trade Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation and the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce on Further Clearing Up and Rectifying Non-Pilot Foreign-Invested 
Commercial Enterprises  
 
Certain Opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and 
China Securities Regulatory Commission on Foreign Investment Issues Involved in 
Listed Companies 
 
11/26 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Anti-dumping and Anti-
subsidy 
 
Administrative Regulations for Foreign Law Firms' Representative Organizations in 
China 
2002 Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning the Implementation of New Foreign-Invested 
Industry Policies 
 
Rules for the Establishment of Foreign-Shared Securities Companies 
 
Provisions of the Ministry of Justice Regarding the Implementation of the 
"Administrative Regulations for Foreign Law Firms' Representative Organizations in 
China" 
2003 Provisions on Foreign Investors' Merger with and Acquisition of Domestic 
Enterprises 
 
Reply of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on Issues concerning 
Registration for Change of Legal Representatives of Foreign-Invested Enterprises 
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Provisions on the Establishment of Investment Companies by Foreign Investors 
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